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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
 
ABSTRACT 
THIS INTRODUCTION PRESENTS THE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTED BY THE BOOK AS THE 
GRAFTING OF THE TOOLS ELABORATED BY THE 
ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE LEGACY OF JOSEPH 
SCHUMPETER TO EXPLORE THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE 
CORPORATE GROWTH REGIME. IT FRAMES THE 
INNOVATION PROCESS AS A CREATIVE RESPONSE BASED 
UPON THE ACCUMULATION, GENERATION AND 
EXPLOITATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND HIGHLIGHTS THE 
NEW STRUCTURE OF ADVANCED ECONOMIES WHERE 
KNOWLEDGE IS AT THE SAME TIME THE PRIME INPUT AND 
OUTPUT. IT EMPHASISES THE LIMITS OF THE NEW 
KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIME, RAISED BY THE ROLE OF 
FINANCE, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RECOMMENDS APPROPRIATE 
ECONOMIC POLICIES BASED UPON AN OPEN TECHNOLOGY 
APPROACH. 
 
KEY WORDS: ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE; KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY; SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH REGIMES; OPEN 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
The economic profession is reluctant to understand the aggregate and 
macroeconomic implications of the radical structural discontinuity brought 
about by the transition to the knowledge economy and the challenges raised 
by the central role of knowledge as an economic good. The decline of the 
industrial economy and the transition to the knowledge economy in 
advanced countries take place amid several difficulties. A major effort is 
necessary to understand this transition as a radical structural change that 
questions not only the working of the economy of advanced countries, but 
also the foundations of both economic analysis and economic policy 
(Kuznets, 1971).  
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Here the quote from the Obituary of John Maynard Keynes by Joseph 
Schumpeter seems most appropriate: “The social vision first revealed in the 
Economic Consequences of the Peace, the vision of an economic process in 
which investment opportunity flags and saving habits nevertheless persist, 
is theoretically implemented in the General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money (Preface dated December 13, 1935) by means of three schedule 
concepts: the consumption function, the efficiency-of-capital function, and 
the liquidity-preference function. These together with the given wage-unit 
and the equally given quantity of money “determine” income and ipso facto 
employment (if and so far as the latter is uniquely determined by the 
former), the great dependent variables to be “explained.” What a cordon 
bleu to make such a sauce out of such scanty material ……This permits 
many otherwise inadmissible simplifications: for instance, it permits 
treating employment as approximately proportional to income (output) so 
that the one is determined as soon as the other is. But it limits applicability 
of this analysis to a few years at most- perhaps the duration of the “40 
months’ cycle” -and, in terms of phenomena, to the factors that would 
govern the greater or smaller utilization of an industrial apparatus if the 
latter remains unchanged. All the phenomena incident to the creation and 
change in this apparatus, that is to say, the phenomena that dominate the 
capitalist processes, are thus excluded from consideration.” (Schumpeter, 
1946:510-512) 
 
Schumpeter discussing the merit of the Marxian Doctrine acknowledged 
that: “As a matter of fact, capitalist economy is not and cannot be stationary. 
Nor is it merely expanding in a steady manner. It is incessantly being 
revolutionized from within by new enterprise, i.e., by the intrusion of new 
commodities or new methods of production or new commercial 
opportunities into the industrial structure as it exists at any moment. Any 
existing structures and all the conditions of doing business are always in a 
process of change. Every situation is being upset before it has had time to 
work itself out. Economic progress, in capitalist society, means turmoil. 
And, as we shall see in the next part, in this turmoil competition works in a 
manner completely different from the way it would work in a stationary 
process, however perfectly competitive. Possibilities of gains to be reaped 
by producing new things or by producing old things more cheaply are 
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constantly materializing and calling for new investments. These new 
products and new methods compete with the old products and old methods 
not on equal terms but at a decisive advantage that may mean death to the 
latter. This is how “progress” comes about in capitalist society. In order to 
escape being undersold, every firm is in the end compelled to follow suit, to 
invest in its turn and, in order to be able to do so, to plow back part of its 
profits, i.e., to accumulate. Thus, everyone else accumulates.” Schumpeter 
(1942: 32) 
 
The Ecole de la regulation has contributed much to exploring the dynamics 
of transformation as a process punctuated by radical technological and 
structural changes. According to Michel Aglietta: “The study of a 
movement, moreover, is the study of a change of state. If a system is 
described as dynamic, then the constitutive relationships of the system must 
have a logic of internal transformation. To conceive of the regulation of a 
system transforming itself in this way is to see the changes that occur in its 
relationship as such that these relationships can always be organized in to a 
system….There is no a priori reason why a transformation must be more 
than a ‘plastic transformation’ of the relationships that structure the system; 
if this were so, then continuity would be assured and reproduction would be 
simple. But when actual social systems are studies, historical experience 
confirms that transformation means rupture, qualitative change” (Aglietta, 
1976/2000:12-13).  
 
Schumpeterian scholars, as Freeman and Louca, exploring the long term 
transformation of advanced economies note that: "The structural 
transformation arising from these new industries, services, products and 
technologies is inevitably associated with the combination of organizational 
innovations needed to design, use, produce, and distribute them" (Freeman 
and Louçã, 2001:147).  
 
All changes in the structure, organization, technology and knowledge 
governance are intertwined not only at the firm level, but also and primarily 
at the system level and reshape the entire architecture of interactions and 
transactions with major effects on both upward and downward 
complementarities (Dopfer et al., 2015).  
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The economics of knowledge provides the tools to analyze not only 
knowledge as a peculiar economic good but also the processes by means of 
which it is generated, accumulated and exploited. The advances of the 
economics of knowledge enable to implement a systematic investigation of 
the causes and consequences of the use of knowledge in society not only at 
the microeconomic level but also at the macroeconomic and meso level. The 
economics of knowledge is indispensable to grasp the working of the 
knowledge economy (Hayek, 1945; Arrow, 1962; Metcalfe, 2014). 
  
The depth and width of the technological and structural changes that are 
occurring in advanced economies justify their analysis in a context of radical 
discontinuity that requires the understanding of the system dynamics at 
work. The identification of the stylized facts seems most useful to articulate 
an analytical framework that helps understanding it. The knowledge 
economy is characterized by the central role of the production and use of 
knowledge. Knowledge is both the central input and output of the economic 
activity. Knowledge based services constitute the bulk of both the demand 
and the supply. Not only final goods are more and more constituted by 
knowledge intensive services. Supply also is more and more based on 
knowledge intensive services that are used as intermediary inputs for the 
eventual production of all the other goods. Advanced countries specialize in 
the production of knowledge-based services as both capital and 
intermediary inputs and final goods that are imported from industrialized 
countries where the production of both capital and final goods takes place. 
Manufacturing industry declines sharply to about a 10% share of the 
economy while the share of Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) 
grow –often at a slower pace- towards the 10%. The traditional share of the 
manufacturing industry is replaced by the combination of advanced 
manufacturing cum KIBS (Antonelli and Fassio, 2014 and 2016).  
 
The new knowledge economy is intrinsically light: the capital intensity of 
the production process of knowledge intensive business services is low and 
much lower than the capital intensity of the production processes of the 
manufacturing industries. The composition of capital also changes as the 
fixed component declines sharply and is partly compensated by the increase 
of the intensity of knowledge capitalized as an asset. The substitution of 
KIBS to the manufacturing industries affects the aggregate figures and 
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triggers the reduction of the capital intensity at the aggregate level with 
effects in terms of the levels of investments and productivity.  
 
The emergence of knowledge economy rests upon a bundle of distinct and 
yet highly intertwined processes: i) the globalization of product markets; ii) 
the globalization of financial markets; iii) the diffusion of new information 
and communication technologies (ICT); iv) the introduction of directed 
technological change biased towards the intensive use of locally abundant 
factors, i.e. in advanced countries, knowledge; v) the decline of the fixed 
capital intensity; vi) the apparent decline of output and productivity growth; 
vii) the increasing levels of income and wealth inequality; viii) the 
increasing privatization and capitalization of knowledge. Let us analyze 
them briefly in turn. 
 
The globalization of international product markets has exposed advanced 
countries to the competition of new industrializing countries endowed with 
a large supply of cheap labor.  The globalization of financial markets has 
increased the access of industrializing countries to a large supply of 
financial resources. The sequential combination of the globalization of 
product and financial markets has accelerated the emergence of the 
knowledge economy. Advanced countries discovered that their international 
competitive advantage could not rely any longer upon high levels of 
intensity of fixed capital. The international variance of availability and 
rental costs of capital declined rapidly. Industrializing countries could 
access and use financial resources at costs and conditions that quickly 
converged towards the –favorable- levels that were once available 
exclusively in advanced countries. The twin globalization of product and 
financial markets shook the foundations of the traditional division of labor 
undermining the competitive advantage based on high capital intensity and 
induced the introduction of biased technological change directed towards 
the intensive use of knowledge i.e. the production factor that emerged as 
relatively cheaper in advanced economies with respect to the rest of the 
globalized economy. Advanced countries experienced a dramatic shrinking 
of their manufacturing industry no longer able to compete with the efficient 
and highly (fixed) capital intensive supply by industrializing and industrial 
countries (Bloom, Draca, Van Reenen, 2016; Kogan et al., 2017).  
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The multinational growth of the large companies of advanced countries 
played a twin role in the process: i) it favored the rapid displacement of 
manufacturing industry towards industrializing countries enhancing the 
transfer of technological competence and favoring the export of their output 
to the domestic markets of advanced countries; ii) accelerated the pace to 
the knowledge economy with the ‘headquarter effect’ by means of which 
the knowledge intensive functions of the corporations based in the home 
countries became the hub of the new knowledge-based specialization of 
advanced countries. 
 
ICT are the pillar of the knowledge economy. Their introduction and 
diffusion enabled the mobilization of and the interactive access to the large 
stock of quasi-public knowledge embedded in the economy of advanced 
countries. The systematic use of ICT enabled to increase the knowledge 
connectivity of the system reducing drastically knowledge absorption costs 
and favored the repeated use of knowledge as an input into the generation 
of new knowledge. ICT enabled the industrialization of the recombinant 
generation of new knowledge favoring the division of knowledge labor, the 
specialization and the participation of an increasing variety of agents 
embodied with different and yet complementary knowledge items to its 
generation, the opportunities for knowledge transactions and interactions in 
emerging knowledge markets and along user-producer interactions, with the 
eventual sharp increase in the efficiency of knowledge generation (Antonelli 
et al., 2000; Antonelli, 2017c). 
 
The rich endowment of the knowledge stock, in terms of both size and 
variety, the high quality of the knowledge governance practices and the 
favorable conditions of its access and use, based upon respectively upon the 
limited exhaustibility of knowledge and its limited appropriability, provided 
advanced economies with the opportunity to implement a new specialization 
based on the intensive use of knowledge as a key good that is at the same 
time an input and an output. The competitive advantage of advanced 
countries could rely upon the low comparative costs of knowledge that 
supported the fast introduction of directed technological change biased 
towards the intensive use of knowledge.  
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The capability of industrializing countries to accumulate and access the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge that characterizes the advanced countries 
is in fact much lower. The Leontieff paradox experienced by the US 
economy, well before the globalization of financial markets, generalized to 
the rest of advanced countries. The specialization of rich, capital abundant 
countries, in skill intensive activities with high levels of knowledge content, 
experienced by the US as the leading country in the international innovation 
race, spread to the countries that the twin globalization eventually exposed 
to the erosion of the traditional foundations of their competitive advantage 
based upon the relative abundance of capital (Antonelli and Fassio, 2011; 
Antonelli and Colombelli, 2011b). 
 
The fast globalization of product and financial markets under way since the 
end of the 20°century has been affecting in depth labor markets. The 
dynamics of factor costs equalization triggers in fact the decline of industrial 
wages and employment in capital abundant countries, together with their 
increase in labor abundant ones. The introduction of new technologies 
however can change the direction of the process as long as it is able to 
expand the frontier of possible outputs in capital abundant countries and 
contrast the fall of wages.  
 
When and if, technological change is directed, however, the change of the 
frontier does not take place as a radial expansion that affects equally all the 
output combinations, and concentrates upon activities characterized by high 
barriers to entry and specific job requirements, the dynamics of factor costs 
equalization triggers the segmentation of labor markets. Standard labor 
employed in the manufacturing industries is fully exposed to the decline of 
wages and of job opportunities with increasing levels of unemployment. In 
the markets for skilled and creative workers, instead, wages are resilient at 
pre-globalization levels and and job opportunities increase. 
 
The organization of the generation and exploitation of knowledge has 
experienced radical transformations in the last decades. The vertical 
integration of knowledge generation activities within large corporations has 
been progressively substituted by venture capitalism and the emergence of 
a knowledge industry specializing both in the provision of KIBS and in the 
generation of knowledge capital. Corporations outsource the generation of 
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knowledge and rely more and more on both specialized suppliers of 
knowledge intensive services and the acquisition of high tech start-ups in 
financial markets. 
 
The generation and use of knowledge as the key input and output of 
advanced economies seems characterized by high levels of: i) skilled labor 
intensity and low levels of fixed capital intensity; ii) high frequency of 
interactions: not only vertical interactions between bottom-up learning 
processes that enable the accumulation of competence and top-down 
technological applications of scientific knowledge, and between users and 
producers, but also horizontal between public and academic research and 
small high-tech start-ups sponsored by venture capitalism. The knowledge 
economy relies upon the intensity of recombination of the variety of 
knowledge items held by each unit in the system.    
 
The path to towards the knowledge economy based upon the central 
economic role of knowledge has major structural implications for advanced 
economies:  
i) The shift away from an industrial economy based upon a strong 
manufacturing industry in terms of sectoral composition of the economy, 
with the decline of the manufacturing industry and the rise of the knowledge 
intensive business services. The share of employment in the manufacturing 
industry of advanced countries started its decline since the late years of the 
XX century. In UK it declined from the 15.7% of 1995 to 9.6% in 2007, in 
France in the same time interval from 15.0% to 11.5%, in the Netherlands 
from 12.9% to 9.6%.  The crisis of 2007 had only marginal effects on the 
process: in UK the share of employment in manufacturing in 2014 dropped 
to 8.1%, in France to 9.9%, in the Netherlands to 8.8%. The share of 
manufacturing in investments drops even more sharply in the same time 
interval. In the UK it drops from 11.6% in 1996 to 5.6% in 2007 and 6.2% 
in 2014, in France from 10.8% to 7.2% in 2007 to 6.9% in 2014, in the 
Netherlands from 9.8% in 1995 to 5.8 in 2007 to 5.9% in 2013; 
 ii) The increasing role of KIBS substitutes and complements the smaller 
manufacturing industry. The vertical disintegration of the generation of 
knowledge and the emergence of a knowledge industry at the core of the 
KIBS has major implications at the system level in terms of faster rates of 
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generation of technological knowledge and hence introduction of 
innovations. 
 
The strong increase of the share of intangible assets in the total asset value 
of the S&P 500 firms from the 16.8% of 1975 to 79.70% in 2005 (Pagano 
and Rossi, 2009) can be considered, coeteris paribus the relative inputs 
price, a reliable clue of the strong bias of technological change directed 
towards the introduction of knowledge intensive and fixed capital saving 
technologies. 
 
After two decades from its preliminary emergence, the transition to the 
knowledge economy reveals to be more problematic than expected. The 
demise of the Fordist model takes place among delays and negative 
reactions. The radical decline of the manufacturing industry as the heart of 
the economy engenders major problems in labor markets with strong 
mismatches between demand and supply in terms of skills and competences. 
The intensive dynamics of factor costs equalization, stemming from the 
strong competition in global product markets raised by low-wage, labor 
abundant large economies, triggers, in advanced countries the sharp decline 
of the wage levels of standard labor that coupled to labor markets rigidities 
leads to the persistent exclusion from the labor markets of a large share of 
former manufacturing workers with low opportunities for reskilling and to 
a significant increase of long-term unemployment. At the same time the 
supply of creative manpower able to participate in the growth of KIBS is 
scarce because of relevant barriers to entry and mobility, with significant 
effects on income levels where wages are augmented by the participation to 
the wealth generated by knowledge. The segmentation of the labor markets 
and the raising levels of wage and rent inequality are the consequence of the 
increasing role of the new mechanisms of generation and exploitation of 
knowledge. The rates of growth of output and productivity in the knowledge 
intensive sectors parallel the systematic decline of aggregate output and 
productivity growth triggered by the decline of manufacturing sectors and 
increasing levels of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth.  
 
This book elaborates the hypothesis that this aggregate dynamics are the 
consequence of the radical structural change that is taking place within 
advanced economics with the transformation from industrial into 
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knowledge economics, stirred by the fast globalization of product and 
capital markets, the identification of a new specialization based upon the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge and the segmentation of labor 
markets with important effects in terms of increasing levels of wage, rent 
and income inequality. A growing and yet unequal knowledge economy is 
emerging as the core of advanced economic systems.   
 
This interpretation contrasts the hypothesis that advanced countries are 
experiencing a secular stagnation brought about by the decline of the rates 
of technological change (Cowen, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Summers, 2014; 
Mazzucato and Jacobs, 2016; Gordon, 2016; Franzini, Pianta, 2016; Bloom 
et al.,2017). The rest of the book elaborates the hypothesis that a radical 
structural change is taking place. The hypotheses about the secular 
stagnation of advanced economies recently and the decline of the 
productivity of research activities seem to be influenced by the poor 
appreciation of the role of knowledge not only as a capital (intangible) input, 
but also as a capitalized output.  
 
The notion of Schumpeterian growth regime becomes necessary to 
understand the structural transformation of advanced economies. The 
discontinuity experienced by advanced economies since the last decade of 
the XX century can be fruitfully analyzed as the consequence of the shift 
from a mode of organizing the generation, exploitation and accumulation of 
knowledge centered upon the industrial corporation to a new mode based 
upon a specialized knowledge industry.  
 
Schumpeterian growth regimes are identified by the alternative sets of 
systemic conditions and coordination modes at the microeconomic, 
mesoeconomic, macroeconomic and institutional levels that shape both the 
out-of-equilibrium conditions that stir the reaction of firms, the size and 
variety of the stock of knowledge embedded in the system,  and the quality 
of the systemic mechanisms of knowledge governance that support the 
generation, exploitation, appropriation and accumulation of knowledge and 
the generation of the endogenous knowledge externalities upon which the 
creative response and the consequent introduction of innovation is 
contingent (Antonelli, 2017a, 2018c).   
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The integration of the recent advances of the economics of knowledge with 
the Schumpeterian legacy enables to elaborate and apply the notion of 
Schumpeterian Growth Regime to understand how the structure of the 
system shapes the mechanisms of generation, appropriation, exploitation 
and accumulation of knowledge that in turn shape the creative response of 
firms, that changes product and factor markets, the structural characteristics 
of the system and its macroeconomic performances. 
 
According to the Schumpeterian framework of analysis of the creative 
response, in fact, firms try and innovate to cope with emerging mismatches 
between expected and actual factor and product market conditions 
(Schumpeter, 1947). Technological knowledge is the key factor of the 
innovative activity of an economic system. The chances that firms can 
implement a creative response that supports the rate of introduction of 
innovations depends upon their learning capabilities and the levels of 
pecuniary knowledge externalities i.e. upon the conditions at which they can 
access and use technological knowledge in order to cope with the 
mismatches between expected and actual product and factor market 
conditions.  
 
When the structural and institutional conditions of the system make the 
generation of new knowledge too expensive, firms can only implement 
adaptive responses and move on the map of existing isoquants. When, 
instead, the size and variety of the stock of knowledge is large and the 
structural and institutional conditions of the economic system, including its 
mechanisms of knowledge and learning governance, enable the access and 
its use at low costs and, consequently, pecuniary knowledge externalities 
are large, firms are able to implement a creative reaction and introduce 
innovations.  
 
The process may exhibit strong elements of path dependent complexity: at 
each point in time the lower is the cost of knowledge and the larger the 
chances that the creative response of firms takes place. In this case firms in 
order to introduce innovations, generate additional flows of technological 
knowledge that add to the stock of quasi-public knowledge that -because of 
its limited exhaustibility and appropriability- under the condition that the 
quality of the knowledge governance mechanisms at work in the system do 
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not decline, can be accessed and used at lower costs. The introduction of 
innovations triggers new out-of-equilibrium conditions in both product and 
factor markets that in turn stir the response of firms. Because of the 
increased size and variety of the stock of quasi-public knowledge, 
augmented by the flows of new knowledge, for given quality of the 
knowledge governance mechanism, pecuniary knowledge externalities are 
larger and the chances that the response of firms, at time t+1, is larger, are 
stronger. A virtuous loop of positive feedbacks, based upon the limited 
exhaustibility and appropriability of knowledge that trigger pecuaniry 
extrernalities, can last until the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanisms does not decay. 
 
Productivity growth and hence economic growth is possible only when and 
if the potentialities for dynamic increasing returns, intrinsic to the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of knowledge and especially its limited 
exhaustibility, cumulability and extensibility, are exploited (Antonelli, 
2017a and 2018c). 
 
The properties of knowledge as an economic good, and specifically its 
limited appropriability, exhaustibility and tradability and the idiosyncratic, 
systemic and contingent conditions and characteristics of the mechanisms 
that implement its generation, use and exploitation qualify the 
Schumpeterian growth regimes and are key to grasping the ultimate 
determinants of growth and change. 
 
The new knowledge economy can be regarded as the new emerging 
Schumpeterian regime based upon a new mode of organizing the generation, 
exploitation and accumulation of knowledge elaborated by advanced 
economies to take advantage of the competitive advantage provided by their 
unique endowment of a large stock of knowledge accumulated through time 
because of its limited exhaustibility. The knowledge economy of advanced 
economics is based upon the unique conditions to accessing and using the 
stock of knowledge as an input and is specialized in the provision of 
knowledge flows generated by the new emerging knowledge industries to 
the rest of the world economy.  
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The radical structural change based upon the shift away from manufacturing 
industry and the specialization in the generation and use of knowledge has 
a strong impact on the whole range of economic activities. Intangible 
investments become the central driver of production. Tangible investments 
consist in the actual purchase of physical capital goods that are being 
produced by an array of specialized industries. Intangible investments are 
but the capitalization of the expenditures consisting mainly if not 
exclusively of creative labor costs and their knowledge output. On the 
output side knowledge as a financial asset is becoming one of the main 
products of economic activity. Yet, in the current accounting procedures, it 
is not recorded as such: it leads directly to the increase of wealth rather than 
value added. 
 
These changes are not properly reflected by the current accounting 
methodologies.  The capitalization of knowledge is the cause of a specific 
and poorly investigated mis-measurement problems that do not stem from 
the problems associated with the prices of high tech product but with the 
correct appreciation of the role of the capitalized knowledge not only as an 
input, but also as an output in national accounts (Byrne, Fernald, Reinsdorf, 
2016).  
 
The increase of intangible capital stock as an input in fact does not parallel 
the inclusion on the output side of the increasing amount of wealth generated 
by the capitalization of knowledge. Accounting methodologies, are more 
and more able to take into accounts the changing mix of inputs in the 
production function that is shifting away from the traditional mix of two 
fundamental inputs -the stock of machines and labor- to a mix of three basic 
factors: tangible capital goods, labor and the stock of knowledge capital. On 
the output side, however, although the increasing amount of knowledge, 
capitalized as a financial asset, plays an increasing role, accounting 
methodologies have not yet made the necessary progress in handling the 
new role of intangible outputs.  
 
The consolidation of the knowledge growth regime as the new institutional 
base of advanced countries and the evidence about their radical 
transformation with the demise of the corporate growth regime and the 
parallel collapse of the middle class call for a political economy approach 
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able to stretch the scope of investigation of the economics of knowledge to 
enquire about the new emerging social organization of the knowledge 
growth regime (Jones, 2002).  
 
The command of the economics of knowledge and the stretching of its 
heuristics to the analysis at the system level enables to understand the 
mechanisms that are at the heart of the transformation of the old industrial 
economies into knowledge economies. The notion of Schumpeterian 
Growth Regimes is indispensable to grasp the depth of this structural change 
into the knowledge economy as it enables to grasp the central role of 
knowledge as the engine of growth and the changing mechanisms of 
knowledge governance.  
 
The analysis of the generation of technological knowledge as a recombinant 
process based upon the stock of non-exhaustible knowledge, cumulated 
through time, and its shift from the corporation to the new knowledge 
industries calls attention on the increasing levels of income inequality. The 
new mechanisms of exploitation of knowledge are associated with 
increasing levels of wage and rent inequalities. Creative workers able to 
generate and appropriate new technological knowledge can enjoy resilient 
wages and income share augmented by their direct participation to the rent 
associate to the capitalization of knowledge. The wages and employment 
levels of standard labor are doomed to a systematic decline driven by the 
dynamics of factor costs equalization triggered by the entry in the 
globalizing product markets of the exports from low-wage and labor 
abundant large economies. 
 
At the same time, it is clear that the strong exclusivity of the current 
intellectual property right (IPR) regime limits the width and the depth of the 
recombinant process upon which the generation of new knowledge rests. 
The identification of an appropriability trade-off between the need to secure 
appropriate levels of incentives to the generation of technological 
knowledge and the need to extend its accessibility in order to reduce the cost 
of knowledge recombination, requires new solutions. 
 
The knowledge economy seems more and more trapped by the 
contradictions of the appropriability trade-off. The positive consequences of 
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the limited appropriability and exhaustibility of knowledge seem larger than 
its negative ones in terms of reduced incentives. The negative effects of 
anticommons are becoming more and more apparent together with the 
increasing role of knowledge as the central input and output of the new 
economic system.  
 
These processes call attention on the need to shape a new knowledge policy 
that is able to overcome the limits of the knowledge economy in terms of 
increasing income inequality and excess exclusivity of IPR. The results of 
the Schumpeterian analysis of the knowledge economy have strong 
implications to advocate a new knowledge policy based upon not only on 
Open Science, but also on Open Technology. A new knowledge policy 
should be based upon the reduction of the exclusivity of knowledge 
ownership augmented by the current (IPR) regime (Posner, 2005; Stiglitz, 
2008) and the incentives to increase the rates of accumulation of knowledge.  
 
In this context it seems more and more important to contrast the trends 
towards the increased privatization of IPR. The enforcement in March 1994 
of the Agreement of Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs Agreement) and the recent US patent reform led to the strengthening 
of IPR and their globalization. This enhanced privatization of knowledge 
can be regarded as one of the main institutional changes that characterize 
the new knowledge economy. Many have compared the current trends 
towards the reinforcement and extension of IPR to the enclosure of common 
land that preceded and actually enabled the Industrial Revolution (Gallini, 
2002; Pagano, 2014; Pagano Rossi, 2009; Aghion, Howitt, Prantl, 2015).  
 
While land enclosures had positive effects on economic growth, knowledge 
enclosures risk to undermine the basis of growth. The enclosure of 
knowledge on the one hand strengthens the market power of the specialized 
suppliers of knowledge, but on the other reduces the access to the stock of 
existing knowledge and hence curbs the rate of the recombinant generation 
of new knowledge and increases dramatically the market price of knowledge 
for downstream users. The viability of the knowledge growth regime rests 
upon the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms based upon the fine 
tuning of the appropriability trade-off, the appreciation of the role of the 
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limited exhaustibility of knowledge and new mechanism of social and 
economic inclusion that limit its intrinsic exclusivity.  
 
The rest of the book is organized as it follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
achievements of the economics of knowledge showing the rich implications 
for macroeconomic analysis of its microeconomic foundations. Chapter 3 
provides a unifying framework that integrates the Schumpeterian creative 
response and the localized technological change approaches stressing the 
central role of knowledge and explores its implications to grasping the 
knowledge intensive direction of technological change and the 
capitalization of knowledge. Chapter 4 presents the notion of Schumpeterian 
Growth Regimes with special attention to the evolution from the 
entrepreneurial growth regime to the corporate growth regime and finally to 
the knowledge growth regime. Chapter 5 presents a political economy 
approach to the knowledge growth regime. Chapter 6 elaborates the 
foundations for a new knowledge policy, indispensable to cope with the 
intrinsic weaknesses of the knowledge growth regime, based upon the 
introduction of non-exclusive IPR that implement the role of knowledge as 
an essential facility in an Open Technology approach.   The conclusions 
summarize the main results of the analysis stressing the role of the 
economics of knowledge to understand the foundations and the working of 
the knowledge economy.   
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2.THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
ABSTRACT. THIS CHAPTER SUMMARIZES THE MAIN 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 
WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE 
LIMITED EXHAUSTIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF CUMULABILITY AND 
EXTENSIBILITY. IT RECALLS THE EARLY ECONOMICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE. IT EXPLORES THE GENERATION AND 
EXPLOITATION OF KNOWLEDGE WITH THE TECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND THE KNOWLEDGE 
GENERATION FUNCTION. IT ELABORATES THE 
KNOWLEDGE APPROPRIABILITY TRADE-OFF, ANALYSES 
THE PROBLEMS OF THE PROVISION OF FUNDS TO 
INNOVATION, HIGHLIGHTS THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
KNOWLEDGE EXTERNALITIES AND TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY STRESSING THE NEW TRENDS TOWARDS 
THE CAPITALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE AS A FINANCIAL 
ASSET. 
 
KEY WORDS: LIMITED APPROPRIABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE; 
LIMITED EXHAUSTIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE; KNOWLEDGE 
ACCUMULATION; KNOWLEDGE GENERATION AND 
EXPLOITATION; KNOWLEDGE AND IMITATION  
EXTERNALITIES; TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTION FUNCTION; 
KNOWLEDGE GENERATION FUCNTION; GENERAL 
INTELLECT. 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge is the primary economic good: it differs however from ordinary 
economic goods as it is characterized by specific and highly idiosyncratic 
properties such as its limited appropriability, exhaustibility and tradability, 
that stress the central role of the systemic and contingent conditions that 
shape its generation, use and exploitation and qualify the Schumpeterian 
growth regimes as they are key to grasping the ultimate determinants of 
growth and change. 
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The emergence and consolidation in advanced countries of the knowledge 
economy makes the analysis of knowledge as an economic good especially 
relevant. The economics of knowledge has developed a rich set of tools that 
now allow us to deepen the study of the mechanisms of generation, use and 
exploitation of knowledge, both at the micro and the meso level and to 
understand the working of the knowledge economy at large (Antonelli and 
David, 2015; Antonelli and Link, 2015).  
The microeconomics of knowledge has made major progresses so as to 
provide an articulated and inclusive framework that enables to grasp the 
determinants of the growth of firms. The achievements of the 
microeconomics of knowledge are so relevant that they deserve to be 
applied as a tool of investigation to grasp the dynamics of economic systems 
at the meso and macro level. 
 
The microeconomics of knowledge has provided the foundations to 
articulate the hypothesis that knowledge in highly specific and qualified 
conditions is the primary source of total factor productivity growth. The 
appreciation of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge, next to its limited 
appropriability, has in fact provided the foundations of a new understanding 
of the working of the system at the aggregate level based upon the 
accumulation and eventual access to knowledge stocks. 
 
The rest of this chapter recalls the key steps of the advances of the 
microeconomics of knowledge from the focus on the limited appropriability 
of knowledge to the discovery of its limited exhaustibility and explores its 
implications for economic analysis and policy at the aggregate level. 
 
2.2 THE EARLY ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE  
The early microeconomics of knowledge was based upon the analysis of the 
economic properties of knowledge as an economic good introduced by 
Kenneth Arrow (1962a and 1969). According to Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962a) knowledge is an economic good characterized by intrinsic low 
levels of appropriability and excludability. Negligible reproduction costs 
compared to high generation costs worsen the risks of uncontrolled leakage 
and reduce the opportunity for inventors to take advantage of their 
inventions.  
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In its first stage the economics of knowledge focused the attention on the 
negative consequences of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the low levels 
of knowledge appropriability in terms of the market failure stemming from 
the limited incentives to its production and the poor division of labor 
stemming from its limited tradability.  
 
Limited knowledge appropriability and excludability has been long 
regarded as a cause of market failure and undersupply of knowledge. The 
knowledge market failure stems from two distinct and yet interrelated 
consequences of the idiosyncratic characteristics of knowledge. Let us 
consider them in turn. 
 
First, knowledge cannot be traded as such. The market exchange of 
knowledge is dramatically limited by the risks of opportunistic behavior ex-
ante by the perspective seller and ex-post by the perspective customer. The 
perspective customer wants to limit the risks of opportunistic conduct of the 
perspective seller and has strong reasons to request the inspection of the new 
knowledge in order to verify its actual content and minimize the risks of 
purchasing a “lemon”. As soon as the perspective vendor, however, accepts 
to reveal the actual content of the knowledge, s/he bears the risk that the 
perspective customer may walk away and use it without any payment. The 
intrinsic information asymmetry impedes the trade of knowledge as a stand-
alone economic good. Knowledge can be traded only if it is embodied in 
other economic goods.  
 
Second, the leakage of knowledge cannot be prevented and competitors can 
take ‘opportunistic’ advantage of the knowledge generated by third parties. 
Imitative entry takes place immediately after the introduction of the 
innovation and triggers the fall of its prices. Even research expenditures 
cannot be expensed: prices fall to the levels of the costs of the capital, labor 
and other intermediary inputs. Consequently, even successful and fertile 
research activities are characterized by substantial uncertainty in terms of 
actual economic returns. The risks associate to its appropriability limit their 
scope to research projects with very high levels of expected yields.  
 
High risks in the actual delivery of the expected research outcome and high 
risks on the actual possibility to extract revenue out of the expected output 
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hinder the provision of financial resource to fund research activities. Only 
firms that can take advantage of existing barriers to entry and enjoy 
extraprofits that can be retained rather than distributed to shareholders can 
fund research activities as barriers to entry act as barriers to imitation.  
 
The two arguments complement each other and suggest that economic 
systems cannot rely on the market place as a reliable mechanism to provide 
the correct allocation of resources to the generation of new knowledge. 
Public policy is indispensable to remedy the knowledge market failure 
(Arrow and Lind, 1970).  
 
The intuition by Zvi Griliches (1979, 1986, 1995, 1998) about the positive 
effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge in terms of spillover and 
knowledge externalities contributed to articulate the Arrovian knowledge 
market failure argument. The analysis of the positive effects of the 
knowledge spilling to third parties has revealed the hidden side of the 
knowledge non-appropriability and excludability. 
 
The eventual introduction of the “technology production function” where 
knowledge spillovers enter as important inputs in turn provided the basic 
tools of the new growth theory.	 The new growth theory provided the 
framework to understand at the macroeconomic level the implications for 
economic growth of the role of knowledge as a central production factor. 		
The new growth theory has been built upon the notion of knowledge 
spillover assuming that ‘inventors’ can appropriate only a part of the 
benefits generated by the introduction of new knowledge, while the system 
at large can benefit of the non-appropriable part so as to generate total factor 
productivity growth. The new growth theory assumes that the output 
elasticity of knowledge is so large that it can be split in private and social 
returns and yet the former is sufficient to induce firms to fund research 
activities that yield “equilibrium” returns plus social returns accounted as 
residual. The availability of the non-excludable portion of knowledge, as a 
public good, accounts for total factor productivity growth.  
 
In the new growth theory, like in Arrow, the amount of knowledge used is 
lower than in equilibrium but its total output (the sum of private and social 
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returns) is larger than in equilibrium. The total marginal product of 
knowledge lies above the private one. For a given knowledge cost the 
“equilibrium” amount of knowledge selected by private investors is lower 
that it would have been if they could appropriate all the returns. At the same 
time, however, the sum of both private and social returns is larger: the social 
returns are accounted as residual (Romer, 1990 and 1994; Link and Siegel, 
2007; Hall, Mairesse, Mohnen, 2010). 	
The new growth theory paves the way to appreciating the role of the 
economics of knowledge to understand the working of the system at large 
and its dynamics well beyond the boundaries of its microeconomic origins. 
The appreciation of the role of knowledge spillover in terms of total factor 
productivity at the system level, however, raises new questions and new 
issues.  	
First, the new growth theory does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the 
determinants of the share of revenue triggered by the use of knowledge that 
can be appropriated by “inventors” and the part that, spilling in the 
atmosphere, contributes total factor productivity. The determinants of its -
large- variance across time, firms, industries, regions and countries are 
poorly investigated.  	
Second, and most important, the new growth theory unveils the mismatch 
between the theory of production and the theory of income distribution. The 
contribution of the stock of knowledge to output is larger than its share of 
revenue. The share of output triggered by the fraction of the output elasticity 
of the stock of technological knowledge that spills and is not appropriated 
is, in fact, accounted as the residual. As such it is paid to all production 
factors. The new growth theory implies that the Euler’s theorem according 
to which the share of revenue paid to each factor equals its output elasticity 
does not apply. The new growth theory is a theory of out-of-equilibrium 
income distribution. The Arrovian knowledge undersupply is now twisted 
to a theory of knowledge underpayment (Romer, 1990, 1994, 2015).  	
The analysis, implemented through this book, impinges upon the 
exploration of the generation of knowledge and of the cost of knowledge, 
the role of absorption, access and use of the knowledge spilling in the system 
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and shifts the focus from technical to pecuniary knowledge externalities to 
provide an analytical framework that can implement the results of the new 
growth theory. The actual justification for excess returns and the related 
growth of output and total factor productivity is found only when the limited 
exhaustibility of knowledge is taken into account together with its limited 
appropriability both in the generation, accumulation and exploitation of 
knowledge. Spillovers engender excess returns because third parties can use 
again knowledge, that has been generated, introduced, used and –partly- 
exploited by “inventors”, at cost that are below equilibrium levels. The 
limited exhaustibility of knowledge is the actual determinant of the positive 
sum game that is accounted by new growth theory.  	
2.3 THE KNOWLEDGE GENERATION FUNCTION 
The economics of knowledge is shifting attention from the analysis of the 
use of knowledge as an input into the technology production function to the 
analysis of the mechanisms and processes by means of which knowledge is 
generated, exploited and valorized. The knowledge generation function is 
the new frontier of the economics of knowledge.  
 
The advances of the economics of knowledge have progressively made clear 
that knowledge is at the same time an input and an output. The knowledge 
used as an input in the production of all the other goods is itself the output 
of a dedicated activity and an indispensable input, not only for the 
introduction of an innovation, but also for the generation of further 
knowledge (David, 1993).  
 
Building upon the Schumpeterian (1934) intuition that the generation of new 
knowledge is the result of the ‘creative recombination of existing 
knowledge’, Weitzman (1996) enriched the analysis of the knowledge 
generation function highlighting its recombinant character: existing 
knowledge items are indispensable for the generation of new technological 
knowledge. Its generation consists in the recombination of existing 
knowledge items that enter the process as inputs in a recursive process 
(Arthur, 2007). Fleming and Sorenson (2001) suggest that the generation of 
technological knowledge follows a branching process where the new 
modules stand upon the old ones.  
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The generation of knowledge acquires the typical traits of a non-ergodic 
path dependent process where indeed the present is influenced, at each point 
in time, by the past, but contingent events can change both its direction and 
rate. This approach has important implication: i) the stock of knowledge that 
entered the technology production function, now enters the knowledge 
generation function: in both cases it is an indispensable input (Fleming, 
2001); ii) the size, variety and accessibility of the existing stock of 
knowledge changes with the recursive accumulation of the new vintages of 
knowledge; iii) the selective availability of existing knowledge shapes the 
direction and the rate of the generation of new knowledge; iv) the larger is 
the portfolio of existing and accessible knowledge modules and the larger is 
the productivity of the knowledge generation process. The wider is the 
inclusion of existing knowledge items in the recombinant knowledge 
generation process and the larger the output (Weitzman, 1996). 
 
As Arthur notes: “I realized that new technologies were not ‘inventions’ that 
came from nowhere. All the examples I was looking at were created-
constructed, put together, assembled-from previously existing technologies. 
Technologies in other words consisted of other technologies, they arose as 
combinations of other technologies” (Arthur, 2009: 2).  
The analysis of the generation and use of knowledge enables to identify 
three distinct layers: i) the stock of knowledge at time t-1 is a necessary 
input into the generation of new knowledge. The stock of pre-existing 
knowledge is in fact the object of the recombination that leads to the 
eventual generation of new knowledge; ii) at each point in time the flow of 
knowledge is the output of a dedicated economic activity, that is the 
knowledge generation function; iii) at each point in time the stock of 
knowledge -augmented by the flows that have been generated at that time- 
is an indispensable input in the technology production function, i.e. in the 
production of all the other goods.  
The appreciation of the recombinant character of the generation of 
knowledge enables to identify and highlight the crucial role of the limited 
exhaustibility of knowledge in the accumulation of stocks of knowledge.  
All the knowledge generated contributes the stock of knowledge including 
the proprietary knowledge internal to each firm. Its limited appropriability 
allows the use of all the stock by third parties. Its access and use, however, 
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are not free: substantial search and absorption activities are necessary even 
for the proprietary component. At each point in time the stock of knowledge 
must be retrieved and applied: such activities are carried out by creative 
workers at a cost.   
Both the size and the variety of the stock of knowledge play an important 
role to support the generation of new technological knowledge and its 
effects in the production of all the other goods. Not only the size matters: 
the wider is the variety of types of knowledge that compose the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge and the stringer the externalities that benefit the 
agents in the system (Antonelli et al., 2017). The larger is the stock of 
knowledge and the wider its variety and the lower the costs of accessing and 
using it. 
For a given size and variety of the stock of knowledge, the quality of the 
knowledge governance mechanisms at work in the system are determinant 
in the identification of the actual level of the cost of accessing and using it. 
The stock of knowledge can be regarded as a quasi-public good. The access 
to knowledge stocks in turn yields long lasting effects in term of growth of 
output and total factor productivity and rents. 
 
Following Griliches (1979; 1984: 1986; 1992) and Weitzman (1996), a 
system of the equations, that includes the technology production function 
and the knowledge generation function, enables to formalize the analysis 
implemented so far. The inputs of the knowledge generation function are: i) 
the current R&D expenditures, ii) the quasi-public stock of quasi-public 
knowledge. The knowledge generation function, in the standard c.r.s. Cobb-
Douglas specification, and the knowledge cost equation are: 
 
(1) KN = R&Dd TK(t-1)1-d 
(2) TCKN = zR&D + vTK (t-1) 
 
where KN stands for the flow of knowledge output, R&D for internal 
research and learning activities, TK, for the stock of quasi-public knowledge 
(at time t-1) and d measures the output elasticity of R&D. Both R&D and 
TK have a cost. The cost z measures the costs of research activities; the cost 
v measures the absorption of and access costs to the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge.  
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We assume that TK, the stock of all the existing knowledge generated until 
that time, is a complementary, indispensable input into the generation of 
new knowledge. Its use is not free: it can take place at a specific cost v that 
accounts for the wide range of activities that are necessary to absorb and use 
it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990).  
 
The flow of knowledge (KN) generated at each point in time contributes the 
technology production function: 
 
(3) Y = Ka Lb TKc 
 
where Y measures output in value added, K measures the stock of capital, 
L labor and TK the stock of knowledge capital; a, b, c measure the output 
elasticity of the inputs. 
 
The cost equation is standard: 
 
(4) TCY = wL + rK + sTK 
 
where w is the cost of labor, r the cost of capital and s the cost of knowledge.  
 
The flow of knowledge generated at each point in time by the knowledge 
generation function adds to the stock of knowledge that enters the 
technology production function, after taking into account the -low- rate of 
depreciation and obsolescence (𝛿): 
  
 (5) TK-TK(t-1) (𝛿) = KN, for   0 < 𝛿 > 1.	
 
Positive pecuniary knowledge externalities are found when v and s, the costs 
of accessing and using the stock of knowledge, are below equilibrium levels. 
When the cost knowledge falls below equilibrium levels the creative 
response of firms can take place. The creative response triggers a cascade 
of positive feedbacks: i) new technological knowledge is generated, 2) the 
stock of technological knowledge available in the system increases, 3) 
innovations are being introduced, 4) total factor productivity and output 
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increase; 5) new out-of-equilibrium conditions in product and factor 
markets emerge.  
The stock of knowledge, however, resides exclusively in the brain of human 
beings. Knowledge consists of creative labor and cannot be separated from 
it. Any quantity of books, patents, blueprints exists and performs an 
economic function only if it is embedded in and commanded by human labor 
able to use and implement it. Without human labor it disappears into 
libraries and repositories with no economic value. Human labor is necessary 
to remember the stock of knowledge, to apply it, and to use it to generate 
new knowledge bioth in the knowledge generation function and in the 
technology production function. Knowledge coincides with the skills and 
competencies of human labor able to memorize and use the stock of 
knowledge: creative labor has distinctive qualifications that distinguish it 
from standard labor.  
Here the Marxian notion of “general intellect” becomes relevant: "Nature 
builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-
acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human 
participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the 
human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of 
fixed capital indicates to what degree generalsocial knowledge has become 
a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the 
process of social life itself have come under the control of the general 
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it; to what degree the 
powers of social production social have been produced, not only in the form 
of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real 
life process." (Marx (1857-8/1974:706). 
The central role of the stock of quasi-public knowledge both in the 
technology production function and in the knowledge generation function 
calls attention on the indispensable role of creative labor to produce both all 
the other goods and new knowledge itself. Knowledge is an activity rather 
than a good and it is intrinsically collective (Antonelli, 2000).  
 
2.4 THE EXHAUSTIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The economic literature has little investigated the broader economic effects 
of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge as an economic good far lower 
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with respect to standard economic goods. Attention has been focused on 
non-excludability, the first key characteristic of public goods. Yet its 
application to knowledge implies necessarily the identification and 
appreciation of the role, not only of its limited appropriability, but also of 
its limited exhaustibility  
 
So far, the economic literature has grasped only some of the important 
effects of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge identifying the role of 
extensibility and cumulability. 
 
Knowledge extensibility is the primary source of economies of density. The 
very same knowledge item can be applied repeatedly as an input into the 
production of a good without limitations. When the –fixed- cost of the given 
knowledge item can be spread on increasing units of output, average cost 
decline. The exploitation of knowledge extensibility is one of the main 
sources of competitive advantage for innovators and creation of barriers to 
entry and market power at the firm level and of total factor productivity at 
both the firm and the system level.   
 
A large consensus about knowledge cumulability has been encapsulated in 
repeated use of the well-known Newton’s quote: “if I have seen further it is 
by standing on the shoulders [sic] of Giants”. The literature has appreciated 
the positive effects of the extended duration of knowledge as an input in the 
generation of further knowledge in terms of economic growth.  
 
The resource based theory of the firm identifies in the accumulation of 
knowledge the basic element of the bundle of resources that defines a firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Along the same lines, the 
evolutionary literature has highlighted the intrinsic cumulativity of 
knowledge as a key factor of the long-term competitive advantage of 
innovators in product markets stressing the role of knowledge cumulatibity 
as a major source of barriers to entry and asymmetric profitability (Dosi, 
1988).  
 
The technology management literature has identified the cumulativity of 
knowledge as the key element that accounts for the persistence of 
innovativity: firms that have been able to build up a knowledge base are 
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more likely to remain innovators in the long term, especially if the strength 
of their internal knowledge base is complemented by the effective access to 
the stock of knowledge. As Teece (2000: 37) notes: “Technology 
development, particularly inside a particular paradigm, proceeds 
cumulatively along a path defined by the paradigm. The fact that 
technological progress builds on what went before, and that much of it is 
tacit and proprietary, means that it usually has significant organization-
specific dimensions. Moreover, an organization's technical capabilities are 
likely to be close to the previous technological accomplishments”. Cefis and 
Orsenigo (2001) provide strong empirical evidence on the cumulability of 
knowledge within firms and its role in accounting for the persistence in the 
rates of introduction of innovations. 
 
In this literature the emphasis on the role of the internal accumulation of 
knowledge is more and more complemented by appreciation of the central 
role of the accumulation of and the access to the stocks of quasi-public 
knowledge available in the system (Antonelli, 2000; Antonelli et al., 2015).   
 
The relevant duration of patent terms -20 years in the European Union and 
in the United States- can be considered a reliable clue of the current 
consensus about the limited exhaustibility of knowledge and the extended 
duration of its economic value.  
 
As a matter of fact, the limited exhaustibility of knowledge lies at the heart 
of its non rivalry in use, another – much better known- property. Non rivalry 
in use applies to public economic goods characterized by indivisibility of 
benefits: “A good is non-rival or indivisible when a unit of the good can be 
consumed by one individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the 
consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit. 
Sunsets are non-rival or indivisible when views are unobstructed.” (Coornes 
and Sandler, 1986: 6). The definition of non-rivalry in use has been 
progressively stretched and applied to a variety of impure public goods 
including knowledge (Stiglitz, 1999). Its application to knowledge has not 
appreciated an important implication: non-rivalry in use of knowledge takes 
place not only because of its non-excludability, but also because of its 
limited exhaustibility. The possibility to sharing knowledge, and yet 
retaining the possibility to keep using it, is possible only because of its non-
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exhaustibility. It seems quite obvious that the use by an agent of a standard 
excludable economic good characterized by standard exhaustibility 
excludes the possibility that a second agent can keep using it at the very 
same conditions. The limited exhaustibility of knowledge and its non 
excludability, stemming from its limited appropriability, are intertwined 
since the very first steps of the economics of knowledge. It is necessary to 
disentangle their separate effects. 
 
The comparative analysis of standard economic goods and knowledge 
shows that the exhaustibility of knowledge is much lower than the 
exhaustibility of standard economic goods. Standard economic goods are 
characterized by high levels of exhaustibility. Consumer goods, such as food 
or personal services are fully exhausted by their consumption. Durable 
consumer goods have lower levels of exhaustibility: yet their duration is 
limited. Intermediary goods are fully exhausted by their transformation into 
output. Capital goods have a longer duration. Economic obsolescence is 
usually faster than their physical exhaustion. The introduction of superior 
capital goods makes existing capital goods that are not yet exhausted by 
physical wear and tear, obsolete.   
 
The exhaustibility of knowledge is far more limited. Consumption of 
knowledge as a final good does not imply its exhaustion. The use of 
knowledge as an intermediary input does not entail exhaustion. The same 
piece of knowledge can be used repeatedly as an intermediary input without 
any effect on its duration. Finally, the use of knowledge as a capital good 
does not entail any physical wear and tear. The duration of knowledge as a 
capital good may be exposed to economic, rather than physical 
obsolescence. Yet “old” knowledge yields strong economic effects as an 
input for the generation of new knowledge.  
 
The understanding of the multiple role of knowledge that acts twice as an 
input and once as an output unveils another limit to its exhaustibility. 
Knowledge in fact is an essential input in the technology production 
function, i.e. the production of all kind of goods (Griliches, 1979, 1984, 
1986, 1992; Griliches and Pakes, 1984) as well as the output of the 
knowledge generation as a dedicated activity (Jaffe, 1986). The generation 
of knowledge as an output, moreover, is the result of the recombination of 
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existing knowledge: knowledge enters the knowledge generation function 
as an indispensable input (Weitzman, 1996). Even after that existing 
knowledge experiences economic obsolescence as a capital good used in the 
production of other goods, it remains an indispensable input in the 
generation of new knowledge. 
 
The analysis of the multiple role of knowledge as: i) an input in the 
technology production function; ii) an output of the knowledge generation 
function; iii) an input in the knowledge generation function, enables to grasp 
the radical difference in terms of exhaustibility of knowledge as a capital 
good with respect to standard capital goods. The economic obsolescence of 
standard capital goods entails their economic exhaustion. This is not the case 
of knowledge. Its economic obsolescence may entail its exhaustion as an 
effective capital good in the technology production function, but not in the 
knowledge generation function, where it remains an indispensable 
intermediary input. The limited exhaustibility of knowledge has important 
implications for economic analysis and policy.  
 
The limited exhaustibility of knowledge combined with its limited 
appropriability is at the origin of the accumulation of a stock of quasi-public 
technological knowledge that keeps increasing -in size and variety- with 
typical non-ergodic features and can yield, with appropriate systemic 
conditions, dynamic increasing returns supporting the creative response of 
firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions.  
 
The use of the stock of quasi-public knowledge is indispensable for the 
generation of new knowledge, and yet its access and use are rooted in the 
web of knowledge governance mechanisms that are localized in the 
economic systems of advanced countries. As a consequence, countries that 
have a larger and wider stock at a given point in time, provided their 
knowledge governance mechanisms are and remain effective, are likely to 
benefit of an increasing competitive advantage amplified by the powerful 
dynamic effects of the accumulation of the knowledge stock so that they 
specialize more and more in knowledge intensive products. 
 
The effects of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge may compensate the 
effects of its limited appropriability. The Arrovian knowledge market failure 
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takes place only when and if the downward shift of the intertemporal derived 
demand for non-exhaustible knowledge engendered by the limited 
appropriability of knowledge and the consequent decline of the price of 
innovated goods is larger than the downward shift of the intertemporal 
derived demand of standard capital goods engendered by their obsolescence.  
The analysis of the derived demand is a powerful tool that enables to identify 
the effects of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge compared to the 
standard exhaustibility of economic goods that enter a technology 
production function as capital (and intermediary) inputs (Antonelli, 2017a).  
 
The formal analysis of the derived demand for technological knowledge 
enables to follow and yet stretch the application of the Arrovian approach 
from the analysis of knowledge as an output to the analysis of knowledge as 
an input. We can proceed with the same comparative approach confronting 
the outcomes of knowledge as a standard good with substantial 
exhaustibility to the outcomes of knowledge as a non-standard good 
characterized by limited exhaustibility.  
 
The analysis of the derived demand of a capital good with an economic life 
that lasts more than a single unit of time requires to take into account the 
distribution of the yearly economic benefits distributed over the stretch of 
time along which the capital good remains into operation, taking into 
account the erosion effects of its obsolescence. When the economic life of 
a capital good exceeds the single unit of time it is necessary to move from 
the instantaneous derived demand to the intertemporal derived demand. 
 
The intertemporal position of the derived demand of any intermediary and 
capital good (K) is determined by the horizontal sum of the instantaneous 
derived demand schedules, that is the yearly schedules of its (PYP’K) the 
product of the price (PY) of the output (Y) and marginal product in physical 
quantities (P’K) taking into account the rates of obsolescence that reduce the 
portion of the capital good in use each year.  
 
For the same token, the intertemporal derived demand of knowledge as an 
input in the technology production function is determined by the horizontal 
sum of the instantaneous derived demands measured at each point in time 
by its marginal product in value (PYP’TK) that is the marginal product in 
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physical quantities of the knowledge stock (TK) as an input in the 
technology production function- times the price of output Y, taking into 
account the rates of obsolescence that reduce the portion of the capital good 
in use each year (Antonelli, 2017a).  
 
The rates of obsolescence play a major role to identify the position of the 
intertemporal derived demand as they have a strong effect on the time 
distribution of the sequence of marginal products of the portions of input 
that remain in the production process. At each point in time the position of 
the intertemporal derived demand is determined by the sum of the 
instantaneous schedules of derived demand over the stretch of time through 
which the knowledge input exerts its productive effects taking into account 
the non-exhausted portion still effective.  
 
The starting point is the Cobb-Douglas specification of the knowledge 
production function: (1)					𝑌 = 𝐾,𝐿.𝑇𝐾0 
where Y stands for the output, K for the capital stock, L for the labor input 
and TK for the knowledge stock. 
 
In the case of standard intermediary and capital goods the economic and 
physical obsolescence entails the yearly reduction of their marginal product 
in value (PYP’K). Assuming standard economic parameters, the (PYP’K) of 
the first year is 100%, the (PYP’K) of the second year is reduced to 80%, the 
(PYP’K) of the third year is reduced to 60% and so on until the capital good 
is fully exhausted1. 
 
According to the analysis conducted above it seems possible to claim that 
the exhaustion of knowledge in its dual role of capital good in the 
technology production function and intermediary good in the knowledge 
generation function takes place at slow rates. Much slower than any standard 
economic good. 																																																								1	The rates of tax depreciation provide a reliable clue about the actual obsolescence of 
tangible capital goods. Although they exhibit a relevant variance - the heights of 30-40 
% for petrochemical and digital capital goods, to 25% for machinery- they confirm that 
the average duration of the economic life of tangible capital goods rarely exceeds 4 
years. 
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In the case of knowledge, the economic and physical obsolescence entails a 
far lower yearly reduction of its marginal product in value (PYP’TK). 
Assuming a possible parameter, the (PYP’TK) of the first year is 100%, the 
(PYP’TK) of the second year is reduced to 95%, the (PYP’TK) of the third year 
is reduced to 90% and so on until knowledge is actually exhausted.  
 
Because the analysis implemented so far does not take into account the 
effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge, it seems clear that the 
position of the intertemporal derived demand of knowledge, calculated as 
the horizontal sum of the yearly schedules of the marginal products in value 
of the non-exhausted portions of knowledge, is far higher than the position 
of the intertemporal derived demand of any other capital good.  
 
The intertemporal derived demand of standard capital goods, assuming that 
the current period is t1 and the initial year t0 and taking into account 
depreciation/obsolescence (d), is: (2)					𝐷 = 3454647 (1 − 𝑑)45	:4𝑃<𝑃′>? 
 
The instantaneous derived demand of knowledge (where the 
depreciation/obsolescence rate is equals the instantaneous derived demand 
of any other capital good) is: 
 (3)				∑454647 (1 − 𝑑)45	:4𝑃<𝑃′>? = ∑454647 (1 − 𝛿)45	:4𝑃<𝑃′B>.      
 
when:			 
 (4)					𝑑 = 𝛿  
 
The intertemportal derived demand for knowledge is larger than the 
intertemporal demand for capital when the effects of the duration of capital 
goods and knowledge over a stretch of time that is larger than the unit are 
taken into account:	 (5)					𝑑 > 𝛿 
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Equation (5) holds because the exhaustibility of knowledge is lower than 
the exhaustibility of standard capital goods and consequently larger portions 
of knowledge capital remain in service with respect to contemporary capital 
goods. As a consequence, the intertemporal derived demand for knowledge 
lies far above the derived demand for any standard capital good: 
 (6)				3454647 (1 − 𝑑)45	:4𝑃<𝑃F>? < 3
45
4647 (1 − 𝛿)45	:4𝑃<𝑃′B 
Figure 2.1 shows the implications. The higher position of the intertemporal 
derived demand for knowledge (D1) stemming from its limited 
exhaustibility contrasts the lower position of the intertemporal derived 
demand for standard economic goods (D2) stemming from their higher 
levels of exhaustibility that reduce the efficiency time window of a given 
capital good. The position of (D2) can be regarded as the benchmark. Out-
of-equilibrium conditions take place when the position of the derived 
demand for knowledge does not coincide with the benchmark and lies either 
above or below it. 
 
Assuming a standard supply curve (S) with a positive slope, it is clear that, 
not only the equilibrium demand for knowledge (QTA) is larger than the 
equilibrium demand for any standard economic good, (QTB) but also the 
price of knowledge (PTA) is larger than the benchmark equilibrium price of 
any standard capital good (PTB).  
 
FIGURE 2.1. THE DERIVED DEMAND FOR KNOWLEDGE AND 
STANDARD ECONOMIC GOODS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
EXHAUSTIBILITY AND APPROPRIABILITY  
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Because of the crucial role of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge -
without taking into account the effects of its limited appropriability- the 
incentives to allocate resources to generate knowledge are not lower but 
actually larger than the incentives to allocate resources to standard economic 
goods. The analysis of the effects of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge 
suggests, in fact, that markets may oversupply knowledge rather than 
undersupply it. The Arrovian market failure would work the other way 
around: too much knowledge is generated and too little standard capital 
goods are demanded by the system. Too much investment in knowledge 
takes place and too little investments take place in standard tangible goods. 
Because of excess duration of its economic life there is an excess-supply of 
knowledge. 
 
 
2.5. THE KNOWLEDGE APPROPRIABILITY TRADE-OFF 
The analysis of the generation and exploitation of knowledge has enabled to 
identify both the negative consequences of its limited appropriability and of 
its uncontrolled leakage that undermine the profitability and the positive 
effects of its un-limited extensibility that enable to apply the very same 
knowledge item to unlimited output items, and of its limited exhaustibility 
and consequent cumulability that enable to extract relevant rents. The 
exploitation of knowledge is consequently a highly contextual process 
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whose actual outcome is strictly contingent upon the institutional and 
economic conditions in which it takes place. 
 
The contradiction between the role of knowledge as a necessary input in the 
generation of new knowledge and its exploitation conditions is at the origin 
of the intrinsic weakness of the knowledge growth regime. The limited 
appropriability of knowledge combined with its limited exhaustibility 
enhances the rates of generation of knowledge and empowers the dynamic 
increasing returns at the system level stemming from the accumulation of 
the flows of current knowledge in a stock of quasi-public knowledge. The 
larger and wider is the stock and the lower is its cost.  
 
The exclusivity of IPR endangers the viability of the knowledge growth 
regime. At the same time, it is clear that the limited appropriability of 
knowledge and the risks of uncontrolled knowledge leakage limits its 
exploitation and hence its profitability with the well-known consequences 
of market failure. The solution of the appropriability trade-off is 
indispensable. The introduction of IPR with limited exclusivity seems to 
provide a suitable solution to the well known appropriability trade-off. 
 
The formal analysis of interplay between positive and negative knowledge 
externalities builds upon the knowledge generation function with its cost 
equation. The net effects of knowledge externalities can be calculated as the 
algebraic sum of the gross positive effects of knowledge spillovers on the 
costs of knowledge as an input and the negative effects of the limited 
appropriability on the price of knowledge as an input.  
 
Knowledge externalities are actually positive only when the positive effects 
in terms of the reduction of the costs are larger than the negative effects in 
terms of the reduction of the revenue. These are net positive pecuniary 
knowledge externalities. 
 
In a Cobb-Douglas specification of the knowledge generation function, 
standard substitution –albeit limited by substantial complementarity- 
between the two basic inputs affect total and average costs with non-linear 
effects. On the output side, instead, the effects on the price, have, linear 
48			
effects on the revenue. It is consequently possible to identify an optimum 
level of knowledge appropriability (Antonelli, 2013, 2015a). 
 
The knowledge generation function, in the standard c.r.s. Cobb-Douglas 
specification, and the knowledge cost equation are: 
 
(1) Y = R&Dd TK(t-1)1-d 
(2) TCY = zR&D + vTK (t-1) 
 
Where Y stands for the flow of knowledge output, R&D for internal 
research and learning activities, TK, for the stock of quasi-public  
knowledge (at time t-1) and d measures the output elasticity of R&D. Both 
R&D and TK have a cost. The cost z measures the costs of research 
activities; the cost v measures the cost of using and accessing the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge.  
 
The stock of all the existing knowledge generated until that time, is a 
complementary, indispensable input into the generation of new knowledge.  
The costs of accessing and using the stock of quasi-public knowledge v are 
a function of the its size and variety. For given levels of the size and variety 
of the stock, the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms at work in 
the system: when it is high the costs of the stock of quasi-public knowledge 
(v) is low.  
 
The levels of the costs of accessing and using the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge affect the knowledge generation function. In the latter, in fact, 
both R&D and TK are fundamental and indispensable inputs. No knowledge 
can be generated without the access to the stock of quasi-public knowledge 
and dedicated research activities. The reduction of v, the costs of the stock 
of quasi-public knowledge, triggers a substitution process that has a limit. 
In the standard Cobb-Douglas production function, factor substitution is 
bounded as it is constrained by the well-known borders.  
 
The recombinant character of the knowledge generation process stresses the 
limits to the substitution process: either factor cannot fall below threshold 
levels. A –large- minimum amount of both the access to the stock of 
knowledge and internal research activities is necessary in order to generate 
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new technological knowledge2.  Hence the costs of the knowledge output 
(TCY ) indeed decline if the costs of the cost of accessing and using the stock 
of knowledge, v, as an input, decline. Yet, because of the bounded 
substitution that takes place within the knowledge generation function, the 
reduction is less than proportionate. 
 
As in the standard Cobb-Douglas we assume that the two inputs are 
complements with a certain -limited- degree of substitutability. In other 
words, the generation of knowledge requires a minimum amount of both 
R&D and TK(t-1). Even if appropriability is small as well as royalties and v 
is low, knowledge generation cannot rely exclusively on R&D. A minimum 
amount of TK(t-1) must be used in any case. Let us call this minimum amount 
TK(t-1) min. Let us call R&Dmax the corresponding level of research and 
learning activities:  
 
(3) R&Dmax = xTK(t-1) (α-1)min.  Where x>1  
 
According to eq. 2, total costs are the sum of the cost component related to 
R&D and the cost component related to TK(t-1). Within the given 
substitutability range, if the access cost to the stock of knowledge v 
decreases, the production of knowledge Y relies less on TK(t-1) and more on 
R&D. When v increases beyond a certain value (that we denote v*), 
however, TK(t-1) cannot further decrease. This implies that for v > v* 
(namely, out of the substitutability range) the component of cost related to 
R&D remains constant, while the component of costs related to TK(t-1) 
decreases linearly with v: 
 
(4) TCY = z R&Dmin + v TK(t-1)*max 
 
We thus have that the cost curve, in its two linear components, with respect 
to v, can be approximated by a homothetic function that exhibits a non-
linear relationship with an upward concavity. 
 
 
																																																								2	The	empirical	evidence	of	Antonelli	and	Colombelli	(2015)	confirms	the	hypothesis	that	the	knowledge	generation	function	exhibits	the	typical	traits	of	an	o-ring	technology.	
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Following Arrow, (1962a) we assume that the price of knowledge (PY) is a 
positive and linear function of the levels of the de facto appropriability of 
knowledge (DFA) within the system: 
 
(5) PY= l(DFA)  
Where 0>DFA<1. When DFA=0 technological knowledge cannot be 
appropriated. When DFA=1 it is fully appropriated: 100% of the revenues 
stemming from the proprietary knowledge is actually appropriated by the 
“inventor”.  
 
The lower are the levels of DFA and the lower the price of the good Y. We 
can assume that the relationship is linear and positive: 
 
(6) l’>0 and l” = 0 
 
The value of the output of the knowledge generation function – i.e. its 
revenue (RY) is directly determined by the price of knowledge as an output. 
Hence the lower the levels of the DFA and the lower the revenue of the 
producer of knowledge that uses knowledge as a necessary input. 
 
The apparatus built so far enables to compare the positive and negative 
effects of the appropriability of knowledge in a single framework. Pecuniary 
knowledge externalities enable to compare the negative effects of 
knowledge appropriability in terms of reduction of the price of the 
knowledge as an output, with the its positive effects, in terms of reduction 
of the cost of knowledge as an input. 
 
The analysis of knowledge as both an input and an output shows that both 
the price -and hence the revenue- and the cost of Y are influenced by the 
levels of knowledge appropriability. The apparatus makes it possible to 
identify the optimum level of knowledge appropriability. Because of the 
differences in slopes of the cost and revenue functions, the relationship 
between positive and negative effects changes according to the levels of 
appropriability: there is clearly an optimum level of appropriability. Before 
and after it the positive net effects of pecuniary knowledge externalities are 
lower.  
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INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2.2 exhibits the framework elaborated so far as it makes explicit the 
relationship between the price and the cost of knowledge and the levels of 
knowledge appropriability. The upper section exhibits the relevant cost and 
revenue curves according to the levels of knowledge non-appropriability (1-
DFA): the outcome is clearly positive. The limited appropriability of 
knowledge triggers a reduction of costs that is larger than the reduction of 
prices. The optimum level of the limits to appropriability (1-DFA)* is easily 
identified when:  
 
(7) DFA* = dRY/dDFA – dTCKN/dDFA = 0 
 
The lower part of Figure 2.2 exhibits the non-linear consequences of the net 
positive effects of pecuniary knowledge externalities. The optimum level of 
non appropriability (1-DFA) -defined in the upper part of Figure 2.1- by the 
maximum distance between the effects of appropriability on the revenue 
(RY) and its effects on the costs (TCY), in terms of the effects on total factor 
productivity. Net pecuniary knowledge externalities, in fact, trigger the 
increase of total factor productivity (Antonelli, 2017a). 
 
Figure 2.2 makes clear that, according to the differentiated effects on the 
levels of prices and costs, respectively, knowledge is indeed quite a special 
good. Full appropriability is not necessarily good for an economic system, 
neither a zero level of appropriability is good for the system. Actually, 
specific intermediary levels of knowledge leakage and dissemination 
produce net positive effects at the system levels. The analysis of knowledge 
as an input and an output enables to identify the level of the price of 
knowledge that maximizes the net pecuniary externalities and yet includes 
profits for knowledge producers. 
 
This section has demonstrated that the perfect and full appropriability of 
knowledge is suboptimal, as much as the zero appropriability. The partial 
appropriability of knowledge is clearly superior from a welfare point of 
view.  
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Note that the actual conditions of use of knowledge spillovers have relevant 
effects on the optimum amount of non-appropriability of knowledge. Figure 
2.2 makes clear that the slope of the revenue function depends upon the 
extent to which the limited appropriability of knowledge affects the revenue 
and the profits of “inventors”.  
 
The analysis of the joint effects of the limited appropriability and 
exhaustibility of knowledge and its dual role, as an output and an input of 
the knowledge generation function shows that both the perfect and full 
appropriability of knowledge and the zero appropriability are suboptimal. 
There is a partial level of appropriability that yields an optimal mix of 
incentives to its generation.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.2. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE LIMITED 
APPROPRIABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
2.6 INTERINDUSTRIAL VS INTRAINDUSTRIAL SPILLOVER 
The analysis of the knowledge base of general purpose technologies that 
apply to a wide range of product markets sheds new light on the 
appropriability trade-off (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Lipsey et al., 
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2005). This section explores the effects of the limited appropriability of 
knowledge on the technology production function according to the use of 
spillovers. The reduction of the revenue triggered by imitation is large when 
proprietary knowledge spills to competitors active in the same product 
market that use it as an input –ready to be used as such- in their technology 
production with evident and strong negative effects on the price of the 
innovated products, the revenue of “inventors” and their profitability. The 
reduction instead is small when proprietary knowledge spills to firms active 
in other product markets that use it as an input in the recombinant generation 
of knowledge and innovation in other product markets: this use of the 
proprietary knowledge has limited effects on the price of innovated 
products, the revenue of inventors and their profitability. 
 
The distinction between intraindustrial and interindustrial spillovers enables 
to operationalize the fine tuning of intellectual property rights in terms of 
differentiated levels of exclusivity. Interindustrial spillovers yield far larger 
net pecuniary knowledge externalities than intraindustrial spillovers. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2.3 presents an analysis of the twin effects of knowledge spillovers 
based upon the Arrovian insight that explores the characteristics of 
knowledge as an economic good. It compares the twin effects of knowledge 
spillovers, in terms of positive and negative pecuniary externalities, 
assuming as a benchmark the case of knowledge as a standard economic 
good and confronting to it the effects of the actual properties of knowledge. 
 
In Figure 2.3, the demand curves D1 and D2 represent the derived demand 
for knowledge that stems from a technology production function where 
knowledge enters as an input, next to standard capital and labor, in the 
production of all the other goods (Antonelli, 2017a). The position of the 
derived demand D1 assumes that knowledge is a standard economic good 
with full appropriability. The position of the derived demand D2 reflects the 
negative effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge on the price of 
the goods produced by the technology production function.  
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In Figure 2.3, the supply curves S1 and S2 stem from the marginal cost of 
knowledge. The supply curve S1 represents the case of knowledge as a 
standard economic good and the supply curve S2 represents the actual case 
of knowledge with its idiosyncratic and specific properties. The shift reflects 
the positive effects of knowledge spillovers on the cost of the stock of 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 2.3 provides a simple welfare analysis of the combined effects of 
knowledge appropriability in terms of positive externalities stemming from 
the spillover and the consequent reduction of the cost of the stock of 
knowledge, and negative externalities stemming from the fall of the price of 
products that embody proprietary knowledge as an input.  
 
Figure 2.3 identifies: 
i)  the surface area of the quadrangle AZIC as the size of the negative 
externalities stemming from the limited appropriability in terms of the 
downward shift of the derived demand of knowledge with the consequent 
loss of consumer surplus;  
 
ii) the surface area of the quadrangle BEDC as the size of the positive effects 
of the limited appropriability of knowledge in terms of spillover with the 
consequent reduction of the cost of knowledge.  
 
The ratio of the size of the surfaces AZIC/BEDC measures the 
appropriability trade-off. When AZIC/BEDC>1, the Arrovian market 
failure applies and appropriability conditions should be reinforced. When, 
instead AZIC/BEDC<1, the limited appropriability of knowledge yields 
superior welfare effects. 
 
The distinction between intraindustrial and interindustrial uses of 
knowledge spillovers is most relevant in this context. Intraindustrial 
knowledge spillovers allow the use of the knowledge, spilling from the 
introduction of new knowledge, within the same product market by 
competitors. Intraindustrial spillovers consist of the use of knowledge by 
firms active in other product markets. Let us now assume that in Figure 2.3 
the derived demand D2 represents the situation of interindustrial spillovers 
and the derived demand D3 represents the case of intraindustrial spillovers. 
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When intraindustrial spillovers apply, the leftward shift of the derived 
demand for knowledge D3 is larger, as their use by competitors has direct 
and strong -negative- effects on the price of the products. When 
interindustrial spillovers apply, the shift of the derived demand for 
knowledge D2 is smaller as the users are active in other product markets. We 
assume that the same shift of the supply curve S2 applies in both cases as 
absorption costs are the same for both inter and intra industrial spillovers. 
 
Let us now implement the welfare analysis, again with the support of Figure 
2.3, to compare the cases of interindustrial and intraindustrial spillovers. 
When intraindustrial spillovers apply, the leftward shift of the derived 
demand for knowledge D3 is far larger than D2 when interindustrial 
spillovers apply. Hence it seems clear that: 
 
(1) AZIC/BEDC<1; aZic/BEDC <1 
 
The optimal levels of appropriability are lower with interindustrial than 
intraindustrial spillovers. The identification of the differentiated effects of 
knowledge spillovers whether interindustrial or intraindustrial has major 
implications for the design of a differentiated property right regime. 
 
The distinction between imitation and knowledge externalities is relevant to 
assess the appropriability trade-off. Imitation externalities stemming from 
intra-industrial spillovers favor the entry of new competitors that benefit of 
knowledge ready-to-use with negative effects that are far stronger than the 
positive ones. Knowledge externalities stemming from inter-industrial 
spillovers take place when knowledge spilling from one party can be used 
as an input in the knowledge generation function with positive effects that 
are far larger than the negative ones.  
 
The appreciation of the joint effects of the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge and of the knowledge appropriability trade-off calls for the 
design of a new knowledge policy framework based upon the differentiation 
of both public subsidies with respect to their actual additionality and IPR 
with respect to terms and levels of exclusivity (See Chapter 6). 
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The exclusivity of patents should vary according to the uses of knowledge 
whether it is intraindustrial and hence an input –ready-to-be-used into the 
technology production function of competitors in the same product market, 
or interindustrial and hence an input into the knowledge generation function 
of firms active in other product markets. 
 
FIGURE 2.3 A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE APPROPRIABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7  KNOWLEDGE AND FINANCE 
Both the generation and the exploitation of knowledge, as an economic 
good, are characterized by high levels of risks that reach almost the 
threshold of radical uncertainty. The Schumpeterian legacy provides the 
basic tools to explore the implications of the limitations of knowledge as an 
economic good with respect to the provision of finance to fund its generation 
and use.  
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The high levels of risks that characterize both the generation -the outcome 
of research activities is characterized by levels of risks close to uncertainty- 
and the exploitation of knowledge -the actual appropriability of the 
knowledge generated is at risk-  expose research activities  to substantial 
credit rationing and excess costs of financial resources. 
 
In his Theory of economic development Schumpeter stresses the central role 
of the “innovative banker” for the provision of appropriate financial 
resources to fund the introduction of innovations by entrepreneurs. The 
innovative banker is the indispensable interface between financial resources 
and innovation. The banker is innovative when he is able to spot new 
opportunities and select, among the myriads of the business proposals that 
are daily submitted, those which have higher chances to get through the 
system and yield successful innovations. With a given quantity of financial 
resources the innovative banker should be able to reduce the flow of funds 
towards traditional activities and switch them towards the new innovative 
firms. Actually, the innovative banker should be able to identify the obsolete 
incumbents that are going to be forced to exit by the creative destruction 
that follows the entry of successful innovators. 
 
The historic evidence has shown that debt finance for innovation suffers a 
major limit. Banks suffer an intrinsic asymmetry: they are fully exposed to 
the failures of risky undertakings but cannot participate to the extraordinary 
profits of the rare undertakings that actually survive and introduce 
successful innovations. 
 
Debt finance exerts a perverse effect on the rate of introduction of 
innovations. In order to compensate for the capital losses stemming from 
non performing loans bankers in fact need to charge high interest rates. High 
interest rates charged to new ventures are themselves a cause of failure that 
reduces the chances of successful introduction of innovations. Only radical 
innovations with high levels of profitability can survive the financial 
burden.  
 
To cope with the limitations of intrinsic asymmetry, in Continental Europe 
the “innovative banker” implemented the mixed banking system that 
combines deposit banking with investment banking and provides long term 
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loans to new industrial ventures and participate into their equity. Mixed 
banking could support the successful introduction of innovations via the 
participation into their equity: the capital gains of the winners could balance 
the losses of the loosers. At the same time, however, the increasing share of 
long term investment had negative effects on the portfolio of banks, reduced 
their liquidity and exposed them to dramatic failures that lead to the collapse 
of a large part of the European financial system especially in Austria, 
Germany and Italy in the third decade of the 20th century  
 
Schumpeter not only realized the limits of the “innovative banker” but 
identified the advantages of the new model emerging in the US economy at 
the beginning of the XX century. The analysis of the corporation as the 
institutional alternative to the ‘innovative banker’ has been laid down in 
Capitalism socialism and democracy. Here Schumpeter identifies the large 
corporation as the driving institution for the introduction of innovations. 
Schumpeter is very clear in stressing the role within corporations of the 
internal financial markets where the resources extracted by extra-profits can 
match the competences of skilled managers and the vision of potential 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, the corporation can act as an intermediary 
between the credit markets and the provision of funds for new innovative 
undertakings. The corporation can borrow, acquire financial resources at 
low costs for the low risks associated with its status of large incumbent with 
barriers to entry, stir and select new undertakings, fund directly the new 
ventures and participate in the provision of selective equity.  
 
The intrinsic asymmetry between the provision of credit and equity to new 
ventures is solved by means of the internal financial markets that favor the 
matching between resources, technological knowledge and market 
competence. Schumpeter praises the large corporation as the institutional 
device that makes it possible to increase both the incentives and the 
efficiency of the innovation process. The internal markets of the 
Schumpeterian corporation substitute external financial markets in the key 
role of the effective provision and correct allocation of funds combining 
financial resources and entrepreneurial vision within competent hierarchies 
(Chandler, 1962 and 1977). 
 
59			
According to Stiglitz (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) equity finance can 
participate into the bottom tail of the highly skewed distribution of positive 
returns stemming from the generation of new knowledge and the 
introduction of new technologies. This has important consequences in terms 
of reduction of both the risks of credit rationing and the costs of financial 
resources for research activities. Lenders in fact need to charge high interest 
rates in order to compensate for the risks of failure and to sort out a large 
portion of the new research activities to avoid as many ‘lemons’ as possible. 
Equity investors instead find an equilibrium rate of return at much lower 
levels because they can participate into the huge profits of a small fraction 
of the new ventures. The fraction of lemons that equity can support is much 
larger than that of debt, hence, as a consequence, financial equity can 
provide a much larger amount of funding for research activities.  
 
With a second line of analysis Stiglitz has questioned the apparent 
superiority of equity finance over debt finance with the distinction between 
hierarchies and polyarchies as alternative mechanisms to manage different 
types of risks (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986 and 1988). Hierarchical decision-
making is better able to avoid the funding of bad projects. Yet the ability of 
hierarchies is limited by the scope of their competence: their decision-
making tends to favor minor, incremental changes and exclude radical 
innovations with typical Type 2 errors. Polyarchic decision making, on the 
opposite, experiences higher risks to including bad projects, e.g. Type 1 
errors, but yields higher chances of inclusion of outstanding projects. 
According to Stiglitz, hierarchical decision-making fits better in economic 
environments characterized by low levels of entropy and radical uncertainty. 
Conversely, polyarchic decision-making applies better in times when the 
levels of radical uncertainty are higher.  
 
The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 errors proves to be very useful 
to assess the working of alternative mechanisms and forms of decision 
making in the selection and implementation of new technological 
knowledge. The argument elaborated by Stiglitz can be used upside-down 
so as to investigate what type of decision-making yields higher results in 
terms of the generation of new technological knowledge and the eventual 
introduction of innovations. 
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Hierarchies are more likely to incur Type 2 errors that arise when good 
innovative projects are excluded. Hence hierarchical decision-making has 
higher chances to favor incremental innovations and to exclude innovative 
undertakings that are disruptive and may trigger problems in terms of 
discontinuities both with respect to the existing knowledge base and sunk 
costs. Polyarchic decision-making, based upon a variety of competences, 
selected on a professional basis according to their expertise and less exposed 
to vested interests, on the opposite, favors the inclusion of a wider range of 
projects. As a consequence, polyarchies tend to include also bad projects. 
But the likelihood that outstanding projects are retained is much higher. The 
occurrence of radical innovations seems higher with polyarchic 
architectures. 
 
The combination and implementation of the two tools provided by Stiglitz 
enables the comparative assessment of the alternative institutional 
mechanisms designed to handle the relationship between finance and 
innovation and identified by Schumpeter: banks and corporations. The 
analysis of their limitations, with the tools provided by Stiglitz, enables to 
identify the emerging venture capitalism as a third distinctive mechanism.  
 
Banks can be considered much closer to polyarchic decision-making. They 
can rely upon a variety of expertise and competence that are hired on a 
professional base. Their competence is much less constrained by a given 
scope of expertise and the effects of irreversibilities and vested interests are 
much lower. As such banks seem better able to avoid Type 2 errors. Banks 
have a clear advantage in the screening process, but their action is limited 
by clear disadvantages in the participation to the profits stemming from new 
innovative undertakings. Banks are exposed to the intrinsic asymmetry 
between debt and equity in the provision of funds to innovative 
undertakings. This is true especially when radical innovations occur. The 
higher the discontinuity brought about by radical innovations and the larger 
the risks of failure of new companies. Banks bear the risks of the failure of 
firms that had access to their financial support but cannot share the benefits 
of radical breakthroughs. As Schumpeter himself realized, this model, 
although practiced with much success in Germany in the last decades of the 
XIX century, suffered from the severe limitations brought about by this 
basic asymmetry.  
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The Schumpeterian corporation confirms that equity-finance is more 
effective than debt-finance for channeling resources towards innovative 
undertakings, but with a substantial bias characterized by continuity with 
the existing knowledge base. The model of finance for innovation based 
upon the corporation ranks higher than the model based upon banks as far 
as equity-finance is more efficient than debt-based finance with respect to 
risk sharing, but has its own limitations arising from the reduction of the 
centers able to handle the decision-making and the ensuing reduction of the 
scope of competence that filters new undertakings.  
 
In the second part of the XX century a few corporations concentrated 
worldwide a large part of the provision of finance for innovation. The 
limited span of competence of a small and decreasing number of incumbents 
made more and more difficult to identify and implement new radical 
technologies: a case of locked-in-competence could be observed. The 
corporation has been able for a long part of the XX century to fulfill the 
pivotal role of intermediary between finance and innovations, but with a 
strong bias in favor of incremental technological change. The screening 
capabilities of corporations fail to appreciate radical novelties. 
The new financial markets are becoming a key component of an innovation 
driven novel institutional setting and subsystem termed “Venture 
Capitalism” which is key for a new model of ‘knowledge-based’ growth 
potentially relevant not only for ICT but also (with adaptations) for 
biotechnologies and new technologies at large.  
 
Venture capitalism is a major institutional innovation based upon the 
identification of economies of scope in the transactions of technological 
knowledge bundled with managerial competence, reputation, screening 
procedures and equity. It has paved the way to the emergence of new 
surrogate markets for knowledge, i.e. financial markets specialized in the 
trade of knowledge intensive property rights with important benefits in 
terms of economics of size in portfolio management and hence profitability 
of investments in high-tech startups. The emergence of venture capitalism 
has important effects in national system of innovation of advanced 
countries, and it is a powerful mechanism for the production, dissemination 
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and integration of knowledge in advanced capitalistic economies, and 
thereby a main driver of a ‘knowledge-based’ growth. 
 
A mechanism based upon a screening procedure performed by competent 
polyarchies and the equity-based provision of finance to new undertakings 
would clearly combine the best aspects of each model. Venture capitalism 
seems more and more likely to emerge as the third major institutional set-
up able to manage the complex interplay between finance and innovation 
when radical changes take place. As a matter of fact, venture capitalism 
combines the advantages of distributed processing typical of polyarchies 
with the advantages of equity-based finance over debt-based finance. 
Venture capitalism in fact makes it possible to combine the more effective 
identification of radical innovations with the more effective sharing of risks 
associated to the provision of funds.  
 
The bank-based provision of funds to innovation suffers the limits of debt-
based finance but ranks higher in terms of distributed processing. The 
advantages of distributed processing are larger, the larger is the number of 
banks, and the larger is the number of independent agents that participate 
into the screening process. The corporation model is less able to avoid Type 
2 errors but enjoys the advantages of the equity-based provision of finance 
to innovation. The corporation model suffers especially from the grip of the 
past that sunk-costs and the irreversibility of tangible and intangible capital 
exerts upon the appreciation of new disruptive technologies. It is also clear 
that the smaller is the number of corporations that control the funding of 
innovative undertaking and the higher the risks of Type 2 errors at the 
system level. Venture capitalism seems able to combine the advantages of 
the corporation model in terms of equity-based provision of funds for 
innovation, with the distributed processing typical of the banking system.  
 
Venture capital companies perform the crucial selective provision of: i) the 
necessary financial resources with the direct participation into the equity of 
new firms; and ii) management able to support scientific entrepreneurs in 
the engineering process that leads to the production of prototypes and their 
marketing test. Venture capital companies rely on qualified polyarchies to 
identify the promising ventures and are able to minimize both errors of 
exclusion and inclusion. Market trials enable to test the transformation of 
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scientific knowledge into technological knowledge and its actual scope of 
application to the downstream economic activities run by corporations. 
Successful start-ups enter eventually the financial markets. The funders can 
cash the large capital gains that compensate for the losses stemming from 
the large share of failures. Capital gains are especially large when 
corporations acquire by means of take-overs the new high-tech public 
companies and integrate them into their production process. The acquisition 
of the new public companies complements if not substitutes the internal 
performance of R&D activities. Financial investments provide the demand 
for the output of the new knowledge industry. 
 
The emergence of the new, dedicated financial markets specialized in the 
public transactions of the knowledge intensive property rights of new 
science-based start-up companies, is the necessary complementary 
institutional and organizational innovation that makes venture capitalism 
possible.  
 
2.8 KNOWLEDGE AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
The special characteristics of knowledge in terms of limited appropriability 
and exhaustibility are the basic determinant of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities that account for the likelihood of the creative response of firms 
caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions, hence are indispensable for the 
introduction of innovations and the increase of total factor productivity. The 
actual output levels are larger than the expected equilibrium ones because 
knowledge, an essential input into the creative response, can be generated 
and used, in qualified institutional conditions, at costs that are below its 
equilibrium levels. 
 
Following Solow (1957), we know that the level of total factor productivity 
is measured by the ratio between the real historic levels of output Y, and the 
theoretical one Y*: 
(1) A = Y/Y*  
 
In the new growth theory, knowledge is assumed to be able to trigger total 
factor productivity automatically. Knowledge output splits in two parts: i) 
an appropriable output that contributes standard production processes with 
constant returns to scale at the firm level, and ii) an appropriable output that 
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spills in the atmosphere and contributes to increasing the general levels of 
total factor productivity. Knowledge externalities are assumed to be 
compatible with general equilibrium conditions as they cannot be 
appropriated by individual agents and apply at the system level. Spillovers 
stemming from the limited appropriability of knowledge are freely and 
symmetrically available to all the agents in the system.  
 
In our approach, the limited appropriability and exhaustibility of knowledge 
may have positive effects in terms of the increase of total factor productivity 
only if firms are willing to undertake the risky and expensive activity that is 
necessary to try and generate new technological knowledge as a part of their 
creative reaction to out-of-equilibrium conditions. Such positive effects do 
take place only if the systemic conditions to accessing and using the stock 
of quasi-public knowledge support the creative response of firms. The actual 
cost of accessing and using the quasi-public stock of knowledge, as 
determined at the system level by the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanisms, as well as by its size and composition, together with the out-
of-equilibrium conditions that urge firms to try and elaborate a creative 
response are the contingent and highly idiosyncratic conditions that account 
for total factor productivity growth. 
 
Total factor productivity levels depend upon the cost of accessing and using 
the stock of knowledge: A > 1 when knowledge costs are below equilibrium.  
 
After Griliches (1979), in fact, the stock of technological knowledge (TK) 
enters directly, as an indispensable input, next to standard -fixed- capital (K) 
and labor (L), a standard Cobb-Douglas production function of all the other 
goods with constant returns to scale. The theoretical level of Y is calculated 
as the result of the equilibrium use of production factors: 
(2) Y* = 𝐾,𝐿.𝑇𝐾0                                                                                              
where K, L and TK are the productive factors and α, β and γ their respective 
output elasticity. The marginal rates of technical substitution are: 																		 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐿𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐾 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝐾
,𝐿.:J𝑇𝐾0𝛼 ∙ 𝐾,:J𝐿.𝑇𝐾0 = (𝛽/𝛼)(𝐾/𝐿)	
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(3)           
MNMOMNMPQ = 			 .∙>RSTU5B>V0∙>RSTB>VU5 	(𝛽/𝛾)(𝑇𝐾/𝐿)																																																 
																 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝑇𝐾𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐾 = 𝛾 ∙ 𝐾
,𝐿.𝑇𝐾0:J𝛼 ∙ 𝐾,:J𝐿.𝑇𝐾0 = (𝛾/𝛼)(𝐾/𝑇𝐾)	
 
Denoting with r, w and s the unit price of the three indispensable production 
factors in the production of Y, the cost equation is 
 
(4) 𝐶 = 𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿 + 𝑠𝑇𝐾																																																																												 
Profits can be defined as: 
(5) 𝜋(𝑌) = 𝑝𝑌(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑇𝐾) − 𝑟𝐾 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑠𝑇𝐾																																																							 
where p is the price of the output Y. 
The first order conditions can be obtained by deriving (5) with respect to 
factors K, L and TK, and putting equal to zero. This can be expressed as 
follows: 
 																													`a`> = 𝑝 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝐾,:J𝐿.𝑇𝐾0 − 𝑟 = 0 
(6) 																													`a`S = 𝑝 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ 𝐾,𝐿.:J𝑇𝐾0 − 𝑤 = 0                                                     
                          `a`B> = 𝑝 ∙ 𝛾 ∙ 𝐾,𝐿.𝑇𝐾0:J − 𝑠 = 0. 
From equation (6), the equilibrium conditions are: 
                                 𝑤/𝑟 = (𝛽/𝛼)(𝐾/𝐿) 
(7)                                    𝑤/𝑠 = (𝛽/𝛾)(𝑇𝐾/𝐿)     
                                         𝑠/𝑟 = (𝛾/𝛼)(𝐾/𝑇𝐾). 
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Firms select the equilibrium mix of inputs such that the relative unit costs 
are equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution. Corresponding to 
these three conditions, the profit maximizing firm will identify TK*, K* and 
L*, i.e. the equilibrium levels of the production factors. In such equilibrium 
conditions the theoretical (Y*) and historic (Y) levels of output would 
necessarily coincide. 
 
Knowledge, however, is not a standard economic good. Because of its 
limited exhaustibility, and hence cumulability and extensibility, its actual 
generation costs (s) can be lower that its theoretical costs (s*):  
 
(8) s< s* 
The access and the use of the stock of knowledge are not free. Knowledge 
externalities are pecuniary rather than technical. The use of knowledge as 
an input is possible only at a cost. Hence knowledge spillovers yield 
pecuniary knowledge externalities rather than pure externalities. The 
introduction of the notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities applies 
directly to the knowledge generation function and indirectly to the 
technology production function.  
 
The cost of accessing and using the stock of technological knowledge may 
be lower than equilibrium when not only its size and variety are large but 
also when the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms is high. As a 
consequence, when firms try and cope with the out-of-equilibrium 
conditions of product and factor markets, and “discover” that the actual cost 
of knowledge is below equilibrium levels, the actual amount of 
technological knowledge (TK) that enters the technology production 
function can be larger than in equilibrium conditions. Output levels are 
consequently larger as reflected by the levels of total factor productivity. 
The amount of the residual –the difference between Y and Y*- and the actual 
levels of total factor productivity (Y/Y*) depends on the extent of the gap 
between s and s*. 
 
The analysis of the knowledge generation function is indispensable to grasp 
the determinants of the gap between s and s*.  
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In the knowledge generation function the knowledge flow (KN) is the output 
of the recombination of the existing knowledge. The knowledge generation 
function has two basic and indispensable inputs: the standard research and 
development activities (R&D) and the stock of the quasi-public knowledge. 
The stock of quasi-public knowledge is the sum of the flows of knowledge 
output (Σ KN) accumulated until that time (TKt-1) and rooted in the 
interaction and coordination mechanisms of the knowledge governance at 
work in the system where firms are based. The knowledge generation 
function and its cost equation can be formalized as it follows: 
 
(9)   KN = (R&D, TKt-1)  
(10) KNC = cwR&D + zTK(t-1) 
 
For a given budget available for the generation of new knowledge (KNC) 
the amount of knowledge produced at each point in time (KN) depends upon 
the cost of creative labor (cw) that performs R&D activities and the costs of 
accessing and using the stock of quasi-public knowledge (z). The unit cost 
of accessing and using the indispensable stock of quasi-public knowledge z 
depends upon the size and variety of the stock itself and the quality of the 
knowledge governance mechanisms in place within the system. 
 
The quality of knowledge governance mechanisms i.e. “the array of 
institutional settings that combine and integrate market transactions, 
personal interactions and communication, ex-ante and ex-post coordination 
both among firms in the economic system and between them and the 
academic system created by the State” and makes possible the use of the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge, plays a central role in this context 
(Ostrom, 2010; Antonelli 2015a: 232). 
 
Knowledge externalities exert their pecuniary effects twice because they 
consist in: i) the reduced cost (s) of the stock of knowledge (TK) that enters 
as an input the technology production function (see eq.1) of the goods, ii) 
and in the reduced cost (z) to accessing and using the stock of knowledge 
(TKt-1) that is necessary to produce the flows of new knowledge (KN) in the 
knowledge generation function (see eq.9) (Crépon et al. 1998; Antonelli, 
2018c).   
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At the system level total factor productivity is large(r) when the generation 
of technological knowledge takes place within economic systems that have 
larger and wider stocks of knowledge and high(er) levels of knowledge 
governance such that the costs of access and using –again- knowledge (z) 
are low(er) and consequently the cost of knowledge as an input into in the 
technology production function (s) is also low(er).  
 
The dynamics of knowledge accumulation and total factor productivity 
growth depends upon the evolution of the size and variety of the stock of 
knowledge as well as upon the quality of the knowledge governance 
conditions that may improve and foster or decline and undermine the access 
and use conditions of the quasi-public stock of knowledge. The difference 
between actual and theoretical knowledge costs is influenced by the costs of 
access and use of the spillovers (z).  
 
If accounting procedures were able to appreciate properly the effects of the 
capitalization of knowledge, both as an input and an output, and the market 
price of knowledge were in equilibrium, the organization of the generation 
of knowledge whether it takes place vertically integrated within innovative 
firms, or in specialized firms within the knowledge industry, would not 
influence the economic understanding of the relationship between 
knowledge as a special economic good and total factor productivity. The 
capitalization of knowledge as an asset as in the case of a patent or in the 
stock market value as in the case of a start-up or any knowledge intensive 
company acquired by means of take-overs and generally merger and 
acquisition at the current accounting system, however, is registered as 
production of wealth and not revenue. In such conditions the shift from a 
generation of knowledge vertically integrated to a generation of knowledge 
specialized in independent knowledge firms and traded in the knowledge 
markets has strong effects in terms of total factor productivity and 
accountability. 
 
When the generation of technological knowledge becomes the output of 
specialized upstream firms within the knowledge industry the difference 
between s and s* is determined by the user-producer relations. When 
downstream knowledge users are “supplier-dominated”, upstream 
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knowledge producers are able to retain a large share of the difference 
between the actual generation costs (s) and the theoretical costs (s*). As a 
consequence, the “apparent” levels of total factor productivity are (seem) 
lower. Total factor productivity is (seems) larger when the upstream 
knowledge industry sells at low costs, closer to s*, its knowledge output, 
and a larger share of the residual is appropriated by downstream customers 
that use it to introduce innovations. 
 
Knowledge is a special good with characteristics -strictly contingent upon 
the structure of the system into which its generation and exploitation take 
place- that account for the levels and the rates of increase of total factor 
productivity.  
 
When the generation and exploitation of knowledge do not take place in 
appropriate contexts, in fact, the case for market failure applies. Knowledge 
market failure impedes the creative response of firms that try and cope with 
emerging mismatches between expected and actual product and factor 
market conditions. Economic systems are not able to organize viable 
Schumpeterian growth regimes cannot take advantage of the opportunities 
provided by knowledge and are doomed to adaptive responses that trap them 
into equilibrium conditions.  
 
When the generation and exploitation of knowledge take place in highly 
qualified institutional and economic contexts that enable high quality 
mechanisms of knowledge governance and the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge enables its effective accumulation into large and varied stocks 
of quasi-public knowledge that can be accessed and used at low costs, the 
cost of knowledge as an output is far below the equilibrium cost of any 
standard good. When knowledge costs fall below equilibrium levels, the 
consequent pecuniary knowledge externalities support the creative response 
of firms caught in out-of-equilibrium conditions and are at the origin of the 
eventual introduction of innovations and total factor productivity growth.  
 
This dynamics is fully recursive and highly path dependent. Because 
knowledge externalities are endogenous, systems able to implement and 
support appropriate and persistent levels of knowledge governance, are able 
to keep adding the new vintages of knowledge generated at each point in 
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time to the stock of quasi-public knowledge, introduce new innovations that 
cause new out-of-equilibrium conditions of product and factor markets that 
in turn stir new waves of creative response with the generation of additional 
flows of knowledge so as to reduce further its cost and experience persistent 
out-of-equilibrium conditions.  
 
2.9 THE CAPITALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
The advances of the economics of knowledge with the appreciation of the 
key role of both its limited appropriability and exhaustibility have important 
consequences on our understanding of the production process and of the role 
of the production and capitalization of knowledge. 
 
In recent years several attempts have been made to directly estimate the 
spending on assets that are ignored or imperfectly covered in the current 
firm-level (as well as national income) accounting practice. These assets 
consist of not only of technological knowledge stocks stemming from the 
accumulation of R&D expenditures but include a broader array of 
knowledge types such as employer-provided training, strategic planning by 
management and reorganization projects in the past, software, 
advertisement expenditures, reputation, brand recognition (Audretsch and 
Link, 2018). These studies have made two main findings; firstly, official 
macroeconomic data exclude a large proportion of total investments and 
assets as a result of a deficient measurement of intangibles, and secondly, 
R&D accounts for only roughly one half of the total intangible capital 
(Corrado et al, 2005). Recent contributions (Corrado et al. 2009; Marrano et 
al, 2009; Rassenfosse, 2017) make considerable progress to extending the 
list of types of knowledge assets that enter, on the input side, the definition 
of intangible capital including various forms of economic competencies, 
innovative property and digitalized information, designs and trademarks 
(Haskel and Westlake, 2017). 
 
The effort to appreciate and include the value of knowledge stocks on the 
input side has not been matched by the necessary effort to take into account 
the role of knowledge on the output side.  The capitalization of knowledge 
output as a financial asset is not properly reflected into the accounting 
methodologies neither at the firm nor at the national level. The notion of 
value added is the basic unit of analysis for all growth accounting. The 
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current methodology for the measurement of value added does not take into 
account as a source the effects of the sale of assets. An example can help to 
make better clear the point. 
 
Let us first consider the case of a tangible capital good. The production and 
sale of a tangible capital good such as a machine tool yields a clear statistical 
record in terms of sales and value added. The purchase of the machine tool 
by a company yields statistical records that contribute the aggregate 
statistics on investments.  
 
The generation and sale of an intangible capital good, such as a patent, exerts 
quite different outcomes in terms of accounting, and growth accounting. The 
generation of new knowledge is the outcome of a flow of R&D expenditures 
that are capitalized, on the input side. The new knowledge typically 
encapsulated in an IPR is accounted as an intangible capital good. Its sale 
engenders a positive gain that affects profitability, but not sales and value 
added. 
 
The same example enables to focus a second problematic aspect. The 
literature assumes that the sale of tangible capital goods is the result of a 
transaction that takes place in a competitive market so that the price is close 
to the intersection between marginal and average costs that in turn implies 
that the factor intensity of the production process is close to equilibrium. 
The literature assumes that the markets for tangible capital goods are 
characterized by many actors on the demand and the supply side. Moreover, 
the literature assumes that the tangible capital good is –quite- homogeneous 
so that many producers can supply other capital goods that share the basic 
properties and functions. The assumption about competitive conditions in 
the markets for knowledge cannot apply. Each patent represents a unique 
product with highly specific and idiosyncratic characteristics that cannot be 
replaced by –almost- any other piece of knowledge. The owner of a patent 
holds evident monopolistic power. As a consequence, the price of the 
knowledge item is far from any standard equilibrium condition.  
 
The capitalization of knowledge raises a set of problems. The sale of a patent 
by an individual or a company raises similar problems. In both cases the 
exploitation of knowledge is not recorded by standard accounting as part of 
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value added. The sale of firm whose value consists only in the financial asset 
that capitalizes the generation of knowledge represents the extreme case. 
Yet this is typically the case of start-ups supported by venture capitalism. 
The revenue of the financial transaction that transfers the intellectual 
property rights or the knowledge intensive equity from an agent to another 
does not add to the figure of value added. Total factor productivity measures 
are undermined by the missing appreciation of current accounting 
procedures of the capitalization of knowledge. 
 
All the transactions of the equity of private firms that take place via mergers 
and acquisitions at prices that are larger than the book value make evident 
the effects of the capitalization of knowledge. It is clear the market value of 
the firm includes in most cases the capitalization of knowledge inputs that 
are accounted as intangible assets. The gap between the book value that 
includes the capitalized knowledge inputs and the market value reflects the 
difference between the value of knowledge inputs and the value of 
knowledge outputs. The value of knowledge output clearly exceeds the 
value of knowledge inputs where both are capitalized: the latter ex ante and 
the former ex post. 
 
The capitalization of knowledge output has even more evident effects when 
financial transactions in the stock markets are taken into account.  Here the 
notion of Tobin’s q plays a central role. Tobin and Brainard (1977) 
introduced the q ratio following exactly the same approach followed by 
Robert Solow to introduce the notion of total factor productivity. The q ratio 
in fact compares an expected equilibrium value of a share with the actual 
one. The expected equilibrium value of a firm (the price of a share times 
their number) should be fully reflected by the replacement costs of its assets 
(including the intangible assets and specifically the knowledge inputs 
capitalized as intangible assets). As a matter of fact, the actual value of a 
public company as calculated from the value of its shares traded in the stock 
exchange differs often radically. Specifically, the q ratio is >1 when the 
market value is larger than the book value. The discrepancy between market 
and book value is determined by the profitability of the firm. The Tobin’s q 
is >1 when profitability is above equilibrium levels and <1 when its 
profitability falls below equilibrium levels.  
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The dynamics is quite obvious: the market value of the shares of firms with 
profitability levels above the equilibrium levels are purchased by investors. 
The rise of the market value takes place until its profitability, measured by 
the ratio of profits to the market value, matches equilibrium levels. 
Assuming that product and factor markets are in equilibrium the 
introduction of innovations is the single driver of profits above equilibrium 
levels.  
 
When the role of knowledge is taken into account as the necessary condition 
for the introduction of innovations, Tobin’s q provides a reliable measure of 
the capitalization of knowledge. Tobin’s q in fact identifies the implicit 
value of knowledge capital that is not properly accounted by the 
replacement costs of firms’ assets as the difference between the replacement 
costs of firms’ assets and the market value of a public company. Here the 
analogy between Solow’s TFP and Tobin’q is clear. The value of knowledge 
capital is the residual.  
 
When a public company is able to earn extraprofits stemming from the 
successful introduction and exploitation of technological and organizational 
innovations, investors are keen to buy its shares in the stock market.  The 
price of the shares and hence the market value of the firm increase until its 
profitability, i.e. the ratio of the extraprofits to the new increased market 
value, matches average levels. Profitability is brought back to equilibrium 
levels. The dynamics of capitalization in the stock markets, in other words, 
enables to restore equilibrium conditions.  
 
When perfect conditions of competitive equilibrium apply, even after the 
introduction of an innovation, the immediate entry of new competitors and 
imitators in the product and factor markets would impede the appropriation 
of the benefits of innovations at the firm level and sweep away all 
extraprofits. Hence the relationship between innovation and profits would 
not take place. When, instead, innovators can take advantage from transient 
monopolistic power and appropriate a share of the benefits of innovations 
in terms of profits, their profits increase and the ratio of profits to the book 
value becomes larger than the equilibrium levels. The basic conditions of 
equilibrium at the system level are altered and out-of-equilibrium conditions 
risks to spread through the markets. The stock markets restore equilibrium 
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conditions (Antonelli and Teubal, 2008 and 2010; Antonelli and 
Colombelli, 2011a).  
 
This conceptual relationship between market value and innovation-cum-
knowledge has been much investigated. Starting with the seminal work of 
Griliches (1981), an array of works has related Tobin’s q with the intangible 
capital that enables firms to generate technological knowledge and 
introduce technological and organizational innovations that reduce costs 
and increase output and, consequently, the profitability that stems from the 
appropriation of the stream of rents secured by knowledge exploitation 
(Cockburn and Griliches 1988; Coad and Rao, 2006).  
 
Financial markets, with the dynamics of capitalization, provide a remedy to 
the out-of-equilibrium conditions engendered by the generation of 
knowledge below its equilibrium levels –because of the effects of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities in the recombinant generation of knowledge- and 
substitute for the missing equilibrium in product and factor markets. The 
capitalization of knowledge in financial markets absorbs the out-of-
equilibrium conditions engendered by the introduction of innovations. 
Capitalization converts ‘extraprofits’ in ‘extracapital’ and in so doing 
restores equilibrium conditions in the relationship between actual profits 
and equilibrium rates of return.  
 
As a consequence, however, it is clear that the capital endowments 
themselves become endogenous. Now the market value of the company 
depends upon its profits. In equilibrium conditions on the product and factor 
markets the relationship works the other way around: the profits of the firm 
depend upon the price of capital. When the introduction of innovations alters 
the equilibrium conditions of competitive markets a divide and a 
discrepancy widen between the market value and the book value of a 
company, both private and public, until the dynamics of capitalization in the 
stock markets enables to restore equilibrium conditions as described. 
 
As a matter of fact, the working of financial markets transforms total factor 
productivity (TFP) into knowledge capital. The capitalization of knowledge 
contains and provides valuable information on the actual amount of 
profitable technological innovation introduced by each firm that is above 
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the levels captured by R&D and patent statistics and converts it in a reliable 
measure of the actual worth of the knowledge capital that has not been 
properly accounted because of the difference between the cost of knowledge 
–including its stock- and its actual contribution to output. The estimated 
value of the stock of knowledge capital provided by Tobin’s q is able to 
capture the correct “equilibrium” amount of knowledge. At the same time, 
however, it reduces the levels of total factor productivity. The customers of 
the knowledge capital -typically the take-over of a high tech startup- record 
the purchase of an intangible capital that has been augmented by the 
appreciation of the knowledge capital. As a consequence, the amount of 
capital in downstream users increases with the ultimate effects of 
downsizing the residual and hence the levels of total factor productivity.  
 
The additional market value of the firm measures directly the gap between 
the capitalized value of the knowledge capital based upon knowledge inputs 
and the actual market value that is able to capture the actual total value of 
the knowledge output. Tobin’q is a consistent measure of the gap between 
the value of the capitalized knowledge inputs and the capitalized value of 
the knowledge output. The Tobin’s q becomes, consequently, a reliable 
measure of the total output of the knowledge generation process that, 
because of the effects of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge is larger 
than expected in equilibrium conditions. 
 
Tobin’s q substitutes the TFP. The two measures can be considered two 
alternative indicators of the effects of out-of-equilibrium conditions 
engendered by innovation. As a matter of fact, both the Tobin’s q and the 
TFP reflect and measure the effects of the introduction of innovations on the 
equilibrium conditions of product and factor markets. More specifically, as 
Antonelli and Colombelli (2011a) show, the out-of-equilibrium conditions 
engendered by TFP, are the cause of Tobin’q values. Yet the working of 
financial markets, measured by the Tobin’s q, leads to the actual substitution 
of TFP. The larger are the Tobin’s q and the lower are the TFP levels for 
downstream users, i.e. the rest of the economy.   
 
Firms able to generate new technological and organizational knowledge at 
costs below equilibrium because of its limited exhaustibility and 
appropriability, to use it to implement a creative response to out-of-
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equilibrium conditions in their product and factor markets and introduce 
technological and organizational innovations and to appropriate their 
economic benefits, are able to produce more output with given levels of 
inputs. Output levels that are larger than expected equilibrium levels are the 
cause of performances above equilibrium levels and specifically larger 
profits. Profits above equilibrium engender the increase of the market value 
of the shares of the innovative firm (Antonelli, 2017a).  
 
The additional knowledge capital reflected in a given time interval by the 
corresponding increase of the levels of Tobin’s q in the same unit of time 
should be accounted as an intrinsic component of the total output of a firm. 
The inclusion of knowledge capital on the output side becomes a key issue 
not only for growth accounting, but a necessary and indispensable step to 
grasping the capitalization of knowledge output, intrinsically and 
systematically larger than knowledge inputs, as the distinctive characteristic 
of the knowledge growth regime. The analysis of the capitalization of 
knowledge as an output made possible by the Tobin’s q reveals the limits of 
the accounting procedures of the intangible assets as inputs that are being –
slowly- adopted by national accounts following the methodology 
implemented by Corrado et al. (2005 and 2009). 
 
The accumulation and exploitation of knowledge as capital becomes the 
distinctive character of the knowledge economy. The knowledge economy 
is characterized not only by the production and use of knowledge intensive 
business services, but also by the exploitation and valorization of knowledge 
as a critical component of total capital.  
 
The assessment of the economic value of the stock of knowledge and its 
incremental addition is based upon financial markets with five distinct 
mechanisms: i) the trade of knowledge as an asset in the quasi-markets for 
knowledge; ii) its –indirect- valorization by means of the Tobin’s q3; iii) the 
merger and acquisition by corporations of start-up companies after they 
entered the stock market and became public companies by means of IPO 
that enable to valorize their knowledge content; iv) the capitalization of 
																																																								3	Current	attempts	to	take	into	account	the	role	of	intellectual	capital	do	not	seem	to	take	into	account	the	foundations	of	growth	accounting	(Ståhle,	Ståhle	and	Lin,	2015).	
77			
extraprofits as intangible assets; v) the merger and acquisition of existing 
corporations that enable to cash the intangible components of their stock.  
 
The limits of current accounting methodologies to include the revenue 
stemming from the generation of knowledge and its exploitation as a 
financial asset undermine the empirical foundations of the current analyses 
on the decline of output growth and total factor productivity increase.   	
The exploitation of knowledge, by means of its capitalization and 
transformation in financial assets, questions the basic accounting 
methodologies from two viewpoints (Byrne et al., 2016): 
 
i)  The capitalization of knowledge complemented by -transient- 
monopolistic rents leads to augmented levels of capital, that, when are 
reflected in accounting procedures on the input side, increase the levels of 
the theoretical output and hence reduces the estimated levels of total factor 
productivity. The outcome is quite paradoxical: the faster are the rates of 
introduction of new technologies and the larger their effects on the levels of 
capitalized intangible assets, and the larger will be the equilibrium level of 
output, hence the lower the rates of increase and the levels of total factor 
productivity. 
 
ii) The generation of knowledge now produces directly wealth rather than 
income. The inclusion in value added based national accounts of the wealth 
triggered by the generation and exploitation of new knowledge as a financial 
asset does not take place and yet it is strictly necessary. The total output of 
an economic system should include the knowledge that has been generated 
both explicitly as the result of a dedicated activity and implicitly as the 
outcome of learning process (Stiglitz, 1987). So far, this inclusion takes 
place in a cursory way. This omission reduces further the estimated levels 
of total factor productivity. 
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3. THE NEW KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE DIRECTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
THIS CHAPTER ELABORATES A UNIFYING APPROACH TO 
THE DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHHANGE THAT 
BRINGS TOGETHER THE FRAMEWORKS OF THE 
SCHUMPETERIAN CREATIVE RESPONSE, THE INDUCED 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, THE DEMAND PULL AND THE 
LOCALIZED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. THE INTEGRATED 
FRAMEWORK ENABLES TO EXPLORE THE EFFECTS OF 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE 
ON THE DIRECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND TO 
UNVEIL ITS KNOWLEDGE AND LABOR INTENSIVE AND FIXED 
CAPITAL SAVING BIAS. THE CORRECT ACCOUNT OF THE 
ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE AS BOTH AN INPUT AND AN OUTPUT 
ENABLES TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ACTUAL DIRECTION 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AT WORK IN THE 
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KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIME IS BIASED TOWARDS THE 
USE OF CREATIVE LABOR THAT IS CAPITALIZED AS AN 
INTANGIBLE ASSET.  
 
KEY WORDS: CREATIVE RESPONSE; LOCALIZED 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE; INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE; DIRECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE; 
TECHNOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE; KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The appreciation of the advances of the economics of knowledge enables 
to try and integrate into a unifying framework the Schumpeterian notion of 
technological innovation as a creative response and the model of localized 
and directed technological change.  
 
Their integration provides enables to accommodate in a single framework 
different and yet complementary attempts to elaborate an endogenous 
account of the introduction of technological change driven by the 
availability of technological knowledge. These approaches, in fact, share 
the basic intuition that technological change is endogenous as it is the 
outcome of the technological response of firms caught in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions contingent upon the access and use conditions of the stock of 
knowledge accumulated because of its limited exhaustibility and made 
available at the system level by its limited appropriability.  
 
3. 2. THE CREATIVE RESPONSE  
According to Schumpeter (1947) firms in equilibrium conditions are 
reluctant to try and innovate. The introduction of innovations requires the 
allocation of relevant resources in activities that are characterized twice by 
high levels of risk close to uncertainty: i) the risk intrinsic to knowledge 
generation; and ii) the risks of appropriation of the benefits triggered by the 
consequent introduction of innovations. The undertaking of innovative 
activities is not compatible with normal profits. Firms are urged to try and 
innovate when they are caught in out-of-equilibrium of their product and 
factor markets. 
 
86			
The irreversibility of the capital stock planned at time t exposes firms to an 
out-of-equilibrium condition when either factor or product markets do not 
match the expected plans. Firms need to cope with the new and un-expected 
conditions of product and factor markets. This can be dome either adjusting 
their techniques or changing their technologies. The actual conditions for 
the generation of new knowledge as determined by the quality of learning 
processes, the size and variety the stock of quasi-public knowledge, its 
access conditions shaped by  the quality of the knowledge governance 
mechanisms, play a central role in assessing the outcome of the response 
whether it can be actually creative or adaptive. If and when no knowledge 
externalities are available and the stock of competence accumulated by 
means of learning processes is small, and switching costs are low, the 
response of firms is likely to be adaptive as they can only move on the 
existing map of isoquants. The introduction of technological changes is a 
viable alternative to adaptive technical changes only when relevant 
knowledge externalities are available and learning processes are effective 
so that knowledge costs are below equilibrium levels. The introduction of 
technological changes is a creative response to the mismatches between 
planned and actual conditions of factor and product markets that can only 
take place when and if sufficient knowledge externalities and effective 
learning processes, that make the generation of new technological 
knowledge possible at costs below equilibrium with the consequent 
introduction of technological changes, are available (Antonelli, 2017a and 
2018c). 
 
The model of the creative response has relevant overlapping with the 
demand pull and induced technological changes approaches. According to 
the induced technological change approach firms introduce new 
technologies in order to cope with the changes in factor markets. In the 
induced technological change approach in fact firms are pushed to innovate 
in order to save on the factors that are becoming more expensive: 
technological change is both endogenous and intrinsically biased (Marx, 
1867; Hicks, 1932; Ruttan, 1997, 2001, Acemoglu, 2001, 1998; Aghion and 
Howitt, 2006).  
 
In the demand pull approach, the increase of the demand pulls the 
introduction of innovations. Firms are pushed to introduce technological 
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changes by the increase of the demand for their products by means of the 
increase of productivity rather than the increase of inputs (Kaldor, 1966, 
1967, 1972, 1981; Schmookler, 1966). 
 
In both cases the introduction of innovation is regarded as a response 
contingent to the changing conditions of the context into which firm are 
placed. The two traditional approaches share the view that technological 
change takes place when firms are exposed to out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. Firms are not expected to introduce innovations in equilibrium 
conditions. Out-of-equilibrium conditions are the cause of technological 
change as much as the introduction of technological change is itself the 
cause of out-of-equilibrium conditions. 
 
The two traditional approaches share another key aspect: both are based 
upon the assumption that firms are not able to cope with out-of-equilibrium 
conditions with standard technical change i.e. with the adoption of existing 
techniques available in the existing maps of isoquants. In both cases in fact 
firms try and react to the changes of their markets with changes that reshape 
the maps of isoquants.  
 
The two traditional approaches acknowledge the central role of knowledge. 
In the original Marxian approach to induced technological change, little 
elaborated by the following literature, technological knowledge plays a 
central role. According to Marx, when wages increase, capitalists are able 
to appropriate the knowledge generated by learning by doing and learning 
by using by workers, articulate it with the assistance of scientific labor, and 
embody it in new vintages of capital goods that substitute labor. The 
demand pull triggers its positive effects in terms of eventual introduction of 
technological innovations only if the additional demand for the product of 
the firm helps increasing the levels of the division of labor, which in turn 
enables higher levels of specialization that improve the competence of firms 
and their command of the enhanced generation of technological knowledge 
that finally leads to improving the efficiency of the production process. 
 
The framework of the localized technological change can accommodate the 
analysis of introduction of innovations as a creative response to the 
changing conditions of product and factor markets integrating the induced 
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and the demand pulled technological change approaches within a unifying 
framework that enables to appreciate the central role of knowledge as the 
key factor in accounting for both the direction and the rate of technological 
change. 
 
3.3. LOCALIZED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AS	 A	 CREATIVE	
RESPONSE 
 
THE FRAME 
Let us start recalling the basic elements of the localized technological 
change approach to understand how and why technological change, induced 
by changing levels of factor costs that myopic firms have not been able to 
anticipate, can trigger the creative response of firms to both changes in 
product and in factor markets as to change both the position and the slope 
of the map of isoquants (Antonelli, 1995, 2003, 2008).  
 
According to its original formulation, technological change is localized by 
the source of competence and knowledge that is acquired mainly if not 
exclusively by means of learning by doing, learning by using and learning 
by interacting (Arrow, 1962b). The localized origins of such ‘tacit’ 
knowledge limit the mobility of firms and the ray of possible techniques 
that firms can use. As Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) note “knowledge 
acquired through learning by doing will be located at the point where the 
firm (or economy) is now operating” (p. 574).  
 
In this approach, in order to introduce technological innovations such firms 
rely mainly if not exclusively upon a form of localized technological 
knowledge based upon the skills of the workforce active at the plant level 
and implemented in the interactions with customers and clients. Localized 
technological knowledge has been generated, primarily, out of learning 
activities. It is the result of bottom-up processes of induction based upon 
tacit knowledge that is eventually implemented and codified. Firms can 
improve only the technologies they have been able to practice and upon 
which they have acquired a distinctive competence that is characterized by 
an idiosyncratic and narrow scope of application.  
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Localized technological knowledge cannot be easily stretched and applied 
far away from its original locus of accumulation. These firms are not able 
to command a broad and codified base of scientific knowledge and to 
extract out of it, with the typical top-down deductive procedure, a wide 
range of new possible applications that can characterize all the range of 
production techniques represented on the full isoquant (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1969; Antonelli, 1995).  
 
Nelson and Winter have made important contributions to the theory of 
localized technological change establishing a clear link to the model of 
induced technological change.  In their model firms, induced to a local 
search by disappointing levels of profitability, introduce directed 
technological innovations: ”When firms check the profitability of 
alternative techniques that their search process uncover, a higher wage rate 
will cause certain techniques to fail the ‘more profitable’ test that would 
have ‘passed’ at a lower wage rate and enable others that to pass the test 
that would have filed at a lower wage rate. The latter will be capital 
intensive relative to the former. Thus, a higher wage nudges firms to move 
in a capital intensive direction compared with that in which they would have 
gone.” (Nelson and Winter, 1974: 900). In their model a local search, 
induced by changes in factor prices that engender a fall in profitability and 
limited to the surroundings of existing techniques, uncovers new superior 
technologies consisting in one single fixed coefficient that is able to make 
much a more intensive use of the factor that is locally more abundant.   
 
Localized technological change is inherently biased by the role of learning 
processes in the generation of technological knowledge. The creative 
response in fact is possible only when and if firms have the actual 
opportunity to generate knowledge at costs that are below equilibrium 
taking advantage of the competence at the tacit knowledge that has been 
accumulated by means of the localized learning processes. The capability 
to generating technological knowledge in turn becomes itself a factor that 
shapes not only the rate but also the direction of localized technological 
change (David, 1975; Antonelli, 1995, 2003 and 2008). 
 
Because of irreversibility, production factors can be altered only by means 
of dedicated activities and consequent switching costs, which keep firms 
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within a limited technical area and prevent significant changes being made 
to the input mix. The very amount of resources that would be necessary to 
perform the switching activities can be used to generate new technological 
knowledge and introduce new technologies that enable firms to cope with 
the new conditions of factor markets. Hence firms can consider to 
implement a creative response only when they are able to generate new 
technological knowledge based upon the valorization of tacit knowledge 
with formal R&D activities, coupled by the access and use the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge, at costs below equilibrium.  
 
The appreciation of the role of learning and more generally of knowledge 
externalities in the generation of knowledge enables to integrate into a 
unifying framework the localized technological change approach, the 
creative response and the induced and demand-pulled approaches.  
 
A GEOMETRIC EXPOSITION 
  Let	us	start	with	a	standard	Cobb-Douglas	production	function	and	its	cost	equation:  
(1)  Y = Ka  Lb 
(2)  C = rK + wL 
 
where Y denotes output in value added, K stands for capital and L for labor, 
a and b denote respectively the output elasticity of capital and labor, under 
the standard assumption of constant returns to scale; r measures capital 
rental costs and w unit wages. 
 
We assume that firms in equilibrium condition in factor markets are 
exposed to an un-expected change. They need to adjust to the new factor 
market conditions. Such adjustment is not free: it requires some adjustment 
activities. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows how a compensated change in relative factor price affects 
the viability of the previous equilibrium A. It is clear that firms cannot stay 
in the old equilibrium point A: the firm produces at costs that are well above 
the new equilibrium levels. 
91			
 
The firm can either change the technique and move to B or change the 
technology by means of the introduction of technological innovations, so as 
to find a new equilibrium in the proximity of the isocline KLA. The outcome 
will depend upon the levels of switching costs, that is the amount of 
resources that are necessary to perform all the activities that enable the firm 
to move from A to B compared to the amount of technological changes that 
can be introduced with the amount of resources that are necessary to switch. 
 
Because of the mismatch between expectations and the actual conditions in 
the markets place, and the irreversibility of the technique that had been 
selected according to the previous factor market conditions, technical 
change, defined as the movements upon the existing map of isoquants, is 
expensive.  In such conditions the introduction of a creative response, based 
upon the generation of new technological knowledge and the introduction 
of innovations, as opposed to the passive adjustment on the existing map of 
techniques, can become a viable alternative.  
 
In Figure 3.1 we see that the new equilibrium condition B requires a change 
in the factor intensity from K/LA to K/LB. These adjustments require some 
switching activity. Switching activities are resource consuming. According 
to the characteristics of the switching activities we can identify the amount 
of resources necessary to move from A to B along the existing maps of 
isoquants.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE 
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FIGURE 3.1  THE INDUCEMENT OF LOCALIZED TECHNOLOGICAL 
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Firms can now explore the possibility of introducing a new technology with 
a clear budget constraint. The introduction of a new technology requires 
dedicated inputs in terms of new knowledge. The cost of knowledge plays 
a central role. For a given budged -defined by the levels of switching costs- 
the amount of innovation that a firm can actually introduce depends upon 
the costs of knowledge. When and where the costs of knowledge are low 
and below equilibrium levels, the firm can implement a creative response. 
The cost of knowledge in turn depends upon the size and variety of the stock 
of technological knowledge available in the system, its access and use costs 
determined by the quality of the knowledge governance mechanism, and 
the learning capabilities of each firm.  	
INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
This approach enables to confront agents and economic systems with 
respect to the shape of their frontier of possible adjustments. The levels of 
switching costs that are necessary to move on the existing map of isoquants 
are regarded as a constraint. The vertical axis identifies the output that can 
be produced bearing the given level of switching costs. The horizontal axis 
identifies the output that can be produced using the resources that are 
necessary to switch, to fund the generation of new knowledge and introduce 
technological innovations.   Figure 3.2 compares three systems (as well as 
three firms) with respectively low, medium and high knowledge costs. 
Figure 3.2 shows the case of alternative distances on the horizontal axis 
reflecting different levels of output produced with different knowledge 
costs and innovation capabilities, such as OD, OE, OF, that can be obtained 
by means of the same level of resources that are necessary for all agents to 
switch from A to B. Agents able to reach OF are able to generate a larger 
output  with the introduction of innovations for a given amount of inputs, 
than agents that cannot move any farther than D.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE 
As it is shown in Figure 3.3 the solution is found by means of the 
maximization of the revenue stemming from the adjustments to the changes 
in factor markets that have driven the firm out-of-equilibrium. The result of 
the maximization is found with the help of the frontier of possible 
94			
adjustments defined by the output levels that can be produced with the 
introduction of either switching or innovation and the map of isorevenues. 
The slope of the isorevenues is necessarily =1 as we assume competitive 
markets with homogenous products and the price does not reflect whether 
firms did switch or innovate. The standard tangency between the 
isorevenues and the largest frontier identifies the best combination of 
switching and innovation that can be attained. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 ALTERNATIVE SHAPES OF THE FRONTIER OF 
POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS  OUTPUT	WITH	SWITCHING																	B	
OUTPUT	WITH	INNOVATION	O	 F	E	D	
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FIGURE	3.3		THE	EQUILIBRIUM	MIX	OF	SWITCHING	AND	INNOVATION	IN	LOCALIZED	TECHNOLOGICAL	CHANGE	
	E	
	K/LA	
	K/LB	
INNOVATION*	
	K/LE*	
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INSERT FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERTE 
 
Figure 3.4 provides a synthesis of the results of our analysis. We see in fact 
that firms exposed to unexpected changes in factor prices (the new isocost 
is tangent to the old isoquant in B far away from A) cannot stay any longer 
in the old equilibrium point A where the old isocost was tangent to the old 
isoquant. A response is necessary. Because of switching costs, however, 
firms cannot easily move from A to B.  
 
The change in the slope of the isocost engendered by the compensated 
increase in unit wages and the decline of the rental cost of capital however 
can be coped with by means of the generation of new technological 
knowledge based upon the valorization of tacit knowledge acquired by 
means of localized learning processes, both in doing and in using, based 
upon the technique defined by the factor intensity of the previous 
equilibrium conditions and the access to the knowledge externalities.  
 
Firms can implement a creative response and change their technologies 
under the constraint of remaining in the technical surrounding of the 
previous technical factor intensity so as move along an isocline. According 
to the relative ease of switching and the technological opportunities based 
upon the competence acquired by means of localized learning processes and 
knowledge externalities available in the system, firms can try and generate 
a new localized technology, i.e, a new map of isoquants that enables them 
to minimize the amount of switching. In order to restore the equilibrium 
condition, the new technology should enable firms to reach the new isocost 
(such as in C and D) and possibly go beyond. All solutions beyond the new 
isocost (such as in C1 and D1) in fact identify the actual introduction of 
new superior and localized technologies that enhance the shift efficiency of 
the firm.  
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Figure 3.4 shows that when the irreversibility of production factor is very 
high and learning is fully localized, the direction of localized technological 
change along the trajectory K/LA is labor intensive. The analysis of the 
equilibrium conditions makes the point clear.  
 
A standard textbook economics setup of the analysis of the equilibrium 
conditions helps grasping the point. Equilibrium is found when: 
(3) cd = ., >S	,  
 
With respect to eq.3 it is evident that the increase of labor output elasticity 
is the single possibility left to firms that try and cope with the increase of 
wages and cannot change the techniques in place as defined by the ratio 
K/L. A fully localized technological change is labor intensive. 
 
The implications are far reaching especially if we assume the long term 
perspective of increasing levels of wages. When wages increase and firms, 
that in the standard substitution process would try and reduce the amount 
of labor and increase the amount of capital, try and elaborate a creative 
response, provided they are able to access and use knowledge at costs below 
equilibrium, especially when learning processes play a central role in the 
generation of new technological knowledge and consequently in the 
introduction of innovations, cannot introduce but directed technological 
changes biased towards increased levels of output elasticity of labor.  
 
At a closer analysis it becomes clear that the creative response based upon 
localized technological change is intrinsically knowledge intensive. The 
introduction of new technologies can take place, in fact, only if firms are 
able to generate new knowledge, based upon localized learning processes. 
 
The augmented level of wages that is -in a historical perspective- at the 
origin of the process can be reconciled with the viability of firms by the 
increased levels of efficiency that in turn are made possible by the larger 
amount of knowledge actually available to the production process. Workers 
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contribute the process participating into the generation of new knowledge 
based upon their own learning processes. From this view point wages are 
actually efficiency wages (Stiglitz, 1974; 1987). Their marginal 
productivity includes the participation to both: i) the production process and 
ii) the knowledge generation process. After the creative response based 
upon the introduction of localized technological change we see that: i) the 
knowledge content is larger as well as, ii) the productivity levels are larger 
because knowledge costs are below equilibrium levels.   
 
SYNTHESIS 
The analysis of the creative response based upon localized technological 
change enables to identify the central role of knowledge as the enabling 
factor of the creative response. In the localized technological change 
approach to the creative response, knowledge exerts two central roles: i) it 
is the necessary condition for the creative response to take place, and ii) it 
shapes the direction of technological change. Let us consider them briefly 
in turn.  
 
Technological change can be introduced as a creative response to 
unexpected changes in product and factor markets provided that firms are 
able to rely upon knowledge that can be generated at costs below 
equilibrium. The Schumpeterian creative response can take place only if 
relevant knowledge externalities enable firms to access and use the stock of 
knowledge and are able to command relevant learning processes. The 
mismatches between expected and actual product and market conditions, the 
rise of the cost of inputs as in the induced technological change approach 
and the increase of the demand for the products of the firm, can actually lead 
to the introduction of new technologies only if firms can generate new 
knowledge at costs that below equilibrium levels and use it to introduce 
technological innovations. 
 
The Schumpeterian notion of creative response enables to accommodate in 
a single unifying framework the standard tools of the economics of 
endogenous technological change: i) the localized technological change 
approach, ii) the induced technological change and iii) the demand pull 
approach.  
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The creative response is inherently localized and knowledge intensive. 
Firms are able to implement a creative response only if they can access and 
use the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by its limited 
exhaustibility and made available through the system by its limited 
appropriability and command effective learning processes that enable to 
accumulate competence based upon the skills of their creative workers. 
 
The unifying framework provided by the merging of the localized 
technological change approach with the Schumpeterian creative response 
and the induced and demand pulled technological change hypotheses 
enables to highlight not only the central role of knowledge in making the 
introduction of technological change possible, but also its knowledge 
intensive direction along knowledge intensive corridors.   
 
The well known argument elaborated by Habbakuk (1962) and implemented 
by Paul David (1975) about the technological corridors that characterized 
the US economic growth finds here a new application. According to David 
(1975) the US economy moved along a narrow technological corridor 
characterized by the persistent introduction of capital and raw material 
intensive technologies. Such a technological corridor was induced by the 
low costs of capital and raw materials and the related accumulation of 
technological competence in a narrow technical space.  
 
Knowledge has been traditionally embodied in capital goods and could not 
be traded as a good per se because of the its low levels of tradability. The 
augmented levels of knowledge triggered by the efforts to generate the new 
technological knowledge necessary to support the creative response would 
lead to increased levels of capital intensity. Technological change has been 
historically capital intensive because the new vintages of capital were the 
single viable vector of superior technologies. 
 
As long as the contribution of knowledge can be identified, isolated and 
appreciated, the analysis, implemented so far, enables to identify the actual 
growth path of economic systems as shaped by the stock of knowledge 
available and the learning processes that act: i) supporting the generation of 
new technological knowledge at cost below equilibrium; ii) making the 
creative response of firms possible, and iii) directing it towards the 
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introduction of new technologies localized in a corridor of highly 
knowledge intensive techniques. 
 
In advanced economies the transition towards the knowledge economy 
seems to be characterized by the increasing role of disembodied knowledge 
made possible by the new mechanisms of tradability of knowledge. The new 
tradability of knowledge, based upon ICT that enable to trade disembodied 
knowledge as a service and capitalized equity, changes the mechanism of 
inclusion of knowledge in the production process and makes better clear the 
knowledge intensive direction intrinsic to technological change at large 
(Abramovitz and David, 1996 and 2001). 
 
In sum, the integration of the Schumpeterian creative response into the 
localized technological change approach helps understanding that the actual 
direction of technological change is knowledge intensive because the 
introduction of technological change is itself possible only after the increase 
of the amount of knowledge a firm and an economic system can command.   
 
3.4 DIRECTED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AS A SOURCE OF 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
The introduction of biased technological change directed at increasing the 
output elasticity of the factor that is locally abundant has strong effects in 
terms of augmented total factor productivity and competitive advantage. Let 
us analyze them in turn. 
 
The study of the effects of the direction of technological change on the 
production function enables to identify the levels of technological 
congruence defined by the matching of the relative size of outputs’ elasticity 
with the relative abundance and cost of production factors. The introduction 
of neutral technological change exerts positive -shift- effects on total factor 
productivity that can be represented by the shift of the map of isoquants. 
The introduction of biased technological change exerts not only shift effects 
but also bias effects that can be represented by the change in the slope of the 
map of isoquants.  
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The size of the bias effects depends on the matching between the direction 
of technological change and the relative factor costs. The introduction of 
labor (capital) intensive technological change in labor (capital) abundant 
countries increases the levels of technological congruence and has positive 
bias effects on the levels of total factor productivity.  The introduction of 
labor intensive technologies in capital abundant countries has negative bias 
effects but can take place, provided that its total effects on total factor 
productivity are positive: positive shift effects are larger than the negative 
bias ones.  
 
The total effect of biased technological change on total factor productivity, 
in fact, is given by the sum of the shift and the bias effects. The sum is 
positive but either component can be negative. For a given level of shift 
effects, the introduction of labor intensive technologies in labor abundant 
countries yields larger results in terms of total factor productivity than the 
introduction of capital (labor) intensive technological change: larger 
positive bias effects add to the shift ones. The introduction of labor (capital) 
intensive technologies in capital (labor) abundant countries may be so 
relevant to actually exert positive shift effects that are, however, partly 
compensated by negative bias effects (Antonelli, 2016b).  
 
The induced technological change approach has little explored the effects of 
the -and the incentives to- the direction of technological change when factor 
markets are heterogeneous. Factor costs homogeneity is, in fact, the 
standard assumption in the literature. Yet competitors that rely on the 
introduction of technological change as a tool of rivalry may be based in 
heterogeneous factor markets.  This takes place when firms have 
differentiated access to factor markets. The analysis of the effects and 
incentives to the introduction of biased technological change is much 
enriched when the assumption of homogeneous factor markets is relaxed so 
as to take into account the variety of local factor markets, 
 
The globalization of product markets makes the case of the heterogeneity of 
factor markets compelling: firms based in different countries with different 
endowments compete on the same product markets. Factor costs 
equalization should drive input costs towards convergence. Factor cost 
equalization, however, yields its effects with substantial delays: transient 
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heterogeneity is persistent. As a matter of fact, the heterogeneity of factor 
costs is found even within national markets, across regions. 
 
Factor costs differentials across regions is especially resilient in 
intermediary inputs that are themselves the local output of an economic 
system characterized by relevant pecuniary externalities. The resilience of 
factor cost differentials becomes endogenous for two reasons: i) local 
producers enjoy specific conditions that cannot be easily replicated 
elsewhere; ii) local producers can increase their supply with increasing 
returns triggered by augmented externalities. 
 
In a static context, with a given technology and hence a given mix of output 
elasticities, cost heterogeneity among competitors is itself an evident source 
of competitive advantage: firms select the factor intensity with standard 
procedures and make a more intensive use of the factor locally cheaper: 
competitors experience larger costs. In a static context, cost heterogeneity 
is a source of barriers to entry and profitability for firms that can access 
inputs at a lower cost.  
 
The strategic search for technologies that are shaped by the effort to take 
advantage of factor costs differentials that are resilient as they are 
endogenous and factor costs equalization does not exert its effects, may have 
relevant effects on the direction of technological change.  
 
The analysis of the strategic direction of technological change impinges 
upon and yet implements the Schumpeterian framework of oligopolistic 
rivalry based on the introduction of product innovations. In the 
Schumpeterian framework firms introduce new products as a tool to 
improve their competitive advantage with respect to incumbents and 
newcomers that imitate the previous products. Process innovations play a 
minor role in the Schumpeterian frame. In the broader context of the 
strategic direction of technological change, the introduction of process 
innovations characterized by the intensive use of locally cheaper inputs 
becomes an additional and actually stronger tool to improve and stretch the 
duration of the competitive advantage. Incumbents and newcomers can 
succeed in taking advantage of the uncontrolled leakage of proprietary 
knowledge but cannot access and use the inputs that are cheaper only in the 
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factor markets of innovators. The competitive advantage based upon the 
introduction of directed technological change biased towards the intensive 
use of locally cheaper input is likely to enjoy stronger appropriability and 
exert more persistent and positive effects on the profitability of innovators 
than the competitive advantage triggered by the introduction of product 
innovations. 
    
The study of the introduction of directed technological change on the cost 
function as the dual of the production function, by innovators based in 
heterogeneous factor markets, enables to identify, next to absolute 
technological congruence, the relative technological congruence. Relative 
technological congruence is found when a technology is biased towards the 
intensive use of an input that is cheaper in the local factor markets with 
respect to its costs in the input market into which the competitors are based. 
This input, however, is not necessarily the cheapest -the cheaper one- with 
respect to the others included in the production function and or available in 
the local factor markets.  
 
The intensive use of a production factor that is locally cheaper with respect 
to other factor markets where competitors are based is a major source of 
competitive advantage as it increases substantially the actual levels of 
appropriability. Even if the new knowledge that enables the introduction of 
the biased technological change spills and imitators can access it freely, its 
actual implementation yields production costs that are larger than those of 
the “inventor”. The new superior technology, in fact, forces the intensive 
use of an input that is locally more expensive for imitators than for the 
innovators. In the imitating region the negative bias effect balances the 
positive shift effect and reduces the overall positive effects of the spillover 
in terms of total factor productivity and specifically of total costs. In the 
innovating country, instead, both the shift and the bias effect can be positive, 
or in any case their sum is larger, and total cost are much lower. 
 
When technological change is biased, technological spillovers are not 
neutral. The imitation of a new directed technology forces the use of the 
very same mix of output elasticities. Imitators based in countries where the 
new technologies make a more intensive use of the -locally- more expensive 
input are deemed to experience higher operating costs with respect to 
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innovators that have directed the introduction of new technologies towards 
the intensive use of the input that is cheaper in their factor markets. Such a 
biased technological change is the source of persistent and augmented cost 
asymmetries that trigger actual barriers to entry. The direction of 
technological change yields a strong competitive advantage in the global 
product markets.    The effects of the introduction of the biased technological 
change can be fully appropriated by “innovators” (Antonelli, 2016b). 
 
The competitive advantage that is triggered by technologies with high levels 
of relative technological congruence and make an intensive use of 
distinctive and rare inputs that are cheaper only in local factor markets and 
more expensive in other factor markets, becomes itself a powerful 
inducement mechanism. The direction of technological change is induced 
by the search of higher profitability instead of higher total factor 
productivity. 
 
The distinction between absolute and relative technological congruence is 
quite important both at the system and the firm level. The levels of absolute 
technological congruence are determined by the relative cost of an input 
with respect to the cost of the other inputs -that enter the cost function- in a 
given factor market. The levels of relative technological congruence are 
determined by the relative cost of an input in a given factor market with 
respect to its cost in the factor markets of competitors. 
 
The distinction exerts major effects on the inducement mechanism. When 
absolute technological congruence matters, the innovator is induced to bias 
its technological change towards the intensive use of the input that is 
cheaper with respect to the other inputs that enter the production function. 
When relative technological congruence matters, the innovator is induced 
to bias technological change towards the intensive use of the input that 
cheaper in its factor market than in the factor market of competitors.  
 
In this latter case technological change may be directed towards inputs that 
are not cheaper in the local factor markets than the others included in the 
production function, but cheaper with respect to the factor markets where 
competitors are based. The direction of technological change will be 
intensive with respect to labor (capital or intermediary input) that is not 
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cheaper than the others included in the production function but with respect 
to the labor (capital or intermediary input) market into which the competitor 
is based. The bias component of technological change is smaller than in the 
case of absolute technological congruence. 
 
Innovators have a clear incentive to direct their technology towards the 
augmented use of the factor that exhibits different costs across factor 
markets. The bias component of total factor productivity of technological 
change directed by profitability may be lower than the bias component of 
total factor productivity that would be obtained by the introduction of a new 
technology that would increase the output elasticity of the cheapest input.  
Innovators prefer to increase the output elasticity of an input that is not the 
cheapest in their factor markets, but relatively cheaper with respect to 
competitors.   In the extreme case innovators may choose to try and 
introduce a directed technology with a large shift effect and small or actually 
negative bias effect. Because of the cost asymmetry the bias effect would be 
smaller for innovators than for imitators. 
 
When technological change is induced by the relative rather than absolute 
technological congruence, a clear conflict between social and private 
incentives takes place. Social incentives are maximized by the introduction 
of technologies directed towards the intensive use of the input(s) that is 
cheaper than the others included in the production function: in this case, in 
fact, the bias effect adds to the levels of total factor productivity determined 
by the shift effect. The innovator, however, may be exposed to the 
uncontrolled leakage of the proprietary knowledge and the consequent 
imitative entry of competitors that take advantage of it and reduce 
drastically the profitability. The search for absolute technological 
congruence benefits the system much more than the innovator. The search 
for relative technological congruence, on the opposite, benefits much more 
the innovator than the system. 
 
The innovator that biases the introduction of technological change towards 
the most intensive use of the input that is cheaper in h/er factor market but 
is not cheaper with respect to other inputs included in the production 
function may increase its profitability more than its total factor productivity, 
calculated in equilibrium conditions. Imitators can easily access the new 
107			
directed technology but cannot operate it at the same cost of the innovator. 
The search for the relative technological congruence increases h/er 
profitability much more than the overall levels of total factor productivity.  
 
Private incentives induce the introduction of directed technological change 
with high levels of relative technological congruence as they enable to 
increase the levels of profitability. The social incentives would induce the 
introduction of technological change with high levels of absolute 
technological congruence as they increase the levels of total factor 
productivity. 
 
The limited appropriability of technological knowledge triggers a contrast 
between social and private incentives as it may yield the perverse effect of 
a “wrong” direction of technological change. Actually it is possible to 
configure the extreme case of the introduction of a biased technological 
change that increases substantially the profitability of the innovator, as it 
leads to the intensive use of a rare input that is cheaper in the local factor 
market than in any other factor market, but has smaller effects on the levels 
of total factor productivity as it makes an intensive use of an input that is 
more expensive than the others included in the production function. The 
shift effect is eroded by the negative bias effect, but only to a limited and 
minor extent for innovators and to a larger extent for imitators. The 
profitability in fact is fully appropriated by the “innovator”. 
 
Firms have a strong incentive to make a strategic use of the direction of 
technological change biased towards a more intensive use of locally 
abundant factors to increase not only their relative technological congruence 
but also their profitability. The strategic bias of technological change 
enables to exploit the cost asymmetries engendered by the exclusive access 
to rare inputs that are rooted in the local factor markets.  
 
The strategic bias of technological change is all the more effective if 
innovators can rely on distinctive competences accumulated through time 
that enable them to command their use: the implementation of effective 
user-producer interactions help to take advantage strategically of factor 
differentials as much the traditional vertical integration. 
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When the determinants of factor costs differential are endogenous at the 
system level, economic policies geared towards the identification and the 
selective support of the activities that yield intermediary inputs with 
significant cost differentials with respect to imitators and possible 
competitors helps to support the direction of technological change towards 
the use of the inputs that happen to be locally cheaper. 
 
The larger are the cost asymmetries, the stronger their resilience and the 
lower the appropriability conditions and the larger are the incentives to the 
introduction of directed technological change with a "wrong" bias with 
lower levels of absolute technological congruence than it would be possible 
to obtain in homogeneous factor markets. 
 
The conflict between social and private incentives does not take place when 
the direction of technological change exhibits high levels of both absolute 
and relative technological congruence. In this case technological change is 
directed towards the input that is at the same time cheaper with respect to 
capital and labor, and cheaper in advanced countries than in industrializing 
ones. This is the case of knowledge. 
 
 
3.5 THE KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE DIRECTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  
 
It is now necessary to reconcile the results elaborated so far about the 
intrinsic knowledge intensity of the creative response as a localized 
technological change with the analysis of the direction of technological 
change (Marx, 1867; Hicks, 1932; Ruttan, 1997 and 2001) selectively 
revived by the systematic investigations of Daron Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 
2003, 2010, 2015).  
 
The aggregate evidence typically based on two-inputs accounting 
procedures has confirmed for quite a long period of time the capital 
intensive and labor saving direction technological change. The new 
empirical evidence in advanced countries highlights the increasing output 
elasticity of knowledge capital (Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003).  
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In advanced countries knowledge capital seems to be the most abundant 
factor. As such it is cheaper than standard labor and capital and cheaper in 
advanced countries than in industrializing ones. 
 
The introduction of knowledge intensive technologies in knowledge 
abundant countries increases the levels of technological congruence and has 
positive effects on both total factor productivity and profitability. The larger 
is the knowledge capital intensity direction of technological change and the 
larger are the levels of technological congruence and the larger is the output 
with a given budget and consequently the larger are the levels of total factor 
productivity and the stronger the competitive advantage of knowledge 
abundant countries. 
 
At a closer analysis, in fact, it becomes evident that the stock of 
technological knowledge capitalized as a component of the broader stock of 
capital is the actual abundant factor and the new effective source of 
competitive advantage for advanced countries. The dynamics of factor cost 
equalization coupled with the globalization of factor markets has made 
capital accessible to industrializing countries at cost and conditions that are 
close to those available to advanced countries.  
 
The relative distribution of the stocks of technological knowledge, instead, 
is far more asymmetric. Technological knowledge is far more abundant in 
advanced countries because of the unique availability of large and varied 
stocks of quasi-public knowledge and the high quality of knowledge 
governance mechanisms.  The actual direction of technological change, as 
a consequence, is intensive in the use of knowledge capitalized as an 
intangible and financial asset, rather in fixed capital. The knowledge 
intensive bias and the fixed capital saving direction of technological change 
is fully consistent with the search for technological congruence. In a global 
perspective, knowledge, rather than fixed capital, is the relatively cheaper 
input in advanced countries.  
 
Imitators based in countries with smaller and less varied knowledge stocks 
and less effective knowledge governance mechanisms can operate the new 
knowledge intensive technologies with higher operating costs. The 
knowledge intensive direction of technological change increases the levels 
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of actual appropriability and yields a strong competitive advantage in the 
global product markets (Antonelli, 2016b).  
 
According to results of our analysis, the traditional interpretation about the 
capital intensive direction of technological change, should be reconsidered. 
In the knowledge economy, in fact, total capital splits into two components: 
fixed capital and capitalized knowledge. The output elasticity of fixed 
capital is decreasing while the output elasticity of capitalized knowledge is 
increasing (Antonelli, 2018b).  
 
The composition of capital is changing. Total capital (See eq.1) splits into 
two quite distinct components: standard fixed tangible capital and intangible 
knowledge capital: 
 
(4) K = FK + TK  
 
Where FK is the stock of tangible, fixed capital and TK is the stock of 
technological knowledge. 
 
The standard aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function upon which 
much macroeconomic analysis is implemented assumes that output Y is 
produced with constant returns to scale by means of capital and labor. This 
frame can be enriched with the inclusion of the stock of knowledge as a 
distinct component of capital in the technology production function:  
 
(5)  Y = A (FKa Lb TKc) 
 
where the standard production function is enriched by the inclusion, next to 
fixed capital (FK) labor (L), of the stock of knowledge (TK). The outputs 
elasticity of the inputs are respectively a, b and c.  
 
A relevant step forward can be done by impinging on the analysis of the 
actual character of the stock of technological knowledge as the “general 
intellect”. The stock knowledge, in fact, consists of labor and cannot be 
separated from it. The generation of all goods including knowledge requires 
creative labor intensive activities able to master the use, access and eventual 
recombination of the stock of existing knowledge. Creative labor is at the 
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same time the source and the repository of the stock of technological 
knowledge. Financial markets, by means of the mechanisms identified by 
Tobin’s q, transform knowledge into intangible capital. The cumulated 
output of the knowledge generation function where creative labor is the 
input, enters the technology production function as capital and yet it cannot 
contribute the production function without creative workers able to use it.  
 
The exploitation of knowledge, however, takes place by means of its 
valorization as knowledge capital and requires the indispensable 
intermediation of financial markets. The exploitation of knowledge as a 
financial asset engenders major rent for agents able to appropriate the tacit 
knowledge generated by learning processes and to command the 
recombination of existing proprietary knowledge together with the access to 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge embedded in the institutional set-up of 
advanced countries. 
 
These arguments can be framed as it follows: 
 
(6)  TK = f(CL) 
 
The substitution of eq.6 into eq.5 yields:  
 
(7)  Y = (A) (FKa SLb (CL)c) 
  
Eq. 7 shows that the actual contribution of labor to the production of output 
at the aggregate level consists of two components: standard labor and 
creative labor that is eventually incorporated in the stock of knowledge, 
itself in turn incorporated by standard accounting procedures into a generic 
capital stock. When the role of creative labor as the ultimate source and 
repository of the knowledge stock is acknowledged, it becomes clear that 
the larger is the role of knowledge in the technology production function 
and the larger the role of (creative) labor. A gap widens between the actual 
product of (creative) labor and the rules of income distribution. Euler’s 
theorem no longer applies. 
 
The introduction of knowledge intensive technologies that augment the 
output elasticity of knowledge as an identifiable input should have the direct 
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effect of increasing the role of creative labor in the technology production 
function. According to the standard assumptions about the relationship 
between the output elasticity of production factors and their share in income 
distribution it becomes also evident that the introduction of knowledge 
intensive technologies should have the ultimate effect to increasing the share 
of income that should be paid to creative labor. 
 
The correct appreciation of the generation, exploitation and accumulation of 
knowledge has major implications for growth accounting. Because of the 
capitalization of knowledge, in fact, the share of income (that should be) 
paid to creative labor, as the source and repository of the stock of 
knowledge, adds to the share of income paid to total capital. Knowledge 
intensive technological change is actually labor intensive. Yet it is 
accounted as capital intensive because of the capitalization of the product of 
creative labor. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The twin globalization plays a central role to understand the determinants 
of this direction of technological change in the knowledge economies. The 
globalization of financial markets has favored the access of industrializing 
countries to credit provided by global financial corporations reducing both 
credit rationing and rates of interest. The spread between advanced and 
industrializing countries has fallen considerably. Capital is no longer 
relative cheaper in advanced countries. The globalization of product markets 
and the delocalization of the manufacturing industry from advanced to 
industrializing countries include tangible capital goods. The combined 
effects of the twin globalization with the production of capital goods that 
takes place in industrializing countries at lower costs and the lower user cost 
of capital induce the search for a new technological congruence that is able 
to exploit the relative abundance and lower relative costs in advanced 
countries of knowledge by means of the introduction of knowledge intensive 
technologies (Antonelli and Fassio, 2014 and 2016; Rodrik, 2013).    
 
The sharp change of the composition of the capital stock of the S&P 500 
firms, where the share of intangible assets in the total asset value jumped 
from the 16.8% of 1975 to 79.70% in 2005 (Pagano and Rossi, 2009), can 
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be regarded as a reliable clue of the strong knowledge intensive and fixed 
capital saving direction of technological change. 
 
Knowledge generation is far less footloose than the production of tangible 
capital goods. Knowledge generation and exploitation is rooted in the size 
and variety of the stocks of knowledge localized in the web of network and 
interactions and knowledge governance mechanisms that make the access 
and use possible at low costs and in the working of financial markets that 
are able to command its exploitation by means of its capitalization as a 
financial asset. 
   
The relative abundance of knowledge in advanced countries, where it is 
rooted in the localized mechanisms of knowledge governance and 
knowledge accumulation that reduce its mobility across the global economy, 
has two effects: i) to direct the search for technological congruence towards 
the increasing knowledge intensity of directed technological changes; ii) to 
favor the specialization of advanced countries in the generation of 
knowledge i.e. the production factor that is relatively cheaper and more 
abundant. The two effects i.e. the new knowledge based international 
specialization of advanced countries and the knowledge intensity of directed 
technological change reinforce each other. 
 
In advanced countries the more intensive use of knowledge as the most 
abundant input increases the levels of technological congruence and bias 
efficiency with positive -additional- effects on total factor productivity 
(Antonelli, 2016b).   
 
When the actual role of creative labor as the “repository” of the stock of 
knowledge capitalized as an intangible asset is acknowledged, the 
contribution of creative labor as an input both in the generation of new 
knowledge and in its application to the production of all the other goods is 
properly identified and the knowledge intensive direction of technological 
change is taken into account, it seems clear that the actual direction of 
technological change is intensive in knowledge i.e. the capitalized output of  
creative labor, rather in fixed capital. The direction of technological change 
is fixed-capital-saving and intangible-capital intensive from the viewpoint 
of income distribution, but creative-labor intensive from the view-point of 
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the theory of production. The distribution of the output of knowledge, in 
fact, does not match the marginal product of creative labor: creative labor 
receives much a smaller share of its output. 
 
With an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function the share of revenue 
paid to capital keeps increasing because of the introduction of labor saving 
technologies that are expressed by the decline of the output elasticity of 
labor and the increase of the output elasticity of the aggregate capital. At the 
same time, however, it is clear that the output elasticity of fixed capital 
declines while the output elasticity of knowledge as the key input is 
increasing.  
 
The dynamics analyzed so far are relevant implications: 
 i) the actual share of income paid to capital is increasing because the share 
of income paid to knowledge capitalized as a financial asset increases: the 
increasing share of creative labor adds to the overall share of capital;  
ii) the dynamics of the share of income paid to standard labor declines as 
the result of the segmentation of labor markets. Wages and employment 
levels of standard labor decline as they are exposed to globalization and to 
the powerful effects of the factor price equalization. Wages paid to creative 
labor are more resilient and are actually augmented by the new mechanisms 
of participation to the rents stemming from the exploitation of knowledge 
as a capital asset. An increasing share of creative workers is actually paid 
by means of the direct participation in capital rents and no longer in terms 
of wage. The distribution of stock options and shares of the equity of start-
ups substitutes and/or complements substantially minimum wages;  
iii) the capitalization of knowledge blurs the distinction between capital and 
labor in the distribution of income;  
iv) the flows of rents paid to knowledge capital in its two components of 
knowledge generators (creative labor) and knowledge exploiters (finance) 
keeps increasing along with the introduction of knowledge intensive 
technological change. Both income and wealth inequality increase as they 
are more and more an intrinsic attribute of a globalized knowledge economy 
based upon the international division of labor where knowledge abundant 
advanced countries specialize in the production and use of knowledge as a 
key input and output and capital and low wage industrializing countries 
specialize in the output of manufacturing industries; 
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v) the fixed-capital saving of the new knowledge-intensive technological 
change triggers the decline of investments in tangible capital goods. The fall 
of investment in tangible capital goods engenders a reduction of aggregate 
demand that makes uneasy the transition and augments the social and 
economic fragmentation of advanced economies; 
vi) the reduction of the aggregate demand is augmented by the fall of 
employment in the manufacturing industries.  
 
The dynamics articulated so far has strong self-reinforcing mechanisms. 
Because of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge, the new flows of 
knowledge add to the stock of quasi-public knowledge and keep increasing 
its size. The relative abundance of technological knowledge in advanced 
countries keeps increasing. The search for technological congruence 
reinforces the knowledge intensive direction of technological change. The 
knowledge intensity of technological change leads to the generation of 
increased flows of technological knowledge that add to the size of the stock 
of knowledge rooted in the economic systems of advanced countries and 
make knowledge even cheaper and relative more abundant, inducing further 
increases in the output elasticity of technological knowledge that reinforces 
the drive towards the international specialization in knowledge intensive 
activities. The dynamics of the process is reduced by the fall of the aggregate 
demand (Antonelli, 2016a and 2018c). 
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4. THE DYNAMICS OF KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: 
SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH REGIMES  
 
ABSTRACT. THIS CHAPTER ELABORATES THE NOTION OF 
SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH REGIMES HIGHLIGHTING THE 
CENTRAL ROLE OF THE SYSTEMIC MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERACTION AND COORDINATION 
THAT CHARACTERIZE THE GENERATION, USE AND 
EXPLOITATION OF KNOWLEDGE AS THE DISTINCTIVE 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY THAT IS AT THE HEART OF 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. IT INTRODUCES THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURIAL, CORPORATE AND 
KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIMES ACCORDING TO THE 
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INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS. 
 
KEYWORDS: KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE; CHANGING 
MECHANISMS FOR THE GENERATION AND EXPLOITATION 
OF KNOWLEDGE; SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH REGIMES; 
ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH REGIME, CORPORATE 
GROWTH REGIME AND KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIMES. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The integration of the recent advances of the economics of knowledge with 
the contributions of Joseph Schumpeter enable to frame into a unifying 
framework the variety of efforts made by the literature to elaborate a 
systemic interpretation of the general set of interdependent and structured 
interactions, coordination and institutional mechanisms that qualify the 
conditions of the economic systems into which the generation, 
appropriation, exploitation and accumulation of technological knowledge, 
the introduction of technological and structural change, and long term 
economic growth may take place.  
 
The notion of Schumpeterian growth regime enables to understand the 
endogeneity of growth and change. It shows how the organization of the 
system shapes the governance of the generation, appropriation, exploitation 
and accumulation of technological knowledge, and hence the stochastic 
determinants of the creative reaction that leads to the introduction of 
innovations. Schumpeterian growth regimes enable to focus the analysis on 
the governance mechanisms by means of which the generation, 
appropriation, exploitation and accumulation of knowledge change through 
time and shape the creative reaction that changes firms, product and factor 
markets, the structural characteristics of the system and its mesoeconomic 
and macroeconomic dynamics. 
 
The notion of Schumpeterian growth regimes builds upon his attempts to 
elaborate a systemic and yet dynamic account of the forces at work in 
economic growth. Schumpeter was in fact, at the same time, well aware of 
the systemic quality of the Walrasian approach and yet convinced of the 
need to go beyond its static limitations. Schumpeter repeatedly attempted to 
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implement a systemic frame of analysis that could account for economic 
growth in the early decades of the 20th century in Europe and eventually in 
the United States.  
 
The application of the tools provided by the economics of knowledge to a 
careful reading of The Theory of Economic Development and Capitalism 
Democracy and Socialism together with Business Cycles and the 1947 essay 
“The creative reaction in economic history” enables to elaborate a “histoire 
raisonnèe” of the dynamics of the organization of the generation and 
exploitation of technological knowledge and the introduction of 
technological change that parallel the shift across different ideal types of 
growth regimes, based upon the analysis of the changing mechanisms of 
governance of the limited appropriability and exhaustibility of knowledge 
as the engine of economic growth (Perez, 2010, Antonelli, 2015a). 
 
The notion of Schumpeterian Growth regimes enables to grasp how the 
different types of knowledge governance at work affect not only the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge but also the dynamics of the 
system, in the product and factor markets and at the aggregate level. 
 
As Schumpeter (1942:43), praising the contribution to economics of Karl 
Marx, makes clear: “There is however one thing of fundamental importance 
for the methodology of economics which he actually achieved. Economists 
always have either themselves done work in economic history or else used 
the historical work of others. But the facts of economic history were 
assigned to a separate compartment. They entered theory, if at all, merely in 
the role of illustrations, or possibly of verifications of results. They mixed 
with it only mechanically. Now Marx’s mixture is a chemical one; that is to 
say, he introduced them into the very argument that produces the results. He 
was the first economist of top rank to see and to teach systematically how 
economic theory may be turned into historical analysis and how the 
historical narrative may be turned into histoire raisonnée.” 
 
The Schumpeterian legacy has contributed to elaborate the notions of 
“Technological Regimes”, “National Systems of Innovation”, 
“Accumulation Regimes” and “Varieties of Capitalism”. They share the 
basic intuition that the introduction of innovations is determined by the 
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systemic characteristics into which firms are embedded. Let us recall then 
briefly in turn. 
 
The notion of “Technological Regime” has been first introduced by Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and enriched by the literature that builds upon the 
founding contributions by Winter (1984; 2006), Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1997) (Malerba, Orsenigo, 2000). Castellacci and Zheng (2010) provide an 
excellent synthesis of this literature. According to Castellacci and Zheng 
(2010) technological regimes are defined exclusively by the industry 
specific characteristics of the technological environment in which 
innovative activities take place such as i) the cumulativeness conditions, the 
extent to which technological activities and performances build upon the 
accumulated stock of knowledge of each firm; ii) the levels of technological 
opportunities defined as the likelihood that R&D activities may yield an 
innovative output; iii) external sources of opportunities defined as the 
amount of knowledge externalities upon which firms may access; iv) 
appropriability conditions. As Castellacci and Zheng state: “In a nutshell, 
the main insight of this approach is that the innovative strategies and 
activities of enterprises vary greatly across sectors because industries differ 
fundamentally in terms of the properties of their technological regimes” 
(Castellacci and Zheng, 2010: 1835). 
 
As it seems clear the notion of “Technological Regimes” explores the 
determinants of the variance of the rates of innovative activity at the 
industrial levels with special attention to the differences in the rates of 
introduction of innovations across industrial sectors. The conditions of 
knowledge generation and appropriation are regarded as the main 
determinants of the interindustrial variance of innovative levels. The 
Technological Regime approach makes an important contribution to the 
Neo-Schumpeterian literature that had primarily focused the types and 
intensity of competition and specifically the size of firms and the levels of 
concentration to account for the variance of innovative activity. The 
Technological Regime approach, in fact, calls attention on the role of the 
characteristics of knowledge as the determinants of the rates of innovation. 
It is worth noting that the Technological Regime approach is fully silent 
about the systemic determinants of the direction of technological change. 
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The “National Systems of Innovation” approach elaborated by Lundvall 
(1992) and Nelson (1993) extends the scope of analysis of the 
“Technological Regime” approach with a systemic analysis of the 
mechanisms put in place at the national level to support the generation of 
knowledge including the role of service industries and especially of the 
public research system. The role of the University as the prime supplier of 
basic knowledge is stressed. The interaction between research activities 
funded and performed by the private sector and the research activities 
carried out by the public research system is analyzed as a major factor in the 
generation of new knowledge. The complementarity between the different 
layers of research activities whether basic, applied or development is 
analyzed in depth together with the division of labor between the public and 
the private sector in their implementation (Fagerberg and Sapprasert, 2011).  
 
The “National Systems of Innovation” approach has stirred much research 
on the mechanisms and channels of knowledge interactions not only 
between firms and research centers but also among firms. The exploration 
of the absorption of knowledge spillovers has enabled to identify, next to 
the horizontal imitation within the same industry, the crucial role of vertical 
user-producer interactions within value chains (Von Hippel, 1988, 1994, 
1998) and the relevance of institutional, organizational, technological, and 
most importantly, geographic proximity in supporting the access and use of 
the stock of quasi-public knowledge as an input in the generation of new 
knowledge (Boschma, 2005). The “National Systems of Innovation” 
approach enables to apply the mechanisms of the knowledge governance 
approach (Ostrom, 2010; Antonelli, 2015b) 
 
The “National Systems of Innovation” approach complements the 
“Technological Regime” focusing the analysis on the role of the systemic 
interactions in the generation of knowledge and in the introduction of 
innovations at the national and regional level. Both make an important 
contribution in calling attention on the role of the systemic conditions that 
now include a broad array of institutions and procedures, to shaping the 
generation of knowledge and hence define the rates of innovation activity. 
Both approaches, however, do not take into account the crucial role of the 
relationship between finance and innovation and of industrial relations and 
corporate governance. As a matter of fact, both the notion of Technological 
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Regimes and the notion of “Systems of Innovation” share the focus on the 
determinants of the rates of introduction of innovations and do not explore 
the determinants of the direction of technological change. Neither one has 
the ambition to explore the systemic conditions of the relationship between 
the conditions of knowledge funding, generation and exploitation and the 
macroeconomic performances of the system into which firms are embedded. 
The “Accumulation Regime” and the “Varieties of Capitalism” approaches 
contribute to explore these latter aspects. 
 
The notions of “Regulation Mode” and “Accumulation Regime” have been 
introduced and implemented by the “Ecole de la regulation”. According to 
Aglietta: “For the study of a mode of production will seek to isolate the 
determinant relationships that are reproduced in and through the social 
transformation, the changing forms in which they are reproduced, and the 
reasons why this reproduction is accompanied by ruptures at different points 
of the social system. To speak of a mode of production is to try to formulate 
in general laws the ways in which the determinant structure of a society is 
reproduced.” (Aglietta, 1976/2000: 12-13).  This approach has been 
implemented systematically to distinguish between Pre-Fordist, Fordist and 
Post-Fordist Accumulation regimes. Accumulation Regimes are identified 
by six key features: i) Monetary and credit relationships; ii) the wage-labour 
nexus; iii) the type of competition; iv) the relationship between wages and 
productivity; v) the mode of adhesion to the international regime; vi) the 
types and tools of economic policy.  
 
The notion of “Accumulation Regime” is far richer and more inclusive than 
the “Technological Regimes” and the “National Systems of Innovation” 
approaches. It pays attention to the role of the financial system and generally 
to the different mechanisms of providing financial resources to innovation 
activities as well as to the levels of openness of economic systems to 
international trade and international financial markets. The core of the 
analysis is provided by the analysis of the macroeconomic coherence 
between production and distribution processes. The analysis of the 
relationship between capital and labor, as well as between management and 
employees plays a central role in the identification of the different 
“Accumulation Regimes”. The notion of “Accumulation Regimes” pays 
much attention to the wage-labor nexus and to the relationship between 
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wage and productivity. According to Boyer (1988a: 72 and 73) “the wage-
labor nexus is defined by a coherent system encompassing the following 
five components: the types of means of production and control over 
workers; the technical and social division of labor and its implications for 
skilling/deskilling; the degree of stability of the employment relation, 
measured, for example, by the speed of employment duration adjustments; 
the determinants of direct and social wages in relation to the functioning of 
labour markets and state welfare services; the standard of living of wage-
earners in terms of the volume and the origin of the commodities they 
consume.”  
 
Boyer (1988a and b) makes clear that cumulative growth is possible when 
real wage income increases with productivity. The actual development of 
the Fordist “Regime of Accumulation” took place only when real wage 
income could increase so as to make possible the actual exploitation of the 
economies of density stemming from the extensibility of knowledge. The 
distinction between price competition and oligopolistic competition is the 
third pillar. Price competition among small firms characterized the Pre-
Fordist Accumulation Regime” while the Fordist and the Post-Fordist 
“Accumulation Regimes” were characterized by oligopolisitic competition 
in final markets, based upon product differentiation where prices are derived 
from a mark-up applied to average costs, among corporations. 
 
In the analysis of the “Ecole de la regulation” the nexus between production 
and distribution plays a central role also with respect to the analysis of the 
introduction of new technologies. The introduction of new technologies is 
associated to investments following the Kaldorian tradition of the demand 
pull account of technological change. New vintages of capital embody –
necessarily- new technologies. The rate of investment is the key determinant 
of the rate of innovation.  
 
The poor analysis of the role of technological knowledge and of the 
innovation process is the main limit of the notion of “Accumulation 
Regime”. New technologies seem to be “on the shelf” readily available and 
at the same time necessarily embodied in investments. This analysis may 
apply to understanding the diffusion of innovations but fails to identify the 
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actual determinants of the generation of new technologies and of the 
introduction of new technologies. 
 
The strength of the Accumulation Regime approach on the other hand 
consists in the clear articulation of the relationship between given rates of 
generation of technological knowledge and introduction of innovations and 
the actual rates of economic growth. The main contribution of the 
Accumulation Regime approach rests on the wage-labor nexus. The analysis 
of the determinants of investments enables in fact to avoid the dangers of 
technological determinism. The very same wage-labor nexus lead to both 
the stagnation of the third decade of the XX century and the “trente 
glorieuses “. The radical difference in terms of growth of output and 
productivity is found in the shift from profit-led-investment to demand-led-
investments. The quest for profits led to shrink wages and consequently 
aggregate demand with the depressive consequences experienced in the 
third decade. The increase of wages experienced after WWII supported the 
rapid growth of aggregate demand that, via the accelerator dynamics, stirred 
additional investment that could embody new technologies with consistent 
and self-supporting productivity growth that in turn enabled to further 
increase the levels of aggregated demand.    
 
The literature on the “Accumulation Regime” has missed to stress the strict 
complementarity with the demand-pull approach to explaining the rate of 
innovation. The increase of the demand is expected to augment the extent 
of the market, hence the division of labor and the levels of specialization 
that in turn make the accumulation of knowledge and the introduction of 
innovations not only possible but also more and more convenient.   
 
The “Accumulation Regime” approach however is not able to account for 
the high levels of variance across regions, countries, industries, and historic 
time of the rates of generation of new technological knowledge and the rates 
and directions of technological change that are the ultimate determinants of 
the growth of output and productivity. This approach contributes to 
understanding the macroeconomic context into which growth may take 
place but fails to articulate the analysis of its causes. 
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Recent advances in this line of analysis, however, enabled to elaborate the 
“Cognitive Capitalism” approach according to the which advanced 
economies are centered upon knowledge as the key component of the 
process of accumulation and valorization of capital (Vercellone, 2003 and 
2006).  
 
The Cognitive Capitalism approach calls attention on the role of  learning 
by doing and learning by using in the generation of knowledge nested into 
the capitalization of knowledge as a financial asset and provides relevant 
contribution to articulating an analytical apparatus that allows to include in 
the analysis the characteristics of the social organization of the knowledge 
economy (Boyer, 2004; Petit, 1996; Vercellone, 2003; Coriat, Petit, 
Schmeder, 2006).  
The Cognitive Capitalism approach enables to grasp the overlapping of 
knowledge and capital: knowledge becomes capital by means of the 
interface between knowledge generation as a specialized activity 
intertwined with the working of financial markets that play the 
indispensable role of mechanisms of knowledge exploitation and 
valorization (Petit, 1996; Boyer and Schmeder, 1990; Jin and Stough, 1998). 
 
The “Varieties of Capitalism” approach stresses the role of the institutional 
coherence of socio-economic systems in accounting for their economic 
performances (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003). Different types of 
capitalism can be identified according to their coordination mechanisms. 
Two coordination mechanisms are identified: market-coordination 
mechanisms and institutional mechanisms. Four main economic spheres are 
investigated: i) industrial relations; ii) vocational training an education; iii) 
corporate governance; iv) inter-firms relations along value chains.  
 
Industrial relations play a central role in the analysis. They include the 
variety of bargaining relations over wages and working conditions, the 
definition of incentives and the participation of workers to the definition of 
the procedures and goals of the firms. Two alternative types of capitalism 
are identified: i) the coordinated market economies and ii) the liberal market 
economies. The former rely more on institutional coordination mechanisms, 
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the latter use the market place as the primary mechanism to coordinate the 
system. 
 
Hall and Gingerich (2004) and Kenworthy (2005:73) have elaborated a 
measure of the levels of institutional coherence based upon the following 
indicators that focus on corporate governance and industrial relations:  
(a) share of corporations based upon the separation between management 
and control, measured by the role managers coupled with dispersed 
shareholders with respect to dominant shareholders; 
 (b) relative size of the stock market, measured by the ratio of the value of 
public corporations on gross domestic product of a country;  
(c) wage coordination, measured by the level at which unions normally 
coordinate wage claims and the degree to which wage bargaining is 
(strategically) coordinated by unions;  
(d) labor turnover, measured by the share of employees who had held their 
jobs for less than one year. 
 
The levels of institutional coherence of a system are determined by the 
levels institutional complementarity: “two institutions can be said to be 
complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns 
from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001:17). 
 
The “Varieties of Capitalism” approach contends that the levels of 
performances of an economic system is a function of its institutional 
coherence: “When firms coordinate successfully, their performances will be 
better, and the result will be better overall economic performances” (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001: 45). 
 
The institutional coherence of a system influences its performances not only 
in terms of levels and quality of the coordination procedures that reduce 
risks, uncertainty, transaction costs, but also in terms of innovative 
capabilities. 
 
Coordinated market economies are better able to generate and exploit 
incremental technological changes while liberal market economies are 
better able to generate and exploit radical innovations. Corporations 
managed by controlling shareholders that rely on skilled workers and 
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managerial regimes that provide enough worker autonomy and secure 
employment can take advantage of learning processes at the shop floor and 
capitalize on the tacit knowledge accumulated and introduce incremental 
innovations. Corporations with dispersed shareholders active in labor 
markets with high rates of turnover coupled with extensive equity markets 
are not only better able to hire talents with high levels of human capital, but 
also to take advantage of the flows of new high-tech firms generated by 
venture capitalism, acquire by means of take-overs in equity markets and 
introduce radical innovations. It is worth noting that also the Varieties of 
capitalism approach falls short exploring and assessing the systemic 
determinants of the direction of technological change. 
  
4.2 SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH REGIMES AT WORK 
The grafting of the advances of the economics of knowledge upon the 
Schumpeterian legacy enables to explore how the changing mechanisms of 
the governance of knowledge generation, appropriation, accumulation and 
exploitation have direct effect on the aggregate dynamics of the system. 
 
Three growth regimes can be identified: the entrepreneurial growth regime; 
ii) the corporate growth regime; iii) the knowledge growth regime. Table 
4.1 summarizes the key characteristics of knowledge generation, 
appropriation, accumulation and exploitation and the mechanisms of 
knowledge governance. Table 4.2 summarizes the characteristics of the 
meso and macro system dynamics that parallel the different mechanism of 
knowledge governance. 
INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3 THE ENTRPRENEURIAL GROWTH REGIME 
The Schumpeterian The theory of economic development provides the basic 
tools to identify the entrepreneurial growth regime implemented in Europe 
for more than hundred years since the end of the 18th century. The 
recombinant generation of new knowledge is the outcome of a bottom-up 
process of accumulation of competence and tacit knowledge that relies on 
learning by doing and learning by using. Tacit knowledge based upon 
learning processes is implemented by the contribution of the scientific 
community that helps its codification and generalization. The bottom up 
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generation of new knowledge relies heavily on the access to the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge made possible by vertical -between users and 
producers- and horizontal -between competitors- proximity within industrial 
districts. The mobility of skilled craftsmen across firms is very high and 
increases the spread of knowledge within industrial districts.  
 
In the entrepreneurial growth regime the academic system plays an 
important role as it supports the codification and generalization of the tacit 
knowledge accumulated by means of learning processes within small firms 
that are not able to command the generation of technological knowledge 
with internal research activities. Scientists are involved in the generation of 
technological knowledge as “consultants” that provide their professional 
services. Academic institutions do not participate to the process but allow 
their members to supply their personal and individual services to small 
firms.   
 
In the entrepreneurial growth regime there is a continuous flow of entry of 
new entrepreneurs. The life cycle of firms is short. Like the Marshallian 
forest trees, the survival of firms is short and the decline and exit of firms is 
rapid. Entrepreneurs acquire their competence on-the-job and are often 
formers employees of incumbents. The short life cycle of firms reduces the 
accumulation of the stock of knowledge within firms. Technological 
knowledge is primarily a collective good and its accumulation takes place 
primarily within the web of interactions that take place in industrial districts 
that are the depositary of technological knowledge. Industrial relations are 
characterized by the central role of highly skilled manpower with distinctive 
craft competences that retains the full control of their competences and are 
actively involved in the accumulation of tacit knowledge ant its eventual 
exploitation. The innovation process rests heavily upon the accumulation of 
tacit knowledge and competence and is directed primarily upstream towards 
the introduction of new capital and intermediary goods that make longer the 
value chain and the roundaboutness of the aggregate production process 
increasing the levels of division of labor and specialization both within firms 
and especially at the system level. The rates of imitation and introduction of 
incremental innovation are fostered by the low levels of knowledge 
appropriability that is based upon the relevance of tacit knowledge. The 
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dissemination of technological knowledge is possible only by means of 
personal interactions within industrial districts. 
 
The Entrepreneurial Growth Regime exhibits the typical traits of a profit-
led mechanism of accumulation: the introduction of innovations is driven 
by the high levels of transient profitability (Boyer, 1988a and b). 
Investments in upstream activities in turn are driven by the rates of 
introduction of innovations and support their diffusion. At the system level 
the accelerator dynamics contribute the increase of the aggregate demand. 
The direction of technological change is strongly capital intensive for two 
broad set of reasons: i) the introduction of capital intensive technological 
change is induced by the strong trend of increase of wages of workers more 
and more able to increase their bargaining power by means of trade-unions 
and works as a form of meta-substitution of labor; ii) the capital intensive 
direction of technological change is consistent and complementary with the 
introduction of process innovations that increase the levels of 
roundaboutness of the production process. 
 
The small size of firms limits the opportunity to take advantage of 
knowledge extensibility: firms are not able to manage large scale production 
processes and cannot spread the application of a given unit of knowledge to 
large output flows. 
 
The distribution of income is highly skewed. Successful entrepreneurs cash 
the short lived extraprofits and the levels of retention are very low. 
Entrepreneurial families grasp a large part of national income and increase 
systematically their wealth: rent and wealth inequalities are very high. Wage 
inequalities are also high: skilled craftsmen employed in the manufacturing 
industry are far above the average in agriculture and traditional service 
activities. 
 
The innovative banker is the primary source of the financial resources for 
new undertakings and plays a key role in the selection and support to the 
introduction of innovations. The innovative banker relies on a web of 
professional competences to sort the projects that are more likely to be 
successful and pay back the credits provided by the bank. The errors of 
exclusion are limited by the quality of the portfolio of professional 
132			
competences that the innovative banker uses to sort the projects.  The 
innovative banker suffers the intrinsic asymmetry: it cannot participate into 
the profits of successful ventures but is fully exposed to the negative effects 
of the failures in terms of non performing loans.   
 
4.4 THE CORPORATE GROWTH REGIME 
The 1942 contribution Capitalism socialism and democracy provides the 
basic tools to identify the corporate growth regime. The introduction of 
radical innovations in the organization of firms, the separation between 
ownership and control with the identification of professionalized managers 
and the consequent increase of the share of retained profits and  the 
integration of the generation of technological knowledge within the 
corporation where specific activities, eventually named Research and 
Development, guided by corporate scientists dedicated to the intra-muros 
generation of technological knowledge and the introduction of innovations 
that enables the growth of firms  are identified by Schumpter as the key 
characteristics of the “American capitalism” that gave the US the 
international leadership in innovation and economic growth since the early 
20th century (Chandler, 1962 and 1977).  
 
The recombinant generation of knowledge funded by and performed within 
the corporation builds upon the control of the relevant internal stock of 
proprietary knowledge by means of systematic R&D activities. The access 
to and the absorption of the stock of quasi-public knowledge is relevant but 
to a lesser extent with respect to the Entrepreneurial Regime. Imitation from 
rivals engaged in oligopolistic competition in the same product markets is 
an important source of knowledge.    
 
The role of the academic system is less relevant than in the entrepreneurial 
growth regime. The corporation internalizes the performance of applied 
research and development and participate directly into the generation of 
scientific knowledge. The academic system specializes in the generation of 
pure science at one extreme and training at the other extreme. 
 
The corporate growth regime is characterized by large firms, ruled by 
managers, engaged in oligopolistic rivalry based upon systematic product 
differentiation of final goods in consumer markets. Industrial relations are 
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characterized by mass production based upon assembly chains that engage 
workers with low levels of skills, competence add human capital, and 
participation to the accumulation of tacit knowledge. Within the corporation 
a core of highly skilled workers with managerial functions takes 
responsibility for the accumulation of knowledge, its recombinant 
generation and its exploitation for the introduction of innovations within the 
context of long term corporate strategies.  
 
The direction of technological change in the corporate growth regime is 
basically neutral. This neutrality however is the result of two contrasting 
forces. The innovative process is mostly directed towards the introduction 
of product innovations that require higher levels of labor intensity. At the 
same time, however, the efforts to reap all the benefits of knowledge 
extensibility, push towards the introduction of mass production that requires 
high levels of capital intensity. 
 
Corporate wages are well above short term productivity levels pushed by 
the strong bargaining power of highly unionized labor that enable workers 
to share the large markup of corporations (Farber, 2018). Corporate high 
wages, however, are efficiency wages as they enhance the participation of 
skilled workers to the accumulation of competence by means of learning 
processes that enable the generation of technological knowledge at costs 
below equilibrium and support the creative response (Stiglitz, 1974).  
 
The dynamics of wages is strongly associated to the rates of introduction of 
innovations and increase of productivity levels, not only by means of the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge but also via the aggregate dynamics: the 
demand pull comes into play. The increasing level of wages supports the 
aggregate demand that in turn pulls the introduction of further product and 
process innovations and their diffusion embodied in the new vintages of 
capital goods brought into the system by the accelerator dynamics of 
investment. The high wage strategy supports the multiplier-accelerator 
dynamics within the loop aggregate demand-investment-demand-pulled 
innovations that feeds the introduction of further innovations. 
 
The wage-productivity nexus has positive effects not only on the persistence 
of the rates of growth of output and productivity, but also on income 
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distribution. Rent inequality declines from the high levels that characterized 
the Entrepreneurial Regime. 
 
The levels of knowledge appropriability are far stronger than in the 
Entrepreneurial Growth Regime as they are augmented not only by more 
stringent IPR regime but also and primarily by substantial barriers to entry 
and mobility -based upon cost advantages stemming from the extensibility 
of knowledge, prime-mover advantages and economies of scale and scope- 
that reduce the risk of imitative entry. Incumbents are able to stretch the 
duration of transient monopolistic rent stemming from the introduction of 
innovation.  The extended duration of the exclusive command of 
technological knowledge favors the internal accumulation of technological 
knowledge and its systematic use to feed the persistent introduction of 
additional innovations. The separation between ownership and control 
enables managers to retain large share of extraprofits and use them to fund 
internally the innovation process.  
 
Competent teams of managers elaborate long term planning devices to focus 
the internal generation of knowledge, to sort the array of possible 
innovations generated by internal R&D laboratories and to implement 
consistent innovative strategies. The errors of inclusion of bad projects are 
reduced by the quality of the internal teams highly competent in their fields 
of expertise and practice.  
 
For this very same reason, however, the corporate growth regime suffers 
dramatically the errors of exclusion. Internal selection procedures are unable 
to identify radical innovations that impinge upon technological 
knowledge(s) that are far away from the current core competence of the 
managerial teams. 
 
Huge coordination costs limit the viability of corporations that are forced to 
implement new specialization strategies based upon the systematic use of 
outsourcing that includes knowledge generation activities. Corporations 
purchase knowledge, generated by small firms, both as a service and the 
equity of high-tech startups acquired in financial markets. 
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At the system level, the twin globalization of product and financial markets 
undermined the viability and economic sustainability of the corporate 
growth regime. The competition in global product markets of the output 
manufactured in low wage countries often by global corporations could not 
be resisted by the manufacturing industry of advanced countries. At the 
same time the globalization of financial markets favored the reduction of 
the levels of international spread and the access of industrializing countries 
to credit provided by global financial institutions. The creative response of 
advanced countries could not be based upon the introduction of biased 
technological change directed to increased levels of output elasticity of fixed 
capital: the difference in the cost of capital was not sufficient to secure a 
profitable division of labor.  
 
4.5 THE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIME 
The knowledge growth regime is substituting the corporate growth regime. 
The knowledge growth regime is characterized by the vertical disintegration 
of the generation and exploitation of knowledge that leaves the corporation 
and becomes the core activity of a specialized knowledge industry. 	Advanced	countries	have	specialized	in	the	upstream	and	downstream	rings	of	the	value	chains,	focusing	on:	i)	upstream	in	the	generation	of	technological	know-how	necessary	 for	 the	design	and	engineering	of	products	and	processes,	 ii)	 financing	 the	generation	of	knowledge	as	well	 as	 the	 production	 cycle,	 and	 iii)	 downstream	 in	 the	 process	 of	enhancing	 tangible	 goods	 -	 physically	 produced	 in	 industrialized	countries	 -	 controlling	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 activities	 ranging	 from	logistics,	distribution,	marketing,	and	advertising	that	can	be	defined	as	commercial	knowledge.	 
 
The organization of the production process is fully redesigned: advanced 
countries retain the knowledge-intensive phases both upstream and 
downstream the manufacturing process. Upstream activities such as the 
generation of new knowledge, its transformation into prototypes and 
advanced production, as well as downstream ones and the financial process 
take place in advanced countries. The manufacturing process itself is 
redesigned with the identification of knowledge-poor activities that are 
assigned to plants located in industrial countries and knowledge-intensive 
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ones with higher requirements in terms of skills and larger opportunities in 
terms of learning processes are kept in knowledge abundant countries. 
 
The decomposition of value chains in the global economy and the 
redefinition of the international division of labor see emerging countries 
take on the role of industrial economies specializing in manufacturing 
products and advanced countries the role of producers of inputs of 
knowledge, not only technological but also organizational and commercial, 
in the form of intermediate goods and especially intangible capital assets 
and KIBS.  
 
The emergence of the knowledge industry parallels the demise of the 
corporation as the locus of generation and exploitation of knowledge and 
the shift of the locus of appropriation of knowledge rents. The vertical 
disintegration of the knowledge generation activities –traditionally 
performed by the corporation - and the stretching of the chain value parallels 
the shifts of the locus of exploitation and valorization of knowledge as an 
asset.  
 
Firms specializing in knowledge generation activities exploit their output 
with two mechanisms: i) they sell directly knowledge as a service in the 
quasi-markets for knowledge; and ii) transform knowledge into knowledge-
intensive equity that can be sold in financial markets with venture 
capitalism. The valorization of knowledge capital shifts upstream. The 
change is quite radical. Downstream corporations acquire knowledge assets 
that incorporate already a large chunk of the knowledge value that used to 
be valorized in product markets. 
 
The large literature that explores the digital economy after the introduction 
of ICT complements the advances of the economics of knowledge as it has 
enabled to grasp the radical changes in the generation and use of knowledge. 
Digital technologies, in fact, provide the basic infrastructure that enables to 
collect, retrieve, store the knowledge items dispersed in the system and 
manage the recombination process. In so doing the array of digital 
technologies becomes the basic infrastructure of the knowledge economy. 
ICT are the technological basis of the knowledge growth regime as much as 
the assembly line was the basis of the corporate growth regime and the steam 
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engine was the basis of the entrepreneurial growth regime: ICT enable the 
industrialization of the generation of knowledge (Frøslev Jens, Maskell, 
2003; Johansson, Karlsson, Stough, 2006; Greenstein, Goldfarb, Tucker, 
2013; Goldfarb, Greenstein, Tucker, 2015). 
 
Knowledge externalities play a central role in the new mechanisms of 
(digital) recombinant generation of knowledge in terms of both the size and 
the variety of the stock of knowledge available in the system.  
 
The recombinant generation of scientific knowledge is now twisted towards 
top-down processes.  Scientific, highly codified, knowledge precedes its 
eventual application. The borders between scientific and technological 
knowledge are radically blurred.  The recombinant generation of knowledge 
is now centered on the academic system. Universities contribute the 
generation of knowledge with three distinct mechanisms: i) they provide the 
system with a large supply of knowledge externalities triggered by the 
augmented amount of scientific publications and improved dissemination; 
ii) they are active in the new markets for knowledge where they supply 
scientific knowledge to corporations that outsource the performance of 
research activities; iii) they are the source of scientific entrepreneurship 
where former scientists engage directly in the -tentative- exploitation of the 
new scientific knowledge. 
 
The generation of knowledge consists in the systematic interaction between 
generic and specific knowledge. General laws are applied to specific 
contexts and yield both innovative solutions and clues to implementing new 
general laws. The speed of the interaction and the variety of applications are 
the primary source of appropriation. 
 
The new organization of the generation of knowledge parallels significant 
changes in its exploitation and valorization. The effects of the limited 
appropriability and exhaustibility of knowledge are most relevant not only 
in its generation, but also in its exploitation and valorization as they 
engender radical information asymmetries between vendors and customers. 
 
Venture capitalism supports the embodiment of new knowledge in new 
firms assisting their birth and selective growth through the process that leads 
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to their eventual entry in the stock markets and the final acquisition by 
corporations. Financial markets enable the systematic exploration of the 
knowledge landscape embodied by new firms based upon scientific 
entrepreneurship and become the new mechanism to coordinate the 
generation and the exploitation of knowledge as a financial asset. 
 
Knowledge intensive business services are able to trade knowledge as a 
service. The stock of proprietary knowledge is the principal input. Its 
application enables providers to satisfy the specific and highly idiosyncratic 
needs of customers. Intensive learning processes, articulated in learning-by-
doing, learning-by-using and learning by-interacting within user-producer 
relations enable knowledge producers at the same time to provide customers 
with useful inputs and to implement their stock of proprietary knowledge 
and to access relevant knowledge externalities. 
 
In this context, scientific entrepreneurship is an indispensable mechanism 
for the effective use of the opportunities provided by the limited 
appropriability of scientific knowledge generated by scientific institutions. 
Scientific entrepreneurship is a distinctive and effective mechanism for the 
generation of new technological knowledge by means of the recombination 
of scientific knowledge spilling from academic institutions and the 
necessary variety of other knowledges and knowledge sources including 
commercial and technological knowledge. Spillover entrepreneurship has 
been able to guide the creative destruction that has characterized the shake-
up of traditional corporate sectors like hardware electronics and big-pharma 
with the introduction of digital and bio technologies that were far away from 
the core competence of incumbent corporations. 
 
The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship identifies the new 
channel by means of which knowledge spillover are actually used. So far, 
the literature had focused primarily the knowledge interactions that take 
place among incumbents, paying little attention to the role of new comers 
as users of knowledge spillovers both to introduce innovations and to 
generate new technological knowledge. The large literature based upon the 
knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship explores systematically 
how and why knowledge spillovers provide the opportunity to entrepreneurs 
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to create a new firm (Audretsch and Keilback, 2017 and 2008; Audretsch 
and Link, 2019).  
 
Scientific entrepreneurs try and apply the results of basic scientific research 
achieved in academic and public research centers with the creation of start-
ups. Industrial relations within start-ups are based on high levels of turnover 
and direct participation of selected and highly skilled personnel to the 
generation of new knowledge and its transformation into prototypes.  
 
Employees participate directly not only to the generation of knowledge but 
also to its exploitation: their income includes stock options that associate 
directly the amount of wealth –as distinct from income- distributed to 
workers to the actual levels of capitalization of the knowledge assets that 
have been produced and exploited by means of knowledge and financial 
markets. The governance of startups is shaped by the increasing levels of 
separation between the original ownership of scientific entrepreneurs and 
the increasing role of competent managers seconded by venture capital 
firms.  
 
The working of the “quasi-markets” for knowledge as a service and a 
financial asset shares the intrinsic characteristics of monopolistic 
competition. Each bit of knowledge is a unique product that commands 
quasi-rents. The exploitation and valorization of knowledge take place in a 
context characterized by a web of knowledge interactions and transactions 
where the price is contextual.  
 
In the knowledge growth regime, the exploitation of knowledge directly 
produces wealth, without taking the form of income. The traditional laws of 
income distribution do not apply to the wealth created and its distribution to 
the production factors does not follow any clear (economic) rule. 
 
The central relationship between the rates of increase of labor productivity 
and the rates of growth of output centered upon the manufacturing industry 
that shaped the Fordist age, is now questioned (Boyer, 2004). The 
distribution of the wealth and income stemming from the generation and 
exploitation of knowledge exhibits a significant shift. A large part of the 
wealth is retained upstream by the producers of knowledge and the financial 
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system that make its exploitation possible. The knowledge and the financial 
industry are characterized by high wages and income levels augmented by 
the direct participation to the stream of wealth by means of stock options. 
The share of appropriation of the stream of income generated by knowledge 
concentrates upstream. Downstream customers appropriate declining shares 
and consequently squeeze the remuneration of production factors and 
especially labor engaged in downstream activities. 
 
The new specialization in the generation and exploitation of knowledge 
triggers the segmentation of the labor markets in two sections: the market 
for creative labor and the market for standard labor. The levels of wages and 
employment of standard labor are fully exposed to the dynamics of factor 
costs equalization triggered by the globalization of product markets and 
exhibit a clear decline. The markets for creative labor, on the opposite, are 
protected by international competition and on the demand side the 
knowledge intensive direction of technological change exerts powerful 
effects supporting wage levels. Increasing wage inequalities add to the 
wealth and rent inequalities triggered by the new mechanisms of knowledge 
exploitation based upon the capitalization of knowledge and contribute to 
increasing the levels of income inequality (Atkinson, 2015).  
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The Schumpeterian notion of growth regime becomes necessary to 
understand the structural transformation of advanced economies. The 
discontinuity experienced by advanced economies since the last decade of 
the XX century can be fruitfully analyzed as the consequence of the shift 
from a mode of organizing the generation, exploitation and accumulation of 
knowledge centered upon the industrial corporation to a new mode based 
upon a specialized knowledge industry.  
 
Schumpeterian growth regimes define the alternative sets of systemic 
conditions at the microeconomic, mesoeconomic, macroeconomic and 
institutional levels that shape both the out-of-equilibrium conditions that stir 
the reaction of firms and the mechanisms of knowledge governance that 
support the generation, exploitation and accumulation of knowledge and the 
generation of the endogenous knowledge externalities upon which the 
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creative reaction and the consequent introduction of innovation is 
contingent.  
 
The shift from a Schumpeterian growth regime to another takes place when 
the mechanisms of knowledge generation and exploitation in place reveal 
their limits and are no longer compatible with the structure of the system 
and relevant organization innovations at the system level provide new 
opportunities. The entrepreneurial growth regime was limited by the 
contradictions of the credit system as the prime provider of finance for 
innovation and by the small size of firms that could not reap the benefits of 
the extensibility of knowledge in terms of its repeated use for large scale 
production. The corporate growth regime had been able to combine equity 
finance with the exploitation of knowledge cumulability and extensibility. 
The corporate growth regime failed because of its limits in funding radical 
technological breakthroughs. The new knowledge growth regime is based 
upon the combination of scientific entrepreneurship with equity finance 
organized by venture capitalism and financial markets that enable to exploit 
knowledge as a capital asset. The vertical disintegration between the 
generation of knowledge and its repeated use as an input into the production 
of other goods made possible the combination of the benefits of small size 
in its generation with the large size in its use. The limited access to the 
existing stock of technological change raised by the current IPR regime 
impedes the full exploitation of the benefits of the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge. The capitalization of knowledge undermines the distribution of 
the income generated by the exploitation of knowledge. 
 
TABLE 4.1. KNOWLEDGE GENERATION, EXPLOITATION AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH 
REGIMES 
 ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH REGIME CORPORATE GROWTH REGIME KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIME 
KNOWLEDGE 
CUMULABILITY HIGH WITHIN INDUSTRIAL 
DISTRICTS 
HIGH WITHIN 
CORPORATE 
BORDERS 
VERY HIGH AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL 
KNOWLEDGE 
EXTENSIBILITY LOW HIGH HIGH 
KNOWLEDGE 
APPROPRIABILITY LOW, BASED UPON TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE 
MEDIUM, BASED 
UPON BARRIERS TO 
ENTRY&IMITATION 
HIGH, BASED UPON IPR 
SOURCES OF 
INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
LEARNING BY 
DOING, BY USING 
AND BY 
INTERACTING 
INTERNAL R&D 
AND INTERNAL 
STOCKS OF 
COMMAND OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
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PROPRIETARY 
KNOWLEDGE 
STOCK OF QUASI-
PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
MOST RELEVANT 
AS A SOURCE OF 
IMITATION 
EXTERNALITIES 
WITHIN 
MARSHALLIAN 
DISTRICTS 
SPILLOVERS FROM 
COMPETITORS IN 
PRODUCT 
MARKETS: 
IMITATION 
EXTERNALITIES  
SCIENTIFIC SPILLOVER WITHIN 
CLUSTERS AND KNOWLEDGRE STOCKS 
AT THE SYTEM LEVEL 
KNOWLEDGE 
GENERATION 
BOTTOM UP BASED 
UPON TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE 
TOP DOWN BASED 
UPIN CODIFIED 
KNOWLEDGE 
SYSTEMATIC INTERACTION BETWEEN 
GENERIC AND SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
DIRECTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 
STRONGLY LABOR 
SAVING AND 
CAPITAL 
INTENSIVE 
NEUTRAL KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE: FIXED CAPITAL 
AND STANDARD LABOR SAVING 
TYPES OF 
INNOVATION 
PROCESS 
INNOVATIONS 
EMBODIED IN NEW 
CAPITAL GOODS  
PRODUCT 
INNOVATIONS 
PROCESS INNOVATIONS 
 
 
TABLE 4.2 SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH 
REGIMES 	
 
 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
GROWTH REGIME 
CORPORATE GROWTH 
REGIME 
KNOWLEDGE GROWTH 
REGIME 
TYPICAL JOB 
PROFILE 
SKILLED CRAFTWORKERS WITH 
LOW TURNOVER 
DE-SKILLED MASS 
WORKERS IN 
ASSEMBLY LINES 
SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER 
WITH HIGH TURNOVER 
LABOR MARKETS DUALISTIC LABOR MARKETS 
WITH HIGH WAGES FOR SKILLED 
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AND LOW 
WAGE FOR THE REST OF 
WORKERS  
FULL EMPLOYMENT IN 
HOMOGENEOUS LABOR 
MARKETS 
MARKET SEGMENTATION 
WITH UNSKILLED WORKERS 
EXPOSED TO FACTOR COST 
EQUALIZATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE WORKERS 
WITH HIGH EMPLOYMENT 
AND INCOME 
SIZE OF FIRMS SMALL LARGE SMALL 
SOURCE OF 
FINANCE 
DEBT CAPITAL PROVIDED BY 
BANKS 
RETAINED EXTRA-
PROFITS 
VENTURE CAPITALISM 
TYPES OF 
COMPETITION 
MARSHALLIAN COMPETITION IN 
INTERMEDIARY AND CAPITAL 
GOOD MARKETS 
OLIGOPOLISTIC 
RIVALRY IN PRODUCT 
MARKETS 
MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION IN 
KNOWLEDGE MARKETS 
KNOWLEDGE 
EXPLOITATION 
 
AS AN INPUT FOR THE 
INTRODUCTION OF 
INNOVATIONS THAT COMMAND 
SHORT-LIVED EXTRAPROFITS 
LONG LASTING MARK-
UPS BASED UPON 
KNOWLEDGE 
EXTENSIBILITY AND 
CUMULABILITY 
CAPITALIZATION OF 
KNOWLEDGE AS A 
FINANCIAL ASSET 
INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 
HIGH WAGE AND RENT 
INEQUALITIES WITH LOW 
AVERAGE WAGES AND HIGH 
PROFITS 
HIGH EFFICIENCY 
WAGES IN 
CORPORATIONS AND 
HIGH LEVELS OF 
RETAINED PROFITS 
HIGH LEVELS OF WAGE AND 
RENT INEQUALITIES 
TRIGGERED BY 
KNOWLEDGE 
CAPITALIZATION 
ENGINES OF 
GROWTH 
PROFIT LED INVESTMENT 
EMBODYING TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE IN INTERMEDIARY AND 
CAPITAL GOODS 
HIGH WAGES DEMAND 
LED INVESTMENT IN 
FINAL PRODUCT 
MAKETS 
INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT 
IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
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5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE KNOWLEDGE 
GROWTH REGIME  
 
ABSTRACT. The mechanisms of generation and exploitation of the 
new knowledge growth regime have major implications on income 
distribution and are likely to trigger a substantial segmentation of labor 
markets into the markets for skilled and creative labor and the markets 
for standard labor. In the context of the globalization of product 
markets factor costs equalization drives the wages of standard labor 
towards global averages that are lower than the pre-globalization 
levels. The knowledge intensive direction of technological change favors 
the resilience of the wages of creative workers. In the corporate growth 
regime, unions were able favor the internal distribution of the large 
oligopolistic gross margins increasing wages well above the levels of 
marginal productivity. The taxation of wealth and high income further 
reduced the income asymmetries. The small size of knowledge intensive 
business firms reduces the role of unions. The capitalization of 
knowledge helps increasing the levels of rent and wealth inequalities. 
The middle class is exposed to the twin pressure of the globalization of 
product markets, the dynamics of factor cost equalization and the 
knowledge intensive direction of technological and structural change. 
The identification of relevant dynamic increasing returns triggered by 
the limited exhaustibility of knowledge together with the need to 
contrast the increasing income inequality call for the effort to increase 
the social inclusion in the generation and exploitation of knowledge.  
 
KEY WORDS: INCOME DISTRIBUTION; ROLE OF WAGES; 
LEARNING PROCESSES; KNOWLEDGE EXPLOITATION; 
MIDDLE CLASS; SOCIALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE.  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The consolidation of the knowledge growth regime and the radical 
transformation of the economic structures of advanced economies calls for 
a political economy approach able to stretch the scope of investigation of 
the economics of knowledge to enquire about the new emerging social 
organization of advanced economies and to investigate the economic and 
functional role of the middle class.  
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Like, at the dawn of Fordism, the creation of the middle class was necessary 
to support the viability and sustainability of mass production, today it is 
indispensable to rebuild the foundations of middle class and to limit the 
exclusivity of IPR to overcome the intrinsic fragility of the knowledge 
growth regime. 
The knowledge growth regime has now completed its run-off phase and can 
be fully considered the distinctive feature of the new economic and social 
system of advanced countries. The generation and use of knowledge, as an 
intangible economic asset, is now the main activity of the advanced 
economic systems and is the main source of income and wealth as well as 
the core for their specialization in the new international labor division. The 
generation, use and exploitation of knowledge are at the center of productive 
activity and concern the very nature of capital and its processes of 
accumulation.  
For a long time, final consumers have been targeting increasing shares of 
their income for the purchase of high-quality services, while resources for 
durable consumer goods have long stagnated and, in relative terms, 
experienced a noticeable contraction (Bell, 1973).  The turning point lies in 
the new centrality of knowledge as a service and both a capital input and a 
capitalized output on the supply side.  
This chapter elaborates the hypothesis that the middle class - a new middle 
class- is strictly necessary for the stability of advanced economic systems. 
The middle class performs a crucial role of institutional mechanism that 
enables to overcome the limits and brittleness of the capitalistic production 
process. The changes in the capitalistic production process with the shift 
from the corporate to the knowledge to growth regime redefine the role and 
economic functions of the middle class. The middle class provided the 
corporate growth regime with an indispensable and complementary tool to 
implement and support the Keynesian aggregate demand.   The transition 
from the corporate to the knowledge growth regime undermines the 
functional role of the middle class. Yet the consolidation of the knowledge 
growth regime seems possible only if a new middle class is organized with 
a new specific functional role.  
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The rest of the chapter shows how and why the middle class emerged as a 
radical institutional innovation at the dawn of the corporate growth regime 
and enabled its consolidation; explores the limits of the knowledge growth 
regime and shows how and why a new re-founded middle class is necessary 
for its consolidation and viability. The conclusions summarize briefly the 
main results. 
It is time to set aside the many interpretations they have seen in the deep 
that marked the transition from the corporate to the knowledge growth 
regime by announcing an irreversible crisis of capitalism (Mazzucato and 
Jacobs, 2016), or the beginning of a secular stagnation (Gordon, 2016; 
Summers, 2014). These interpretations can be found in the tradition of the 
traditional neoclassical economic theory, which has no tools to analyze the 
processes of transformation out of the equilibrium that characterize the 
economy.  
It is surprising, however, the consensus that these interpretations gather in 
those who fall outside the neoclassical field. Capitalism is based on 
continuous processes of crisis, transformation, recovery and growth. 
Capitalism cannot be in equilibrium: equilibrium is the true end of 
capitalism (Antonelli, 2017a and 2018c).  
The dynamics of capitalism are marked by phases - as they happen with 
quite irregular and more or less prolonged rhythms- of crisis, transformation 
and recovery (Schumpeter, 1939).  
It is necessary to reconsider, not only from the point of view of economics, 
but also and above all from the point of view of the political economy, the 
structure that the knowledge economy system is undertaking. The process 
of decomposing and redefining wealth production and income distribution 
is in fact so profound and radical to question not only the foundations of 
economics, but also the social structure of advanced countries and the role 
of the middle class.  
The implications from the viewpoint of the political economy are powerful 
as they recall the causes and the processes that shaped the emergence of the 
middle class in the turbulent phase of the transition to the corporate growth 
regime and its functional role in the eventual consolidation of the corporate 
growth regime itself.  
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This chapter elaborates the hypothesis that the middle class is relevant not 
only from a sociological and political viewpoint, but also from an economic 
viewpoint (López and Weinstein, 2012).  
The middle class performed –at the time of the corporate growth regime and 
can perform again within the knowledge growth regime- the indispensable 
role of social stabilizer of the intrinsic contradictions and brittleness of 
capitalism. The changing mode of capitalistic organization brought by the 
emergence of the knowledge economy calls for a new economic role of the 
middle class.  
The middle class enables to enhance the positive effects of increasing 
returns beyond the limits of the marginalistic rules of income distribution. 
Within the corporate growth regime, the increase of blue collars’ wages, 
beyond the marginal productivity of labor, was more than compensated by 
the rightward shift of the demand for the output of mass production. The 
cliometric evidence suggests that the right ward shift of the demand curve –
determined by the increase of wages- did yield much a larger equilibrium 
point at the crossing with the average cost curve –characterized by the 
negative slope stemming from increasing returns- even after taking into 
account the upward shift of the cost curve stemming from the larger wages.  
Within the knowledge growth regime, the cost of inclusion of marginal 
creative workers is more than compensated by the increasing returns, in 
terms of knowledge output, stemming from the recombination of a larger 
variety of knowledge items possessed by the augmented number of creative 
workers at work, and the higher chances to sort and include actual talents. 
The emergence of the middle class at the dawn of the corporate growth 
regime can be regarded as a major institutional innovation that provided the 
corporate growth regime with the social foundations of the Keynesian 
aggregate demand implementing the dedicated support to the demand of the 
output of mass production. The parallel demise of the corporate growth 
regime and the decline of the middle class call for the analysis of the limits 
of the knowledge economy and its need of a new middle class.  
A new middle class based upon different foundations and with a different 
functional role, is again, indispensable for the viability and sustainability of 
the knowledge economy.  
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5.2 THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE CORPORATE GROWTH 
REGIME 
The corporate growth regime, which lasted about 80 years since its 
introduction in the United States at the dawn of the twentieth century, to its 
long decline that coincided with the end of the same century, and had 
touched its apex in the "glorious thirty (years)” between 1945 and 1975, was 
based on the Fordist assembly line and the production on a large scale within 
the Chandlerian large firms (Chandler, 1964 and 1977).  
The corporate growth regime had replaced highly skilled small-scale 
productions with standardized and standardized productions, and the skilled 
worker of manufacturing capitalism with the mass worker. Above all, it has 
placed at the center of the wealth creation and accumulation and income 
distribution, the corporation able to enhance and internalize significant 
increasing returns mainly related to the exploitation of economies of density 
and the accumulation of increasing stocks of knowledge. The corporation is 
the fulcrum of the corporate growth regime as much as the assembly line.  
Workers in the assembly line mature an increasing awareness of their central 
role in the overall capacity of the system to produce income and wealth. 
White collars in the organization of corporations are the second economic 
and social leg of the corporate growth regime. Fordism provided the basis 
and the opportunities for the emergence of the middle class.  
The middle class was the main result of a trade union and political action 
that has been able to enhance the basic conditions of the Fordism itself. The 
formation of a broad consumer group became the very basis for the 
expansion of Fordism and its economic benefits.  
In the United States, the welding between blue and white collars took place 
mainly through and within the corporation where the union force was able 
to organize the birth of the middle class through a very strong increase in 
blue-collar wages to the level of the white collar. The business bargaining 
allowed trade unions to identify the emerging islands of Fordism and 
concentrate there a powerful work of enhancing wage salaries and targeted 
action to participate in the design of business organizations by promoting 
the integration of blue and white collars (Farber et al., 2018).  
The middle class in the corporations managed to attract and absorb 
progressively professional and commercial intermediaries and integrate 
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public workers into a relatively homogeneous social block. In Europe, the 
same clotting action was mainly carried out by the state.  
The welding between white collars and blue collars was based on the 
awareness that their alliance was the lintel, the supporting structure of the 
"general class" based on the centrality of the corporation in the production 
process. The corporation, based on the assembly line and the great 
organizational structures, was indisputably the privileged site of creation of 
income. As such, it dictated the models and procedures of social and 
political action that gradually spread in the whole social system of the great 
Atlantic democracies.  
The establishment of the middle class was not obvious. The birth of the 
corporate growth regime had not been painless. The advent of mass 
production has been itself a process of creative destruction that reshaped 
industrial capitalism with the substitution of the corporation to the fabric of 
small, highly specialized businesses, deprived skilled workers of their 
craftsmanship and the collapse of the family-led entrepreneurial ventures 
into which capital and skills were blended.  
The corporate growth regime itself mingled in Continental Europe with 
forms of social and political organization far from democratic values . 
Consensus towards the totalitarian regimes came not only from the 
"agrarians", but also and perhaps above all from the reactionary drives of 
the social groups marginalized by the corporate growth regime itself.  
The constitution of the middle class corresponded to the precise and intrinsic 
economic needs of the corporate growth regime.  The strength of the 
corporate growth regime was based on its ability to organize and exploit the 
increasing returns that came from economies of scale and especially from 
the exploitation of knowledge extensibility and hence from the production 
of large amounts of relatively homogeneous durable goods based upon the 
very same technological blue prints. A strong and growing final demand 
was obviously indispensable for the economic sustainability of the corporate 
growth regime.  
Middle class is based on a distribution of income that favors the 
convergence between median and average wages and allows to fuel a strong 
and growing demand for durable consumer goods. The strong increase of 
wages in corporations was the economic foundation of both the middle class 
and the corporate growth regime. As a matter of fact, the strong increase of 
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wages was made possible by the strong bargaining power of trade-unions in 
large firms that made possible to sharing the rents stemming from the 
increasing returns enjoyed by corporations (Farber et al., 2018). 
Within the corporate growth regime, the increase of blue collars’ wages 
beyond the marginal productivity of labor was able to increase the overall 
revenue levels at the system level and the profitability of corporations 
because of the working of increasing returns in mass production. The 
increase of wages did push to the right the demand curve so as to yield much 
a larger equilibrium. Increasing returns gave the average cost curve a strong 
negative slope able to compensate for the upward shift stemming from the 
larger wages. The corporate growth regime had become wage-led after the 
negative outcome of the attempt elaborated in the thirties to combine a 
profit-led growth with mass production (Boyer, 1988a and b). 
With the advent of the knowledge growth regime the functional 
fundamentals of the middle class in the corporate growth regime have 
progressively declined. The support of the demand provided by the high 
wages paid to assembly line workers -once indispensable to increase the 
aggregate demand- now risks to benefit –only- the import of the output of a 
manufacturing industry fully delocalized in low-wages countries.  The 
formation of the knowledge growth regime questions not only the economic 
bases of the middle class, but also its functionality.  
 
5.3 THE DEMISE OF THE CORPORATE GROWTH REGIME AND 
THE DECLINE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 
Replacing the knowledge economy to the manufacturing economy is an 
aspect of a deeper structural transformation of the economy that affects the 
whole organization of the economic system, as much as the advent of the 
corporate growth regime itself.  In the first decades of the 20th century, the 
consolidation of the corporate growth regime was accomplished through the 
destruction of a whole production mode and its social articulations, 
undermining the foundations of the manufacturing bourgeoisie and skilled 
workers with knowledge and crafts and hence in fact privileged. Today the 
gradual consolidation of the knowledge economy is accomplished through 
the decline of manufacturing industry and the expulsion from the production 
processes of the unskilled workers  -the mass workers- who had formed the 
core of unionized blue collars. The mass worker who expelled the craftsmen 
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is now marginalized by the creative workers who are the basis of the 
knowledge economy.  
As then the corporation assumed the role of pulling the economic system 
through the generalization and expansion of large-scale production to every 
possible field, today the production and exploitation of knowledge as capital 
is the driving force. The academic-financial complex has become the new 
pivot. The transition is overwhelming as it is accelerated by a globalization 
that acts on multiple fronts by breaking ties and connections that seemed 
inextricable.  
Aggregate demand is now global as well as the organization of value chains. 
The increase in middle-class consumption capacity, a time indispensable to 
Fordism, is now superfluous by the real possibility of collecting pay-
demand segments on global scale. Only companies capable of acting on 
global markets can survive. Domestic demand subsidies and in general all 
the efforts to support the domestic aggregate demand only strengthen the 
impetus of imports from industrialized countries.  
The high wages paid to assembly line workers in the corporate growth 
regime were compatible with the large rents earned by corporations within 
national markets protected by international competition on two counts: i) 
competition among firms that shared the high wage strategy was symmetric; 
ii) aggregate demand was not exposed to competition from low wage 
countries. 
Equally obvious is the breakup of the connections between knowledge 
generation and the production of goods. What happened within the strong 
vertical integration of corporations, today it is done through the valorization 
and exploitation of knowledge directly on the financial markets of 
companies capable of generating knowledge and as such acquired at high 
prices by global corporations. The corporation was at the same time the 
center of the mass production and an extraordinary internal market in which 
it crossed its ability to generate knowledge with its financial capabilities 
sustained by extra profits gained on the oligopolistic markets of the final 
goods. The task of the corporation was not only the manage the economies 
of scale, but also, and perhaps above all, the generation of knowledge that 
would allow to renew the increasing returns over time through the 
introduction of product innovations.  
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The formation of the knowledge growth regime takes place in a context of 
crisis and transformation very similar to the turn of the corporate growth 
regime also with respect to the working of financial markets.  Even the 
euphoria of the financial markets faced with the new way of producing 
immense profits that emerged, and the subsequent dramatic crises, due to 
speculative excesses, which had however made available to the rising 
corporate growth regime the massive resources needed to create the bases 
of mass production, took on some of the features found in many of the early 
financial events of the XXI century.  
The 2001 dot.com bubble is the real cause of the 2007 crisis, also due to the 
mistakes of an overly accommodating monetary policy, to handle the 2001 
crisis, that indeed fueled the real estate prices and then, with a sudden 
change, overly restrictive. The dot.com bubble, however, made available to 
the new knowledge capitalism an extraordinary amount of resources that 
enabled it to create its digital technology bases. Even the incredible mistakes 
of economic policy of the Coolidge and Hoover presidencies recall the 
disasters, this time European, of the fiscal compact.  
Vertical disintegration of knowledge generation and exploitation is 
accomplished both through globalization, which strengthens the 
international division of labor, and through the financial markets in which 
capitalizing on the ability to produce knowledge.  
Radical innovations in the organization of the knowledge generation 
processes, increasingly external to corporations, put the interaction between 
knowledge and finance at the center stage. Knowledge, no longer embedded 
in tangible goods, can only be valued because it is transformed through 
financial markets directly into financial capital. The true measure of the 
value of knowledge is by now the Tobin’s q (Antonelli and Colombelli, 
2011a).  
The formation of a new academic-financial complex emerges at the core of 
the system. Knowledge production abandons the large R&D department of 
corporations and is more and more placed in the academic sphere. The 
traditional distinctions between science and technology, as well as the three-
part OECD-based trials, from basic research, to applied research and 
development research lose their empirical foundation. Science and 
technology are an integral and indissoluble field in which the academic 
ethos fully unfolds its liberal origin. The academy produces knowledge. 
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Venture capital performs the critical role of screening mechanism that tests 
the actual economic use of the new knowledge and nurtures its selective 
application to economic activities.  Finance deals with its exploitation.  
Knowledge exploitation moves upstream in the value chains and is 
inextricably intertwined with finance. Since it is almost impossible to buy 
and sell knowledge as such, knowledge exploitation takes place primarily 
through the sale and purchase of knowledge-intensive-equity, or transactions 
in the ownership of companies and business units that incorporate 
knowledge that has been proven source of profits (Antonelli and Teubal, 
2008 and 2010).  
The exploitation of knowledge as a capital asset produces enormous rents 
that are partially shared with the creative workers that originate it. 
Manufacturing corporations are deprived of much of the value of the 
knowledge they need to compete. The annuities have moved upstream. The 
mechanisms of knowledge generation and exploitation are in turn at the 
origin of a new social structure.  
It is a grave mistake to believe that the knowledge economy is not building 
for its indispensable necessity a coherent and functional social structure. 
Indeed, the evolving character of a new social class is evident, of which 
knowledge makers –the creative labor- and the managers of financial 
exploitation mechanisms –the financial community- are the two, 
complementary economic and social components.  
Standard income distribution rules, based on the marginal productivity of 
production factors, cannot apply in the distribution of wealth generated by 
the exploitation of knowledge directly as a financial asset. The new financial 
wealth generated by the exploitation of knowledge is allocated to its two 
components, creative workers and finance workers, with ad hoc rules. The 
opacity of the mechanisms and allocation procedures that dictate the 
distribution of income in the knowledge economy is one of its main causes 
of its fragility and limited sustainability.  
At the same time, an increasing share of the income generated in the system 
is concentrated in the academic-financial system. In advanced countries, the 
profits of manufacturing firms are diminishing, due to the purchase at high 
cost of upstream knowledge, while industrial wages fall due to the effect of 
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factor costs equalization triggered by globalization and reinforced by 
immigration.  
The growing inequality in income distribution finds its causes in the 
ongoing crisis and transformation process. The crisis contributes to 
strengthening inequality for short-term economic reasons: the sharp 
increase in unemployment caused by the decline in manufacturing industries 
is itself the primary cause of increased inequality. The strong labor market 
pressure caused by international labor mobility that augments the supply of 
low-skilled workers, increases the impetus towards inequality as it favors 
the shrinking wage levels of low-skilled jobs already exposed to 
manufacturing contraction (Autor et al. 2003; Autor, and Dorn, 2013).  
Alongside these dynamics of economic activity, the structural dynamics of 
the knowledge growth regime through the strong increase of financial 
capital partly shared with the income of knowledge workers -and financial 
managers- play a decisive role in skewing the distribution of both income 
and wealth (Aghion, Caroli, Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Franzini e Pianta, 
2016).  
The ongoing evolution threatens the very foundation of the social and 
political structure that has allowed over 70 years of democracy. The ongoing 
segmentation of knowledge workers on the one hand and productive 
workers on the other is the cause and the consequence of the profound 
structural change in progress.  
The marginalization of the constituent ties of the corporate growth regime, 
the mass worker in charge of the assembly chains and white collars 
responsible for the operation of the giant corporate bureaucracies, triggers 
conservative dynamics that sometimes take reactionary characters.  
Knowledge –creative- workers increasingly acquire specific characteristics 
that move them away from the traditional political and trade union 
representations of labor. At the same time, they grow into a growing 
awareness of their "general-class" role as they hold the bases of wealth and 
income production.  
The knowledge creative worker has very specific socio-economic 
characteristics: s/he manages his own human capital with business and 
financial criteria of which s/he is increasingly aware. It is characterized by 
high levels of mobility across firms and in regional space. He calls for 
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protection of his human capital rather than the contingent working 
relationship. It's for self-employment rather than employee. The 
identification and formation of a separate social class is underway with 
enormous social, cultural and political consequences. This social class now 
exemplifies a cultural, almost anthropological, appeal. Intermediate, 
commercial and professional, classes are attracted to it. Public white collars 
are exposed to strong centrifugal forces from the traditional middle class 
and strongly centripetal with respect to the new social class.  
5.4 THE MIDDLE CLASS IN THE KNOWLEDGE GROWTH 
REGIME 
This is the ground on which the new great social and political game of the 
XXI century is played. Large risks and bifurcations are outlined. The 
formation of the middle class was the result of far-sighted politics and trade 
union action, but not obvious. Alongside the positive result achieved in the 
Atlantic democracies, forms of oligarchic democracy were produced when 
not even the establishment of totalitarian regimes.  
The corporation, especially in the United States and to a lesser extent in 
Europe and the Welfare State, especially in Europe and to a lesser extent in 
the United States was, in a historical perspective, the strategic factor of a 
profoundly innovative and far-sighted political action. Political action was 
able to focus the constitutive problem of the corporate growth regime, that 
is, the creation of a strong aggregate demand that would allow full 
exploitation of increasing returns and find an institutional solution based 
upon the middle class.  
The segmentation of the middle class is the direct consequence of the 
globalization of product markets and the creative response that led to the 
emergence of the new knowledge growth regime. The labor markets have 
experienced a drastic segmentation engendered by: i) the powerful effects 
of the dynamics of factor costs equalization with the decline of wages for 
standard labor employed in the production of tangible goods exposed to the 
increasing competition brought about by low-wage and labor abundant 
industrializing economies, coupled with ii) the increase of the derived 
demand for creative labor, able to participate into the generation and 
exploitation of knowledge as a capital asset with the consequent sharp 
increase of their total income as composed by wages and knowledge rents, 
triggered by the knowledge intensive direction of technological change, 
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itself the outcome of the creative response that has led to the emergence and 
consolidation of the new knowledge growth regime; iii) the new 
mechanisms of knowledge exploitation with the increasing participation of 
creative workers to the appropriation of both knowledge capital and 
knowledge add to the increase the levels of rent and wealth inequality . 
These new mechanisms of generation and exploitation of knowledge and its 
role in the specialization of advanced systems within the global economy, 
have direct negative effects on the coherence of the middle class and are at 
the origin of intense processes of increasing income inequality.  
It is necessary to start the search for mechanisms of social inclusion capable 
of combining the demands of democracy with an economic policy action 
capable of removing the intrinsic limits of the knowledge growth regime 
drawing from the extraordinary capacity of Western democracies to 
combine in the formation of the middle class, at the dawn of the corporate 
growth regime, not only the quest for democracy but also the strengthening 
of the corporate growth regime itself.  
In the new knowledge growth regime, the game of the middle class 
rebuilding is played in the ability to govern inclusive processes of 
generation and accumulation of knowledge. The potentiality of a public 
policy aimed at implementing and supporting the “general intellect” are 
important from the viewpoint of both the social and the economic effects. A 
public strategy based on institution-building and knowledge-building 
mechanisms that increase the bottom-up participation to the generation and 
the exploitation of knowledge can play the role of integrating mechanism of 
a new middle class based on the enlargement of processes of knowledge 
generation and accumulation. The new social class needs to strengthen its 
participation in knowledge exploitation by containing capitalist 
accumulation processes.  
The knowledge growth regime needs the middle class as much as the 
corporate growth regime. But for very different reasons. The contradiction 
between knowledge generation and exploitation is a source of fragility and 
radical uncertainty at the system level. The financial bases of knowledge 
exploitation are a constraint and a limit that curbs the dynamics of the 
generation itself. The high levels of risk associated with knowledge 
production are badly combined with the inability of financial markets to 
manage uncertainty. The exclusivity of IPR curbs the dynamics of the 
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recombination processes on which the generation of knowledge is based. 
The growing separation in global production chains reduces the intensity of 
vertical flows of tacit knowledge and increasingly distances the processes 
of accumulation of tacit knowledge from the processes of generating 
codified knowledge (Pagano and Rossi, 2009, Pagano, 2014).  
It is therefore necessary to put in place a political action based on 
mechanisms that are capable not only of countering the strong tendencies in 
the formation of an oligarchic democracy, but also to remove the intrinsic 
limitations of the knowledge growth regimes.  
The knowledge growth regime has elements of radical fragility stemming 
from: i) the brittle suture between the processes of knowledge generation 
and knowledge exploitation; ii) the lack of rules able to combine fairness 
and efficiency in the distribution of financial wealth produced, in the form 
of income; iii) the intrinsic limits of knowledge generation mechanisms 
based on the individualism of excellence. 
The distribution of income deriving from knowledge capitalized as financial 
wealth must be driven by inclusion mechanisms that promote the expansion 
of the knowledge-based generation processes and cannot be limited to 
excellence often identified only ex-post. 
Because the generation of knowledge is a collective activity that consists in 
the recombination of the variety of existing knowledge items distributed in 
a myriad of agents, knowledge output increases more than proportionately 
with the increase of the variety of active agents that participate purposely to 
knowledge generation. The integration of the top-down approach to 
knowledge generation with the bottom-up approach calls attention to the 
need to integrate the traditional hierarchical vision according to which new 
knowledge is generated exclusively by “stars” with the appreciation of 
crucial role of the bottom-up participation of a variety of agents with 
heterogeneous skills and experiences.  
An expanded participation through the building of an extensive social base 
for knowledge generation goes hand in hand with the strengthening of 
public institutions capable of generating knowledge.  
The increase of the variety of knowledge-generating mechanisms and the 
participation in its exploitation is indispensable, not only to foster 
integration and therefore to build a new middle class but also to increase the 
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ability of systems to produce knowledge.  High quality mass education 
combined with inclusive and non-frustrating social outcomes is the only 
chance of identifying new potential Nobel prizes needed to enhance the 
capability of a knowledge-based system. Appropriate and non-exclusive 
valorization of human capital formation pathways is in turn indispensable 
to engaging potential talents.  
It is evident that abandoning to forms of precariousness with no perspectives 
generations of young scholars is not only iniquitous, but also and above all, 
inefficient and counterproductive, because it devalues incentives to the same 
formation of human capital and thus slows down and stifles the finding of 
talents. In parallel with the enhancement of the learning process based on 
the tacit knowledge of workers without a doctorate, but carriers of valuable 
skills, based on bottom-up learning processes, can not only promote the 
convergence of blue-collar workers in the new middle class, but also 
broaden the capability of the system at large to generate knowledge.  
The knowledge growth regime needs a new middle class because only such 
a middle class can support not only the capability to generate knowledge but 
the sustainability and viability of the knowledge economy at large.  
Within the knowledge economy, the cost of inclusion of marginal creative 
workers is more than compensated by the additional revenue stemming from 
the Jacobs increasing returns engendered by the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge and the role of its variety in the recombinant generation of new 
knowledge. The inclusion of -seemingly- marginal creative workers 
augments more than proportionately knowledge output because it enables 
the recombination of a larger variety of knowledge items possessed by the 
augmented number of creative workers at work and increases the chances to 
include, in the knowledge generation process, actual talents with high risks 
to social exclusion. 
For the same token it seems clear that the reduction of the exclusivity of IPR 
is necessary to increase the actual productivity of the knowledge generation 
process. The exclusivity of IPR risks to delay the generation of new 
knowledge as it reduces the opportunity for new recombinations.   
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
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Schumpeterian growth regimes are unstable and intrinsically fragile. Their 
sustainability requires an institutional context able to overcome its 
limitations. The middle class has performed the crucial role of functional 
stabilizer of the corporate growth regime. The middle class provided the 
corporate growth regime with the Keynesian support to the aggregate 
demand and enabled the growth of the demand for the output of mass 
production upon which the corporate growth regime based its own 
performances. The demise of the corporate growth regime has paralleled the 
decline of the middle class and the rise of substantial income and wealth 
inequalities that affect the social viability of advanced systems.  
The analysis of the role of the middle class at the time of the corporate 
growth regime has shown that the removal of the limits of the marginalistic 
rules of income distribution with the increase of blue collars’ wages beyond 
the levels of their marginal productivity enabled to enhance the positive 
effects of increasing returns in mass production.  
The re-foundation of a new middle class based upon the extension of the 
knowledge generation process with the inclusion of wider sources of 
knowledge is today crucial to support the consolidation of the knowledge 
growth regime. The knowledge growth regime has intrinsic and yet 
elements of brittleness stemming from the shaky foundations of its 
mechanisms of income distributions, the limits of its individualistic mode 
of knowledge generation and the bottlenecks of its financial exploitation. 
The creation of a new middle class based upon the social valorization of the 
knowledge generation mechanisms is necessary to stabilize and actually 
empower the working of the knowledge growth regime.  
The inclusion of marginal creative workers with their participation to an 
extended knowledge generation process can, again, empower the positive 
effects of increasing returns stemming from the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge and its recombinant generation process. Within the knowledge 
economy the inclusion of a larger variety of agents in the knowledge 
generation process can increase the knowledge output more than 
proportionately because of the powerful effects of Jacobs knowledge 
externalities and the scope for the “discovery” of unexpected talents.  
The reform of the current IPR regime with the differentiation of patents 
according to their use and the reduction of their exclusivity seems 
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indispensable to overcome the tragedies of anticommons and their limits to 
the full exploitation of the potentialities of the knowledge growth regime. 		
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6. TOWARDS A NEW KNOWLEDGE POLICY 
ABSTRACT. The identification of the increasing returns triggered by 
the limited exhaustibility of knowledge and of the central role of the 
interindustrial knowledge externalities triggered by the dissemination 
of knowledge across product markets calls for a new knowledge policy 
aimed at reducing the exclusivity of the intellectual property regime 
with the introduction of two layers patents according to the activity of 
perspective users and new public subsidies based on high levels of 
additionality. 
 
KEYWORDS: KNOWLEDGE POLICY; KNOWLEDGE 
INCREASING RETURNS; USER SPECIFIC PATENTS; R&D 
SUBSIDIES; ADDITIONALITY REQUIREMENTS. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The viability of the knowledge growth regime depends upon the access 
conditions to knowledge. The analysis of the crucial role of knowledge calls 
attention on the need for a new knowledge policy.  Traditional research 
policies have been heavily influenced by the large consensus about the 
Arrovian knowledge market failure. The analysis of the negative economic 
consequences of the limits of knowledge as an economic good has been 
implemented for several decades and provided the base for an articulated set 
of research policies aimed at increasing the incentives to the generation of 
knowledge deemed to be insufficient.  
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The cornerstones of the research policy that stems from the hypothesis of a 
generalized knowledge market failure due to the limited appropriability of 
knowledge, are: i) the public support to the generation of knowledge by 
means of the supply of scientific and technological knowledge with the 
creation of a public infrastructure including academia and specialized public 
research centers; ii) the provision of public subsidies designed to reducing 
the costs of knowledge generating activities so as to balance the negative 
effects of the persistent limited appropriability of proprietary knowledge 
even after the protection provided by patents; iii) the public support to 
knowledge exploitation with the implementation of the IPR regime designed 
to increase the appropriability of knowledge.  
 
The results of the analysis carried out by this book suggest that quite a 
radical change is necessary. Knowledge is an economic good with special 
characteristics that enable economic systems and firms to take advantage of 
the dynamic increasing returns that stem from its limited exhaustibility and 
hence its cumulability and extensibility. Technological knowledge can be 
used again and again with limited effects in terms of wear-and-tear. 
Technological knowledge is not only an indispensable input in the 
technology production function i.e. for the production of any other good, 
but also an essential input for the recombinant generation of new 
knowledge.  
 
The identification of the new properties of knowledge as an economic good 
calls attention on the merits and strengths of knowledge as an economic 
good and its pivotal role as the engine of dynamic increasing returns and 
questions the Arrovian assumption about the limits and weaknesses of 
knowledge because of its limited appropriability and the consequent market 
failure in terms of knowledge undersupply stemming from the lack of 
appropriate levels of incentives to its generation and use. 
 
The recent advances of the economics of knowledge and of the new growth 
theory, integrated by the Schumpeterian legacy, have shown that the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge are characterized by increasing 
returns that take place at the system level and trigger out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. The generation of knowledge is. The limited appropriability of 
knowledge yields the combination of quasi-equilibrium conditions at the 
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firm level: spillovers limit the appropriation of the more than proportionate 
increase of output with respect to knowledge inputs. Spillovers in fact yield 
knowledge externalities that benefit third parties that can access and use 
knowledge as a quasi-public good at low cost. The limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge makes possible the repeated use of existing knowledge to 
generate new knowledge at costs that below equilibrium levels.  The larger 
is the stock of quasi-public knowledge that firms can access to pursuit the 
recombinant generation of new knowledge and the larger both the 
knowledge output and the total output of all the other goods that use 
technological knowledge as an indispensable input.  
 
The special properties of knowledge i.e. its limited appropriability and 
exhaustibility, trigger out-of-equilibrium conditions because knowledge 
externalities -with appropriate knowledge governance mechanisms- enable 
the secondary use of existing knowledge as an input in the generation of 
new knowledge and enable to increase the levels of total factor productivity 
at the system level that are larger the larger the gap between the equilibrium 
cost of knowledge and its actual costs (Antonelli, 2018a).    
 
Let us analyze the wheels of the mechanism in detail. The larger is the 
knowledge output at each point in time and -because of its limited 
exhaustibility and appropriability- the larger is the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge at time t+1. The larger the size and the variety of the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge and the better the knowledge governance 
conditions in the system that reduce absorption costs and enable to effective 
access to it- the lower is the cost of accessing to and using the stock of quasi-
public knowledge in the knowledge generation function at time t+1. The 
lower are the costs of the stock of knowledge – that enters the recombinant 
knowledge generation function as an indispensable input- and the lower is 
the cost of knowledge as an input in the technology production function of 
all the other goods. The lower is the cost of knowledge in the technology 
production function of all the other goods and the lower are their cost. The 
lower are the cost of output and the larger its quantity, and larger are the 
positive effects in terms of total factor productivity. The exploitation and 
generation of knowledge are the cause and the consequence of conditions 
that are far from equilibrium. This dynamics is further reinforced by the 
forces that shape the endogenous direction of technological change and the 
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search for technological congruence. At each point in time the availability 
of a larger stock of knowledge that can be accessed at lower costs induces 
the introduction of biased technological change directed at increasing the 
output elasticity of knowledge and its intensity of use. The augmented levels 
of technological congruence provided by the better matching between the 
availability of the cheaper input knowledge and its increased output 
elasticity in the technology production function, have the multiple effects 
of: i) increasing the demand for knowledge, hence its eventual generation 
with additional expansion of the knowledge stock, ii) enhancing the levels 
of total factor productivity and iii) strengthening its appropriability in the 
global product markets as rivals localized in less knowledge abundant 
countries can imitate but bear larger operating costs (Antonelli, 2018a).  
 
This dynamic process exhibits the evident characters of dynamic increasing 
returns that make clear the positive effects of the increase of the flows of 
R&D activities at each point in time well beyond the boundaries of any 
equilibrium conditions.  
 
The positive effects of the additional flows of R&D activities are a direct 
consequence of the full range of special characteristics of knowledge as an 
economic good: its limited appropriability, that makes its access and use 
possible to all the agents in the system, together with its limited 
exhaustibility that makes the accumulation possible. The knowledge 
externalities stemming from non-exhaustible knowledge spillovers benefit 
all the system.  
 
In this new out-of-equilibrium- context the goal of knowledge policies 
should be to increase of the flows and the stock of knowledge available in 
the system, rather than restoring the supposed equilibrium conditions of the 
markets for knowledge. The increase of R&D activities should become the 
prime goal of public subsidies rather than the compensation of the missing 
revenue of “inventors” expropriated by the limited appropriability of 
knowledge.     
 
This new approach, that highlights the merits, as opposed to the limits, of 
knowledge as an economic good and builds upon the new understanding of 
knowledge generation as a recombinant process into which existing 
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knowledge is a necessary and indispensable input, has strong implications 
in terms of knowledge policies.   
 
In this context there are strong and evident reasons for the public support to 
the generation of technological knowledge so as to increase the size of the 
stock of knowledge with its positive consequences. For the same token the 
public support to the improving the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanism is expected to yield positive effects in terms of better conditions 
of accessing and using the existing stock of knowledge (Antonelli, 2019a 
and b).  
 
The analysis of the consequences of the limited appropriability of 
knowledge must be framed into the new context that appreciates the 
potentialities of knowledge for dynamic increasing returns. IPR are 
necessary to secure the appropriation of the rent stemming from the 
generation of technological knowledge and its use for the introduction of 
innovations. A system deprived of IPR risks indeed to face the fall of the 
incentives, at the firm level, for the generation of knowledge even 
accounting for its long term positive effects. The differentiation of IPR 
according to the use of proprietary knowledge whether in the technology 
production function as an input into the introduction of technological 
innovations or in the knowledge generation function as an input in the 
generation of new knowledge seems to open the way to a knowledge policy 
based upon the Open Technology approach.  
 
The reduction of the exclusivity of IPR with the introduction of non-
exclusive patents with compulsory licensing based upon the liability rule 
seems especially appropriate when existing knowledge is used for the 
generation of new knowledge. Perspective users of the existing proprietary 
knowledge can access and use it, provided that the owner of the IPR is 
informed and receives a fair royalty. 
 
In the new analytical framework, the actual increase of amount of R&D 
activities carried out by private firms and hence the actual increase of the 
flows of knowledge generated at each point in time becomes the goal of 
public R&D subsidies. The shift from a knowledge cost reducing to a 
knowledge output increasing mission calls attention upon the additionality 
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issue. The support to the generation of knowledge based upon the strong 
additionality requirements and the support to the exploitation of new 
technological knowledge with differentiated exclusivity levels seem the 
appropriate tools to implement a new knowledge policy based upon the 
Open Technology approach. Let us analyze them in detail. 
 
6.2 THE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO KNOWLEDGE GENERATION 
Public subsidies are aimed at the reduction of R&D costs as a mean to 
compensate firms for the missing revenue due to the limited appropriability 
of knowledge. Subsidies are finalized to restore the equilibrium conditions 
of the markets for knowledge. The equilibrium conditions of the markets for 
knowledge are upset by the limited appropriability of knowledge that 
undermines the incentives to its supply. Public interventions aim at restoring 
the equilibrium conditions.  The pursuit of the increase of the level of R&D 
activities is a secondary goal of public intervention and is expected to take 
place only within the boundaries of equilibrium conditions. Public subsidies 
are expected to trigger an increase of R&D expenditures up the equilibrium 
level. Not beyond it. 
 
This section elaborates a new approach to the analysis of the foundations of 
public subsidies to R&D activities performed by firms. The increase of the 
flows of R&D activities and hence –because of the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge- of the accumulation of the stock of quasi-public knowledge 
should be the aim of public subsidies to R&D activities, rather than their 
mere cost reduction. Building upon these bases this section advocates the 
introduction of strong additionality requirements for granting public 
subsidies to R&D activities performed by private firms. Public subsidies 
should be granted only to firms that are committed to increase their R&D 
activities by an amount that is at least equal to the amount of the public 
subsidy.    
 
R&D SUBSIDIES AND R&D ACTIVITIES 
In the standard Arrovian framework, public R&D subsidies deemed 
necessary to compensate firms for the missing revenue of the innovations 
engendered by the limited appropriability of knowledge. Public R&D 
subsidies were finalized to compensate the reduced revenue with a reduced 
cost. The reduction of R&D cost was the basic aim of public R&D subsidies. 
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The performance of additional R&D activities was left to market forces and 
to the internal procedure of resource allocation.  
 
A variety of alternative modes of provision of public R&D subsidies has 
been experienced including the use of tax credits, or specific allocations, 
whether they take into account the levels of R&D activities carried out by 
firms or their rate of increase. The recent introduction of the patent box has 
introduced the further distinction between R&D subsidies and patent 
subsidies, i.e. ex ante and ex-post subsidies: the former support the 
appropriation of the output of the knowledge generation function, the former 
its prime input such as R&D activities (Bloom, Griffith, Van Reenen, 2002). 
A large literature has explored the effects of these alternatives in terms of 
additional flows of R&D activities and patents. Much attention has been 
paid to the identification of the actual levels of “losses” stemming from the 
limited appropriability of knowledge and to identify the types of research 
costs that can be subsidized (Zúñiga-Vicente, Alonso-Borrego, Forcadell, 
Galán, 2014; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014) 4.  
 
In the Arrovian market failure approach, once the public subsidies balance 
the losses stemming from the limited appropriability and the missing 
revenues are compensated by the reduction of R&D costs, firms are 
expected to allocate the correct amount of resources to the generation of 
knowledge (Guellec, van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie, 2003; Huergo, 																																																								4	The European Union has implemented the notion of ‘net extra costs’ i.e.  “the 
difference between the expected net present values of the aided project or activity and 
a viable counterfactual investment that the beneficiary would have carried out in the 
absence of aid.” (EU, 2014, pp. 7). The European Union uses the notion of extra-cost 
as a yardstick to quantify the appropriate amount of public subsidies and to limit the 
risk of undermining perfect competition: “Where it is shown, for example by means of 
internal company documents, that the aid beneficiary faces a clear choice between 
carrying out either an aided project or an alternative one without aid, the aid will be 
considered to be limited to the minimum only if its amount does not exceed the net 
extra costs of implementing the activities concerned, compared to the counterfactual 
project that would be carried out in the absence of aid. In order to establish the net extra 
costs, the Commission will compare the expected net present values of the investment 
in the aided project and the counterfactual project, account being taken of the 
probabilities of different business scenarios occurring” (EU, 2014, p.20). 	
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Trenado, Ubierna, 2016; Henningsen, Hægeland, Møen, 2015; Becker, 
2015).  
 
The literature has also explored the effects of public subsidies and tax 
incentives to R&D activities in terms of increased output and productivity 
trying to assess whether their provision was actually able to compensate for 
the asserted knowledge market failure (Klette, Møen, Griliches, 2000; 
Hall Van Reenen 2000; D’Andria, Pontikakis, Skonieczna, 2018).  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that public subsidies trigger a limited 
increase of actual R&D activities performed by recipients: the increase of 
R&D activities performed by recipients is lower than the actual levels of 
R&D subsidies received by firms. The issue of a crowing out effect has been 
identified and the need to assess carefully the actual additionality of R&D 
subsidies has becoming more and more evident (Marino, Lhuillery, Parrotta, 
Sala, 2016).  
 
The additionality of public R&D subsidies is measured by the ratio of the 
public subsidy to the value of the additional R&D activities actually carried 
out. The empirical evidence shows that automatic public subsidies granted 
to R&D activities performed by private firms yield only a limited increase 
of the R&D actually carried out (Clarysse, Wright, Mustar, 2009). A large 
literature confirms that an important share of public subsidies substitutes 
internal funds with a crowding out effect (Busom, 2000; David, Hall, Toole, 
2000).    
 
The rationale of the provision of public subsidies to R&D activities carried 
out by firms needs to be reconsidered. The assessment of the empirical 
evidence depends upon the rationale and the goals of the public subsidy. 
The low levels of  current additionality are not a signal of opportunistic 
crowding out behavior of recipient firms. The provision of public subsidies 
is aimed at compensating firms for the losses stemming from the limited 
appropriability of knowledge. The large and systematic evidence about the 
substitution of private resource with public ones to perform R&D activities 
by recipient firms is fully consistent with the goal of a public policy aimed 
at reducing the costs of R&D activities, but not with the goal to increasing 
the levels of R&D activities beyond their “equilibrium” levels.  
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The issue of the low additionality of public subsidies to R&D becomes 
critical as soon as the positive effects of R&D activities in terms of 
synchronic knowledge externalities are taken into account. R&D subsidies, 
in fact, benefit not only the recipient firm that is compensated of the negative 
effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge, but the whole system 
provided that the subsidies yield positive effects in terms of additional 
volumes of R&D activities and hence additional flows of spillover and 
consequent knowledge externalities that support the recombinant generation 
of new knowledge in the long term.  
 
The issue of the additionality of public subsidies to R&D becomes even 
stronger as soon as the positive effects of the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge in terms of diachronic knowledge externalities are taken into 
account. The actual increase of R&D activities at time t yields positive 
effects at the system level in terms of additional flows of spillover and 
consequent knowledge externalities that last for a long period of time as the 
new additional flows of R&D activities contribute the size of the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge that yields long lasting knowledge externalities that 
make possible to generate new additional knowledge at costs below 
equilibrium with positive effects on total factor productivity. 
 
 
PUBLIC R&D SUBSIDIES AND THE LEVELS OF R&D 
ACTIVITIES. THE DERIVED DEMAND FOR KNOWLEDGE AND 
R&D 
 
The advances of the economics of knowledge, namely the introduction of 
the technology production function and the knowledge generation function, 
provide the tools to analyze the effects of public R&D subsidies on the 
demand for knowledge (Antonelli and David, 2016). 
 
The joint analysis of the role of knowledge as an input in the production of 
all the other goods, implemented by the technology production function, and 
as an output of the knowledge generation function enables to frame the 
exploration of the determinants of the effects of public R&D subsidies on 
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the amount of knowledge used as an input downstream and an output 
upstream using the derived demand methodology. 
 
The demand for knowledge in downstream activities can be studied as the 
derived demand of the stock of knowledge in the technology production 
function. The analysis of the demand for knowledge by downstream users 
in turn enables to study the determinants of the demand for R&D activities 
by upstream knowledge producers. Let us make the necessary steps. 
 
The technology production function can be formalized as it follows: 
 
(1) Y = Ka LbTKc 
 
where Y measures output in value added is the product of the quantity QY 
and its price PY, K the stock of capital, L labor and TK the stock of 
knowledge capital; a, b, c are the respective output elasticity of the 
production factors K, L and TK. 
 
The cost equation is standard: 
 
(2) TCY = wL + rK + sTK 
 
where w is the cost of labor, r the cost of capital and s the cost of accessing 
and using the stock of knowledge at time t. 
 
The knowledge generation function, in the standard Cobb-Douglas 
specification, and the knowledge cost equation are: 
 
(3) KN = R&Da TK(t-1) 1-a 
(4) TCKN = zR&D + vTK(t-1)  
 
where KN stands for the flow of knowledge output, R&D for the internal 
research, learning and development activities and TK(t-1), for the stock of 
quasi-public knowledge (at time t-1), with their respective output elasticity 
a and 1-a. Both R&D and TK(t-1) have a cost. The cost z measures the costs 
of research and learning activities; the cost v measures the cost of accessing 
to and using the stock of quasi-public knowledge. 
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Public subsidies help reducing the cost of R&D activities. Their effect in 
terms of actual increase of the amount of knowledge output and of the actual 
increase of R&D activities carried out by recipient firms depends upon the 
demand of the stock of knowledge that can be easily derived from the 
technology production function (See eq.1) and the demand for R&D 
activities that can be derived from the knowledge generation function (See 
eq.3). 
 
The equilibrium level of the derived demand of the stock of knowledge the 
output of the knowledge generation function (see eq. 3) is determined by the 
value of its marginal product, as an input into the technology production 
function, and its cost (see eq.1):  
 
(5) dY/dTK =Y/TK PY c = s   
 
According to eq. 5, the derived demand for the stock of knowledge, with 
respect to time, is determined by the output elasticity of the stock of 
knowledge (c) in the technology production function, the price (PY) of the 
product Y and the cost (s) of the access to and the use of the stock of 
technological knowledge.  The cost of the additional stock of knowledge is 
endogenous as it depends on the knowledge generation function.  
 
The reduction of the cost of R&D activities z affects the knowledge 
generation function (see eq. 3) and helps reducing the costs of the flow of 
knowledge output (KN) with positive effects on the cost (s) of the stock of 
knowledge (TK) that enters the technology production function (see eq. 1). 
The average cost of Y is consequently reduced.  
 
The extent to which the reduction of R&D costs -triggered by R&D 
subsidies- affects the actual increase of R&D expenditures depends upon 
four factors: i) the market form of the product market; ii) the appropriability 
conditions in the knowledge markets; iii) the relative size of the subsidy 
itself; iv) the rates of growth of recipient firms. Let us analyze them in turn. 
 
The market form of the product market Y affects the actual reduction of the 
price (PY) of the product Y triggered by the subsidy.  The closer is the market 
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to competitive conditions and hence the price to the actual product cost, and 
the smaller is the reduction of PY -triggered by the subsidy- hence the 
smaller is the slope of the derived demand for the stock of quasi-public 
knowledge.  
 
The augmented levels of the stock of knowledge (dTK) triggered by the 
reduction of its costs coincide with the flow of knowledge generated 
upstream in the knowledge generation function. The inclusion of the 
equilibrium conditions of the demand for R&D activities derived from the 
knowledge generation function completes the analysis: 
 
(6) dKN/dR&D= KN/R&D PKN a = z 
 
For each given level of the demand for the stock of knowledge, the provision 
of a public subsidy affects the demand for R&D activities that in turn 
depends upon its price (PKN) in turn shaped the levels of knowledge 
appropriability.  
 
The smaller is the appropriability of knowledge in the markets of knowledge 
and -hence the flatter its shape-, and the larger - for given levels of the output 
elasticity of R&D activities in the knowledge generation function- the effect 
of the R&D subsidy that reduce the levels of z, on the actual levels of R&D 
activities carried out by the recipient.  
 
On the opposite, the larger is the appropriability of knowledge in the 
markets for knowledge, and the larger is the slope of the derived demand 
for R&D activities and hence the steeper is its shape and the smaller the 
effect of a reduction of R&D costs on the levels of R&D activities performed 
by recipient firms. 
 
 Figure 6.1 synthetizes the bulk of the argument.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6.1 ABOUT HERE 
Public subsidies reduce the costs of R&D activities: the supply curve of 
knowledge shifts from S1 to S2. Their effect in terms of actual increase of 
R&D activities carried out by recipient firms depends upon the combined 
effects of the slope of the derived demand for the stock of knowledge and 
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the slope of the derived demand for R&D activities. The closer to 
monopolistic conditions are both product and knowledge markets and the 
larger is the slope of the derived demand for knowledge as much as the slope 
of the derived demand for R&D (see D1), and the smaller are the 
additionality levels <1: R&D expenditures increase from R&DA to R&DB . 
In competitive product and knowledge markets the slope of the derived 
demands is small (see D2), additionality levels are larger and >1: R&D 
expenditures increase from R&DE to R&DF .  
 
 
FIGURE 6.1 EFFECTS OF R&D SUBSIDIES ON R&D LEVELS 
 
 
 
Let us now consider the well-known effects of demand elasticity. For given 
slopes of the derived demand for the stock of knowledge and of the related 
derived demand for R&D, the effects of subsidies, in terms of increased 
levels of R&D, depend upon the levels of R&D costs with respect to the 
derived demand. The increase of R&D expenditures triggered by R&D 
subsidies is larger, the larger is the price elasticity on the derived demand. 
Subsidies that reduce R&D costs in the portion of the derived demand with 
e>1 will trigger a larger rate of R&D increase than subsidies that affect the 
reduction of R&D costs where -on the derived demand curve- e<1. For a 
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given level of subsidy, the smaller is its share with respect to R&D costs and 
the closer it is to the intercept on the vertical axis of the derived demand, the 
larger are the effects in terms of actual rate of increase of R&D activities. 
Subsidies that represent a small share of high quality research projects with 
high costs that insist on the elastic portions of the derived demand for R&D 
activities are likely to stir a large increase of R&D activities.  
 
Finally, it seems clear that the larger the rate of growth of recipient firms 
and the larger the rate of increase of R&D activities, hence the easier to meet 
the strong additionality requirement that can be matched even without the 
increase of the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. In a dynamic setting the 
strong additionality requirement can be easily met by firms that enjoy rapid 
rates of growth.  
 
Public subsidies aimed at increasing the actual size of the stock of quasi-
public knowledge and hence the current level of R&D expenditures should 
be assigned to firms that are active in competitive product markets with low 
barriers to entry and imitation, to R&D activities that are likely to deliver 
knowledge outputs with low levels of appropriability and radical research 
projects with large R&D costs. 
 
The introduction of a strong additionality requirement according to which 
firms can benefit from public R&D subsidies only if they are able to increase 
the amount of R&D activities by an amount at least equal to that of the 
public subsidy triggers a self-selection mechanism by means of which the 
possible recipients operate in competitive product markets with low barriers 
to entry, knowledge markets with low levels of appropriability, undertake 
R&D activities with high costs and enjoy fast rates of growth. Low growth 
firms that enjoy barriers to entry low appropriability would be able to meet 
the strong additionality requirement only if the research project is actually 
promising so as to justify the actual increase of R&D activities beyond the 
levels of the public subsidy. The strong additionality requirement would sort 
out firms that undertake research projects that are less likely to yield 
important knowledge externalities to the rest of the system. 
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A NEW GOAL FOR R&D SUBSIDIES: FROM R&D COST 
REDUCING TO KNOWLEDGE OUTPUT INCREASING  
 
The analytical framework elaborated so far enables to articulate a clear 
policy procedure. Public R&D subsidies can be provided to private firms 
that undertake innovative activities only if they are able to meet the strong 
constraint of an additionality level >1. The additionality level is > 1 when 
the flow of additional R&D activities (DR&D) carried out by the recipient 
of a subsidy is larger than the amount of the subsidy (SUB) itself: 
 
(7) ADD= DR&D/SUB; where ADD >1 when DR&D>SUB. 
 
The identification and implementation of the goal of an additionality level 
>1 has several positive effects: 
 
i) it helps increasing the rate of generation of knowledge and hence the rate 
of accumulation of the stock of quasi-public knowledge that supports with 
increasing and persistent pecuniary knowledge externalities the 
recombinant generation of new knowledge; 
 
ii) it reduces the costs of R&D activities and hence compensate firms that 
carry out innovative activities for the limited appropriability of the new 
knowledge;  
 
iii) it helps screening and sorting recipient firms that operate in competitive 
product markets with low levels of knowledge appropriability; 
 
iv) it favors the allocation of public subsidies to firms that engage in high-
quality R&D projects.  
 
The combination of these four layers is most important. The strong 
additionality requirement, according to which the ratio of the rate of increase 
of R&D activities to the subsidy must be >1, helps directing the public 
support towards recipients that are active in competitive product markets 
with low barriers to entry and experience fast rates of growth and are 
engaged in high-quality R&D activities.  
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Firms that are not able ex-post to certify the compliance with the strong 
additionality requirement should pay back the excess subsidy. 
 
In so doing the strong additionality requirement helps the identification of 
the types of firms, R&D activities and knowledge exploitation processes 
that are most likely to contribute the accumulation of a quasi-public stock 
of knowledge and hence the rate of generation of new knowledge and of 
introduction of further innovations. 
 
Stronger additionality requirements act as a self-selection mechanism by 
means of which only firms active in competitive markets with lower levels 
of knowledge appropriability and fast rates of growth and high quality of 
their research activity, that contribute more to the accumulation of the stock 
of quasi-public knowledge, can actually comply with the new constraints to 
access the public subsidies to their R&D activities.  
 
 
6.3 THE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO KNOWLEDGE EXPLOITATION 
Patents had been introduced first in the late XV century by the Republic of 
Venice to attract craftsmen from the Middle East to Venice. The economics 
of knowledge rationalized, ex-post, their role as an effective institutional 
remedy to reduce the negative effects of the limited appropriability of 
knowledge. Patents and trade-marks enable knowledge holders to reduce the 
risks stemming from the limited appropriability of knowledge. Patents and 
trade-marks provide the foundations for the monopolistic exploitation of 
technological and commercial knowledge. Patents and trade-marks provide 
the institutional foundations for the working of knowledge quasi-markets. 
Without patents and trade-marks knowledge trade would be impeded by the 
uncontrolled leakage of knowledge. Patents and trade-marks enable to 
valorize knowledge not only by means of knowledge transactions, but also 
by means of the embodiment of intellectual property rights in capital by 
means of the creation of knowledge intensive equity.  Patents are 
indispensable not only to increase the appropriability of knowledge and its 
exploitability, but also to favor the dissemination of knowledge. Patents 
avoid or reduce the systematic use of secrecy that would become the unique 
tool for knowledge holders to increase the chances to retain the flows of 
rents stemming from knowledge. Moreover, patents are a powerful 
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mechanism that makes the advances of the knowledge frontier publicly 
known: patents provide information to the system.   
 
The current regime of intellectual property rights is based upon 
homogeneous patents characterized by absolute exclusivity.   
 
There is no differentiation of patents across types of knowledge and their 
use. The very same patent applies to the full spectrum of types of knowledge 
and possible uses. Patent holders have the right to exclude third parties from 
the unauthorized use of their patents.  Patent holders may decide to license 
their patents and receive a royalty from the users, but they are not obliged 
to license. They may retain the exclusive right to use the knowledge until 
the patent expires.  
 
The solution of the appropriability trade-off is at the heart of the long-term 
viability of the knowledge growth regime. On the one hand it is in fact clear 
that patents are indispensable to increase the appropriability of knowledge, 
on the other, however, patents reduce the pace of the recombinant 
generation of new knowledge as they limit the access to indispensable 
inputs. All changes in the intellectual property right regime modify the 
effects of the appropriability trade-off.  The augmented levels of knowledge 
appropriability provided by the strengthening of the intellectual property 
rights implemented since the last decade of the XX century play a central 
role in the exploitation and valorization of knowledge as capital (Orsi, and 
Coriat, 2006).  
 
The knowledge growth regime suffers the intrinsic contradiction between 
the conditions of the generation of technological knowledge and the 
conditions of its exploitation (Pagano, 2014; Pagano and Rossi, 2009). 
 
As Pagano (2014: 1416) notes: “Rather than preventing a tragedy of 
commons, their private ownership is instead likely to produce an anti-
commons tragedy (Heller and Eisemberg, 1998). The fields of knowledge 
are not subject to overcrowding. By contrast, they may be greatly damaged 
if they are enclosed within narrow and rigid boundaries. When the access to 
knowledge is severely restricted by the fields privatized by others, agents 
are forced to specialize in narrow fields and they are likely to suffer a 
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dramatic squeeze of investment opportunities. In other words, an anti-
commons tragedy due to over-privatization is likely to occur.”  
 
The recombinant generation of technological knowledge relies on the access 
and use of existing knowledge. Knowledge shares all the intrinsic 
characteristics of an essential facility as its use as an input is indispensable 
not only for the production of all the other goods -in the technology 
production function- but also in the generation of knowledge. Moreover, 
because of its limited exhaustibility, the larger is the amount of 
knowledge(s) each agent can access and use and the larger is the knowledge 
output. Specifically, knowledge output increases at a more than 
proportionate rate with respect to the increase in the variety of knowledge 
inputs. At the same time the exploitation of knowledge requires high levels 
of appropriability of knowledge as an output. Intellectual property rights are 
strictly necessary to enforce knowledge appropriability. The un-limited 
access to all existing knowledge limits the incentives to its generation as 
well as the viability of its funding.    
 
A system with no intellectual property rights would suffer the negative 
consequences of the lack of incentives: patents are necessary. At the same 
time patents limit the access to existing knowledge as an indispensable input 
in the recombinant generation of new knowledge (Boldrin, Levine, 2002 
and 2013). The over-privatization of knowledge curbs the rates of 
generation of new knowledge.  
 
The exclusivity of the current IPR regime has been criticized for the high 
risks of anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg (1998). The barriers and delays 
to the use of proprietary knowledge stemming from exclusive patents 
increase knowledge appropriability and hence the incentives to its 
generation but reduce the general efficiency of the generation of knowledge. 
According to Scotchmer (1999; 2004; 2010) the negative effects of the 
exclusivity of patents are especially evident when new knowledge builds 
upon the previous knowledge vintage. Exclusive IPR induce firms and 
inventors to duplicate research effort and to invent around. In the extreme 
cases, exclusive patents impede the use of an essential facility that cannot 
be reproduced and stop the advance of technological knowledge (Laitner 
and Stolyarov, 2013). New technological knowledge, in fact, is the result 
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of the recombination of existing knowledge: in such a context the stock of 
existing knowledge has all the intrinsic properties of an essential facility 
(Antonelli, 2007).  
 
Current IPR together with high transaction costs in the markets for 
knowledge produce a fragmented knowledge landscape where owners of 
small complementary bits of knowledge are unable to participate in the 
collective effort that is needed to generate new knowledge as an output 
while using existing knowledge an input (David and Hall, 2006).  
 
At the same time, it is clear that patents perform an essential role in the 
knowledge economy as they provide indispensable information about the 
progress in the frontiers of knowledge. The alternative to patents is secrecy: 
firms and inventors would try and keep their knowledge secret so as to 
reduce the risks of uncontrolled leakage. Secrecy has strong negative effects 
in terms of missing information about the advances of knowledge and may 
actually increase the amount of resources wasted in the duplication of 
research efforts (Bielig, 2015). 
 
The classical argument in favor of the introduction of differentiated patents 
rests upon the analysis of the types of market forms in the different 
industries and product markets (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990). Patent terms 
should be industry-specific: shorter the more intense is competition, the 
higher the productivity of R&D activity and the more intricate the reverse 
engineering (Mosel, 2011).  
 
Yet it is clear that the very same knowledge may be relevant in a broad array 
of industries and many different types of knowledge are relevant within the 
same industry. The cases of general purpose technologies, such as ICT and 
biotechnologies, show how large can be the scope of some knowledge items 
that apply to a variety of well distinct industries with well differentiated 
types of competition and market structure (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 
1995). 
 
The literature has concentrated its attention on the optimal breadth and 
length of patents and has explored in depth the limits of the current levels 
of exclusivity calling attention of the negative effects of exclusive property 
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rights on the generation of new knowledge characterized by high levels of 
cumulativity (Scotchmer, 1999, 2004, 2010; Polanki, 2007; Green and 
Scotchmer, 1995; O’Donogue Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998). This literature, 
however, has not explored the possibility of the coexistence of patents that 
allow different levels of exclusivity for the very same proprietary 
knowledge. 
 
The differentiation of the IPR regime can be implemented by the analysis 
of the distinction between intra-industrial and inter-industrial spillovers and 
knowledge externalities. The use of patents with high levels of exclusivity 
to remedy the negative effects of the limited appropriability of knowledge 
is an effective tool to increase the amount of knowledge generated in a 
system in the case of intra-industrial spillovers, rather than in the case of 
inter-industrial spillovers. When interindustrial spillover apply, compulsory 
licensing with fair royalties seems to yield a superior outcome. 
 
The positive effect of patents, in fact, consists in the impediment to the entry 
of imitators in the very same product market. Patents with high levels of 
exclusivity help contrasting the Arrovian knowledge market failure as they 
create a legal monopoly that enables inventors to extract the expected quasi-
rents from the exploitation of their knowledge and re-establish the 
appropriate levels of incentives to the generation of knowledge. As far as 
intra-industrial spillovers are concerned, the negative consequences of 
patents with high levels of exclusivity, in terms of delayed use of an 
essential facility, are compensated by the positive effects in terms of 
augmented knowledge appropriability and hence incentives to its 
generation.  
 
The negative consequences of exclusive patents are much stronger for inter-
industrial spillovers than for intra-industrial ones. The positive effects of 
exclusive patents are not sufficient to compensate the negative ones. 
Exclusive patents, in fact, limit the use of proprietary knowledge as an input 
in the generation of new knowledge that applies to other product markets 
and have no consequences in terms of augmented knowledge appropriability 
and hence incentives to its generation, but strong negative effects in terms 
of opportunity costs for the generation of new knowledge. Because of the 
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exclusivity of patents, the recombinant generation of new knowledge cannot 
access existing knowledge as an essential facility. 
 
USER SPECIFIC PATENTS 
The case of general purpose technologies and the appreciation of the 
intrinsic heterogeneity of the uses of knowledge together with the key 
distinction between intra-industrial and interindustrial spillovers enables to 
explore the viability of the introduction of user-specific patents. The 
exclusivity of a patent should vary according to its users and uses: users that 
declare to be non-competitors of the patentee should be enabled to access 
and use the proprietary knowledge with lower levels of exclusivity. 
Standard exclusivity should apply to their use by competitors. 
 
The identification of the optimum level of the price of knowledge enables 
to implement the effective application of the liability rule to the compulsory 
licensing of non-exclusive patents (Reichman, 2000; Reichman and 
Maskus, 2005). 
 
Compulsory licensing of non-exclusive property rights applies when 
potential users, active in other product markets, access proprietary 
knowledge only as an input for the generation of new knowledge, rather than 
as an input –ready to be used- in their technology production function, 
provided they pay a fair royalty, based upon the value of the proprietary 
knowledge, that includes appropriate profit margins for knowledge 
producers (Antonelli, 2015a and b). 
 
The design of a differentiated IPR regime, based upon user-specific patents, 
enables to separate the negative effects of intraindustrial spillovers in terms 
of reduced incentives, from the positive effects of the knowledge 
externalities stemming from interindustrial spillovers.  
 
The design of differentiated IPR in terms of exclusivity levels should be 
implemented according to the uses of knowledge: i) patents with weak 
exclusivity that should be granted to knowledge items that are used as inputs 
into the knowledge generation function by non-competitors; and ii) patents 
with strong exclusivity that can be confirmed only to knowledge items 
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ready-to-used as inputs in the technology production function of 
competitors.   
  
Inventors apply at the same time for a two layers patent for the very same 
knowledge. Inventors would hold for the same knowledge item: 1) an 
exclusive patent so as to increase the appropriability of their proprietary 
knowledge and impede its imitative use by competitors in their product 
market and 2) a non-exclusive patent with compulsory licensing that does 
not exclude its use by third parties that sign a non-competition declaration. 
Compulsory licensing entitles the patent holder to receive the payment of a 
royalty from the user.  
 
The definition of a fair level of royalties is clearly crucial. The levels of the 
royalties define the levels of de-facto exclusivity. High level royalties imply 
strong de-facto exclusivity. Low level royalties imply weak de-facto 
exclusivity.  
 
A fair level of royalty can be identified by the compulsory declaration of the 
value of patented knowledge as a part of procedure for the assignment of 
the patent. The procedure for patent granting should include a value 
declaration: the patent seeker declares the expected value of the knowledge 
for which the patent is requested. The value of the proprietary knowledge 
declared to the patent office is submitted to a specific taxation. The negative 
fiscal consequences of the declaration of excess values are clear: the 
perspective patent holder must pay relevant taxes.  
 
The value of the proprietary knowledge provides the basis for the 
identification of a fair royalty that should include appropriate levels of 
profitability taking into account the levels of risks and the complementarity 
of the new knowledge with respect to the knowledge base of the patentee.  
 
The access to non-exclusive IPR is subject to the payment of a fair royalty 
that can be identified on the basis of its declared value. The patent office 
defines the maximum level of the total royalties that can be earned. The 
actual definition of the royalty is left to the market place. Once the 
maximum level of the royalty has been earned by the patentee, knowledge 
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is no longer proprietary and all firms can access and use it without any 
royalty.  
 
The licensing contract should be made public so as to increase the 
transparency of the market place. Licensees can take the courts to curtail 
excess royalties. Patentees have the right to appeal in court licensees that do 
not comply with the non-competition declaration.   
  
The strength of the differentiation of the exclusivity of IPR consists in the 
reduction of the negative effects of the appropriability trade-off. The access 
to proprietary knowledge for uses and by users that are not competitors of 
“inventors” for the generation of new knowledge, that does not affect the 
product market where inventors are based, enables to take full advantage of 
the positive effects of the recombinant generation of knowledge, to fasten 
the rate of generation of new knowledge and to reduce its costs, hence to 
increase total factor productivity.  
 
The enforcement of a fair royalty enables to protect the correct levels of 
incentives for the generation of new knowledge and to avoid the risks of 
knowledge market failure without missing the opportunity to take advantage 
of the use of knowledge as an indispensable input in the generation of new 
knowledge.  
 
The ex-ante enforcement of the proposal seems to be quite straightforward. 
The access to proprietary knowledge is conditional to: i) a non-competition 
declaration by the perspective user and ii) a value declaration by the 
patentee. Moreover, all the licensing contracts should be public so as to 
increase the transparency of the new markets for knowledge and avoid 
excess royalties. 
 
Compulsory licensing for non-competitive uses of proprietary knowledge 
should help to implement the working of the markets for knowledge stirring 
both the demand for knowledge as an input and its supply by loath patentees. 
Much evidence confirms that the supply of proprietary knowledge to 
potential users in the markets for licenses is hampered by patentees that are 
reluctant to make their knowledge available to third parties (Geroski, 1995).  
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The weakness of the differentiation of the exclusivity of IPR stems from the 
enforcement costs that are likely to be non-negligible. The declaration of 
non-competition on the part of users is likely to trigger substantial litigation 
that add to the controversies about the boundaries of the proprietary 
knowledge itself (Sterlacchini, 2016, Cremers, 2017). The general purpose 
nature of knowledge entails that it is not straightforward to distinguish 
knowledge "by uses" and by products of application. The boundaries among 
product markets are not easy to identify and grey zones may exist, with 
negative consequences in terms of reasons for controversy and litigations 
(Bloom, Schankerman, Van Reenen, 2013). The enforcement of the new 
non-exclusive IPR would share the same problems faced by competition 
policy enforcement where the assessment of the extension of the product 
market plays a crucial role (Stiglitz, 2008 and 2017). Yet, although the 
enforcement costs of competition policy are quite relevant, there is no doubt 
that their implementation yields positive effects at the system level. 
   
Quite the same argument seems to apply to the introduction of the two-
layers IPR regime. The joint assessment of the weaknesses and strengths of 
the proposal suggests that the net positive effects are larger. The advantages 
of the reduced exclusivity of property rights and the consequent access to 
the existing stock of knowledge as an input in the generation of new 
knowledge is likely to trigger significant benefits at the system level in terms 
of increased total factor productivity levels that largely offset enforcement 
costs. 
 
The costs of litigations about the maximum level of the fair royalty may be 
regarded as a major source of weakness. The risks of legal actions by 
licensee however should prevent patentees from imposing excess royalties. 
The transparency of the licensing agreements including the levels of 
royalties should help to enforce the working of the market place. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
THE CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZE THE FOUNDING STONES OF 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTED BY THE 
BOOK GRAFTING OF THE TOOLS ELABORATED BY THE 
ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE LEGACY OF JOSEPH 
SCHUMPETER. IT SYNTHETIZES THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE 
ANALYIS: i) THE NEW STRUCTURE OF ADVANCED 
ECONOMIES, ii) THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE CORPORATE 
GROWTH REGIME, iii) THE EMERGENCE AND 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW KNOWLEDGE GROWTH 
REGIME WHERE  iv) KNOWLEDGE IS AT THE SAME TIME THE 
PRIME INPUT AND OUTPUT. IT EMPHASISES THE LIMITS OF 
THE NEW KNOWLEDGE GROWTH REGIME, RAISED BY THE 
ROLE OF FINANCE, INCOME INEQUALITY AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. IT RECOMMENDS A 
NEW KNOWLEDGE POLICY BASED UPON AN OPEN 
TECHNOLOGY APPROACH THAT BUILDS UPON NON-
EXCLUSIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND R&D 
SUBSIDIES WITH STRONG ADDITIONALITY. 
 
KEY WORDS: INCOME INEQUALITY; OPEN TECHNOLOGY 
APPROACH; NON-EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS; 
ADDITIONALITY REQUIREMENTS.  
 
The new economics of knowledge is indispensable to grasp the working of 
the new knowledge economy. The analysis of knowledge as an economic 
good is a fertile and promising field of investigation that can yield important 
results in the analysis not only of the generation and exploitation of 
knowledge but also in the analysis the working of a system based upon the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge.  
 
Knowledge has several idiosyncratic properties that deserve all to be 
identified and explored in detail. Their implications and consequences are 
most important and need to be considered all together. The economic 
literature has paid much attention to a sub set of the broader bundle of 
knowledge idiosyncratic features. Attention has been attracted primarily if 
not exclusively by its limited appropriability, its non-rivalry in use, the sharp 
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difference between generation and reproduction costs.  The selection of 
these features has led to a substantial consensus about the limits of 
knowledge as an economic good and their consequences in terms of market 
failure.  
 
The identification of the limited exhaustibility as a key intrinsic property of 
knowledge enables to modify the standard frame according to which 
knowledge has many shortcomings and weaknesses as an economic good. 
Actually the ‘discovery’ of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge seems 
to uncover unexpected merits and strengths of knowledge as an economic 
good.  
 
The distinction between intra-industrial and inter-industrial spillovers 
enables to enrich the analysis of the effects of the limited appropriability of 
knowledge. Intra-industrial spillovers engender imitation externalities that 
consist in the direct access of competitors and rivals, in the same product 
market, to proprietary knowledge ready-to-be-used as an input into their 
technology production function. Imitation engenders the entry of new 
suppliers and the consequent reduction of the prices of the innovated goods 
and the fall of the price-cost-margins of inventors. The traditional 
Schumpeterian argument according to which monopolistic market power 
for innovated goods is transient and yet positive in terms of welfare is based 
upon intra-industrial spillovers and applies to imitation externalities. 
Monopolistic extra-profits are doomed to decline because of imitation and 
yet yield strong incentives to the generation of new knowledge. The 
Arrovian postulate, according to which the limited appropriability of 
knowledge is at the origin of a major failure of competitive markets for the 
lack of incentives to the generation of knowledge applies clearly to imitation 
externalities.  
 
Knowledge externalities take place when proprietary knowledge spills 
outside the industry and is not ready-to-be-used as such but is used by 
recipients as an input for the recombinant generation of new knowledge. 
Knowledge externalities augment the amount of knowledge that can be 
produced by the knowledge generation function with a given budget. 
Knowledge externalities take place when and if the cost of accessing and 
using the stock of quasi-public knowledge that characterizes economic 
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systems, is lower than the costs of its regeneration. Knowledge externalities 
exert three distinct effects: i) direct positive effects in the knowledge 
generation function as they enable to increase the amount of knowledge that 
can be produced with a given budget; ii) indirect positive effects as the 
cheaper knowledge generated upstream in the knowledge generation 
function enters the downstream technology production function and enables 
to produce a larger amount of output with a given budget; iii) negligible 
negative effects on the price of goods produced and sold in the product 
market of the inventor.  
 
The Arrovian postulate does not apply to inter-industrial spillovers and 
knowledge externalities because there is not the risk of market failure 
stemming from the fall of price of products within the industry of inventors, 
with the well-known consequences in terms of missing incentives and 
undersupply of knowledge. The positive effects of inter-industrial 
spillovers, instead, are very strong in terms of reduced knowledge costs. 
 
The appreciation of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge coupled with its 
limited appropriability enables to understand that knowledge as an 
economic good is “better” rather “worst” than standard goods because of its 
powerful effects on the generation of knowledge and its effects on the 
creative response of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions. 
 
Knowledge is at the same time an input and an output of the generation of 
knowledge is an explicit economic activity. The generation of knowledge in 
fact consists in the recombination of existing knowledge items. The access 
to knowledge generated by third parties plays a central role in the 
recombinant process. Existing knowledge is an essential facility. 
Knowledge spilling from third parties cumulates into a stock of quasi-public 
knowledge that firms try and use as an input. Pecuniary knowledge 
externalities stem from the difference between reproduction and access 
costs. The positive effects of knowledge externalities consist in the 
reduction of knowledge costs and hence in the downward shift of the 
knowledge supply schedule. The negative effects in terms of reduction of 
the price of innovated goods in the original product market, and hence 
missing appropriation and fall of incentives, are negligible. The analysis of 
the appropriability trade-off shows that the positive effects of pecuniary 
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knowledge externalities in terms of above equilibrium supply of knowledge 
and below-equilibrium knowledge prices are far larger than their negative 
ones. 
 
Within the Schumpeterian framework of the creative response, the 
conditions for the generation, use and exploitation of knowledge are crucial 
to support the innovative capability of an economic system.   Knowledge is 
a special good that may be actually “better” rather than “worst” than 
standard economic goods.  
 
When its generation and exploitation take place in highly qualified and 
contingent institutional and economic contexts it enables to achieve 
economic performances well above equilibrium levels. The limited 
exhaustibility of knowledge enables its accumulation with major 
implications for its generation. The cost of knowledge is far below the 
equilibrium cost of any standard good. As a consequence, productivity and 
output growth depend upon the conditions in which the difference between 
knowledge equilibrium cost and actual cost is actually exploited. When the 
generation, use and exploitation of knowledge take place in highly qualified 
institutional and economic contexts, knowledge costs fall below equilibrium 
levels and enable firms to extract rents and economic systems to experience 
output levels that are above the equilibrium levels. 
 
When its generation and exploitation do not take place in appropriate 
contexts, instead, and pecuniary knowledge externalities vanish, the case for 
market failure applies. Economic systems are not able to take advantage of 
the opportunities provided by knowledge as an economic good that might 
have been  “better” than standard economic goods and are trapped into 
equilibrium conditions.  
 
The characteristics of the system into which the generation, accumulation 
and exploitation of knowledge take place in terms of quality of knowledge 
governance mechanisms are crucial to take advantage of the potentialities 
of knowledge.  
 
The new understanding of the dynamics of increasing returns stemming 
from the limited exhaustibility of knowledge and its effects in terms of 
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accumulation of a long lasting stock of knowledge that is indispensable for 
the generation of new knowledge enables to grasp the working of advanced 
economic systems where knowledge is the central economic good. 
 
The emergence of the new knowledge economy that has been taking place 
since the end of the XX century and the first decades of the XXI century has 
been driven by the: i) increasing globalization of product markets; ii) 
increasing role and globalization of financial services; iii) continuing 
reduction of the share of GDP produced by manufacturing industries in 
favor of the share of GDP produced by service industries; iv) introduction 
of directed technological change biased towards knowledge intensive 
technologies; v) exploitation of knowledge capitalized as a financial asset; 
vi) decline of the fixed capital intensity of the production processes and the 
consequent reduction of investments; vii) apparent reduction of the rates of 
growth of output and productivity; viii) increase in the share of revenue paid 
to knowledge capital that ix) parallels the  segmentation of labor markets 
with increasing levels of income and wealth inequality.  
 
This interpretation contrasts the argument according to which western 
economies would be facing a secular decline of productivity growth 
determined not only by structural and social unbalances –headwinds- at the 
system level but also by the slowdown of technological change.  
 
The analysis carried out through this book has shown that the trends towards 
the decline of output and productivity growth are more apparent than real. 
Current economic and statistical procedures are unable to cope with the 
structural change of advanced economies away from the corporate growth 
regime into the knowledge growth regime and the central role played in this 
context by the capitalization of knowledge as a financial asset.  The evidence 
is influenced by the statistical mis-measurement of the effects of the 
capitalization of knowledge as an output that adds to the mis-measurement 
problems associate with the prices of high tech products.  
 
This book has articulated the hypothesis that the economic system of 
advanced countries is experiencing not only the consequences of the 
introduction of radical technological changes, but also and primarily a 
radical transformation of its Schumpeterian growth regime i.e. the 
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mechanisms that implement the coordination and organization at the system 
level of the generation, exploitation and use of knowledge in societies and 
make the creative response possible. The new role of knowledge as the key 
output and input, the central product as well as the central production factor 
and the new modes of organizing its generation, use and exploitation 
identifies the transition to a new Schumpeterian growth regime.  
 
The mechanisms by means of which economic systems cope with the 
properties of knowledge as an economic good -its limited appropriability, 
exhaustibility and tradability- and the idiosyncratic, systemic and highly 
contingent conditions that shape its generation, use and exploitation and 
enable the creative reaction of firms caught in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions, are in fact key to grasping the types of Schumpeterian growth 
regimes at work. 
 
The notion of Schumpeterian growth regime enables to analyze the 
changing sets of systemic conditions at the level of firms, final and 
intermediary product markets, financial and labor markets, and the 
macroeconomic and institutional contexts that shape: i) the out-of-
equilibrium conditions that stir the reaction of firms; ii) the mechanisms of 
knowledge governance that support the generation, exploitation and 
accumulation of knowledge; iii) the re-production of the endogenous 
knowledge externalities; iv) upon which is based the capability of economic 
systems to support the creative reaction and the consequent introduction of 
technological and structural change. 
 
The Schumpeterian growth regime is an indispensable frame necessary to 
understanding the dual relationship between the working of the system and 
the mechanisms of generation, exploitation and accumulation of 
technological knowledge. Schumpeterian growth regimes show, in fact, 
how the system shapes the creative reaction and the generation, exploitation 
and accumulation of technological knowledge, and how the mechanisms of 
generation, exploitation and accumulation of knowledge in turn shape the 
structure and the dynamics of the system. 
 
In the new Schumpeterian knowledge growth regime, knowledge is not only 
the central input and output of the knowledge economy, but also as the 
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critical component of total capital. The capitalization of knowledge emerges 
as the distinctive element of the new growth regime. The analysis of the 
laws of generation, exploitation and valorization of knowledge is 
indispensable to understanding the working of the knowledge growth 
regime at the aggregate level.  
 
The idiosyncratic characteristics of knowledge as an economic good are at 
the origin of the growth of total factor productivity and output. The better is 
the quality of the knowledge governance mechanisms that reduce the levels 
of knowledge absorption cost and the larger is the current generation of 
knowledge and the larger the knowledge stock, the lower is cost of 
knowledge as an output of the knowledge generation function, and as an 
input in the technology production function, and the larger are the chances 
that the response of firms to out-of-equilibrium conditions is creative and 
consequently the larger are output and productivity levels.  
 
The analysis of the capitalization of knowledge and of the central role of 
financial markets, carried out through this book, should enable to grasp the 
actual dynamics of growth of output and productivity at the aggregate level 
that takes place in the knowledge growth regime.  
 
Finally, the increasing role of knowledge as the base of the international 
specialization of advanced countries exposed to the globalization of product 
and factor markets has the direct consequence to expose standard labor to 
the consequences of the international competition from low wage countries 
while the employment opportunities of creative workers are relatively 
protected by the size and quality of the stock of quasi public knowledge as 
well by the quality of the mechanisms of knowledge governance rooted in 
the economic systems of advanced countries. The pervasive role of 
knowledge as the prime input and output of the knowledge growth regime 
is the prime cause of the increasing levels of wage, wealth and income 
inequality.  
 
The shift away from the corporate growth regime to the knowledge growth 
regime can be regarded as the outcome of the creative response 
implemented by advanced countries to cope with the twin globalization. The 
twin globalization of product and financial markets undermined the viability 
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of the corporate growth regime on two counts. First, the globalization of 
product markets exposed the manufacturing industry of advanced countries 
to the winning competitive pressure of the industrial products manufactured, 
often under the control of global corporations based in advanced countries, 
in low wage countries. Second, the globalization of financial markets gave 
industrializing countries the access to credit at low costs, often provided by 
global financial institutions based in advanced countries, that questioned the 
specialization of advanced countries based upon the relative abundance of 
capital. The decline of the corporate growth regime stirred the search and 
eventual implementation of a new specialization based upon the relative 
abundance of the stock of technological and scientific knowledge embedded 
in the structure of advanced economic countries.  The emergence of the 
knowledge growth regime that puts the generation and exploitation of 
knowledge at the core of its participation to the international division of 
labor, can be regarded as the outcome of the collective creative response of 
advanced countries to cope with the crisis and decline of the corporate 
growth regime. The strong increase of the share of intangible assets in the 
total asset value of the S&P 500 firms and the decline of the share of fixed 
capital seems to confirm the important role of the knowledge intensive and 
fixed capital saving bias of technological change.  
 
The increasing levels of income inequality associated with the transition to 
the knowledge growth regime are the results of: i) the segmentation of the 
labor markets into two distinct sections. In the markets for standard labor, 
wages decline because of the dynamics of factor costs equalization. In the 
markets for creative labor, on the opposite, wages increase because of the 
sharp increase of the derived demand for knowledge triggered by the 
knowledge intensive direction of technological change; 2) the new 
mechanisms of knowledge exploitation based upon its capitalization 
together with the knowledge intensive direction of technological change that 
increases the share of income paid to the possessors of knowledge; rather 
than to creative labor that is indispensable to both its generation and 
application to the production of all the other goods. 
 
The appreciation of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge and its effects 
on the radical difference in the outcomes of the appropriability trade-off 
between intra-industrial and inter-industrial spillovers and consequently 
204			
between imitation and knowledge externalities has important implications 
not only for the economic analysis of the knowledge economy but also for 
economic policy. The discovery of the limited exhaustibility of knowledge 
in fact has important consequences for the current regime of IPR and the 
rationale behind the provision of public subsidies to R&D activities funded 
by firms.  
 
It seems necessary to overcome the limits of the homogeneous patent system 
based on the exclusivity of the knowledge property assigned by patents and 
to move towards a differentiated regime of IPR based upon user specific 
patents. 
 
It seems necessary to limit the application of current exclusive patents to 
intra-industrial spillovers. Patents holders retain the right to exclude 
competitors and rivals from the uncontrolled use of their proprietary 
knowledge ready-to-be used in their technology production functions. 
 
The use of proprietary knowledge as an input in the recombinant generation 
of new knowledge should not be impeded. Compulsory licensing should 
apply for all uses of proprietary knowledge to generate new technological 
knowledge and introduce innovations in other industries and other product 
markets. The liability rule can apply effectively in this context. The 
definition of fair royalties can be implemented with the provision of detailed 
information on R&D costs incurred by inventors. Non rival users have the 
right to use proprietary knowledge as an input, provided they inform patent 
holders and pay them a fair royalty. 
 
The systematic and generalized provision of exclusive IPR and automatic 
public subsidies to the generation of all kinds of knowledge, irrespective of 
their actual levels of exhaustibility and appropriability should be 
reconsidered. The heterogeneity of knowledge in terms of varying levels of 
exhaustibility and appropriability should be operationalized to design a 
differentiated set of knowledge policies.  
 
The differentiation of IPR with the introduction of user-specific patents with 
varying terms and levels of exclusivity according to the use of proprietary 
knowledge spilling –whether as an input in the technology production 
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function of competitors in the same product markets, or an input in the 
knowledge generation function of firms active in other product markets- 
should be implemented so as to take into account the twin positive and 
negative effects of knowledge spillovers. The introduction for the very same 
knowledge item of non-exclusive patents for non-competitive uses of the 
proprietary knowledge next to exclusive patents for the proprietary 
knowledge used to compete in the same product market can help fostering 
the pace of technological change and the viability of the knowledge growth 
regime. 
 
The identification of the long term effects of the limited exhaustibility of 
knowledge calls for the implementation of a new framework for knowledge 
policy aimed at increasing the additionality of R&D subsidies so as to foster 
the rates of accumulation of the stock of quasi-public knowledge.  
 
The primary goal of the public subsidies to R&D activities, provided to 
private firms that undertake R&D activities, is no longer the reduction of 
R&D costs to compensate for the missing revenue caused by the limited 
appropriability of knowledge but the increase of the flows of knowledge 
generated in the system and consequently the rates of accumulation of the 
stock of quasi-public knowledge that build up because of joint effect of the 
limited exclusivity and appropriability of knowledge and yields crucial 
pecuniary knowledge externalities.  
 
The strong additionality requirement has positive effects on the system both 
synchronically and diachronically. At each point in time the strong 
additionality requirement acts as a sorting mechanism that select recipients 
that experience fast rates of growth, perform high quality research projects 
that yield large spillovers that help increasing consumer’s surplus in the 
downstream product markets. At the same time the augmented flows of 
R&D activities and knowledge generated increase the rates of accumulation 
of the stock of quasi-public knowledge with long-lasting positive effects in 
terms of knowledge externalities. 
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